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THE PROBLEM OF FAITH AND WORKS IN BUDDHISM

By Alan W. Watts
Joint Editor of the "Wisdom of the East Series"

It is generally assumed that philosophic Buddhism, and especially that form of it expressed in the Pali Canon, is par excellence the way to salvation or illumination by self-help. For in the philosophy attributed to Gautama by the earliest records no place is given to a God or gods who can assist man in the development of spiritual life; the existence of such divine beings is not denied—it is ignored on the ground that no power on earth or in heaven can interfere with another's *karma*. And *karma* (Pali, *Kamma*) is a very inclusive term, for primarily it means "action" or "doing," though in a secondary sense it has come to mean the law of cause and effect—a sense which has been much over-emphasized by Western theosophical interpretations. But it would seem that original Buddhism does not only set aside the possibility of interference with *karma* for the reason that it is impossible to separate a cause from its effect (in the Christian sense of absolution). It also rejects the possibility of divine intervention at the causal end of the process, having no parallel to the Christian concept of Grace. In Christianity there is no human power which can, of its own resources, make for righteousness and salvation, for by reason of original sin it is impossible for man to move upwards without the gift of divine Grace. Buddhism, however, would appear to be a method of lifting oneself up by one's own belt, for according to a famous passage in the *Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta* (v. ii, 27-35), we are advised, "Be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge unto yourselves. Take to yourselves no other refuge."[1]

Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism in the historical development of their philosophy and practice have, for the most part, kept to this principle of absolute self-reliance. If any faith was involved, it was faith in one's own capacity to *work* out one's own salvation, and faith in the ability of Buddhism to supply the necessary method. In

1. An interestingly different train of thought is suggested by this passage if we follow Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids' translation of "yourselves" as "the Self," in the Upanishadic sense of *ātman*.

the Hīnayāna system the method was to exhaust the process of *karma* by perceiving the fundamental unreality of the individual (*atta*) who sets *karma* in motion. The Mahāyāna followed a variation of the same method, but, under the influence of Brahmanic thought, supplemented the idea of individual unreality with the concept of a universal, non-dual Reality similar to the Vedantist idea of Brahman. In one sense this Reality, called by such names as *Tathatā, Śūnyatā,* and *Dharmakāya,* was beyond *karma* (*akarma*), and thus the realization that it alone existed involved deliverance from the toils of *karma,* even though one might continue to live in the "world of birth-and-death." But the radical non-dualism of, say, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* refused even to make any absolute distinction between *karma* and *akarma,* the world of illusion and the principle of Reality, the transient, separate individual and the eternal, undifferentiated "Suchness" (*Tathata*):

> There is no Nirvana except where is Samsara; there is no Samsara except where is Nirvana; for the condition of existence is not of a mutually-exclusive character. Therefore, it is said that all things are non-dual as are Nirvana and Samsara.[2]

The problem of faith and works in Buddhism, as we shall discuss it, will be entirely in terms of the Mahāyāna school. To understand its doctrinal and psychological background we must pay particular attention to the Mahayanist doctrine of non-duality, bearing also in mind that only in Mahāyāna has a way of salvation by faith arisen. Our attention will be directed, however, to doctrinal and psychological aspects of the problem rather than historical, for we cannot say precisely whether the historical development of the way of faith came as a logical result of certain philosophic trends or as an answer to a natural human need. Furthermore, the historical aspect of the problem is complicated by our uncertainty as to the exact age of many of the important sutras involved. But we do know that the way of faith developed quite early in Mahāyāna history, playing an important role in the works of such early patriarchs of the school as Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghoṣa and Vasubandhu.

Mahāyāna philosophy is centered upon two closely related ideas. The first, descended from Vedānta, is that Enlightenment (the Bud-

2. *The Lankavatara Sutra,* translated by D. T. Suzuki (London, 1932), pp. 67 f.

dhist life-goal) consists in an inner realization of non-duality. All those things upon which unenlightened man depends for his happiness are dual, and thus conditioned by their opposites. Life cannot be had without death, pleasure without pain, joy without sorrow, youth without age, or good without evil. We cannot, therefore, depend for our ultimate salvation and security upon any one aspect of a given pair of opposites (*dvandva*), for the two are as essential to each other as back and front are essential to the totality of any object. Thus, while we look to such limited states for our salvation, we are involved in a world of ups and downs which goes under the general name of Saṁsāra, the wheel of birth and death.

From the beginning, the purpose of Buddhism was to find deliverance from this wheel, to discover the state of Nirvāna, differing from these limited states by being eternal, unchanging, and subject to no ups and downs. In the Pali Canon there is no special emphasis upon the non-duality of Nirvāna. It is here something quite outside and different from Saṁsāra—an escape. But the Mahayanist Nirvāna is described in much the same language as the Upanishads describe Brahman, the "One-with-out-a-second." Here Nirvāna is the experience which differs from all these limited experiences by *having no opposite.* The Mahāyāna sutras are at such pains to stress the non-duality of Nirvāna and Enlightenment (*bodhi*) that they do not even allow Nirvāna to be opposed to Saṁsāra, or Enlightenment to be opposed to Ignorance (*avidya*). To the fully enlightened man Saṁsāra *is* Nirvāna; ordinary, everyday experience of the world of opposites is for him transformed into the supreme spiritual experience of deliverance or freedom.

The second important principle of Mahāyāna is the Bodhisattva-ideal. In one sense the Bodhisattva is a lesser Buddha. In another, he is one who, by patient striving throughout countless incarnations, has attained the right to Nirvana, but who postpones final entry into its eternal rest in order to come back into the world and work for the liberation of "all sentient beings." But this rather picturesque view of the Bodhisattva is actually taken from the Hīnayāna standpoint. Nirvāna is still an *escape* from Saṁsāra, even though the Bodhisattva has temporarily renounced it. But from the thoroughgoing Mahāyāna standpoint, the Bodhisattva-ideal is the necessary consequence of a philosophy denying the duality of Nirvāna and Saṁsāra. The Bod-

hisattva has no need to escape from Saṁsāra because he realizes that it is Nirvāna. Thus, to quote the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* again,

> those who, afraid of sufferings rising from the discrimination of birth-and-death, seek for Nirvana, do not know that birth-and-death and Nirvana are not to be separated the one from the other; and, seeing that all things subject to discrimination have no reality, imagine that Nirvana consists in the future annihilation of the senses and their fields. They are not aware . . . of the fact that Nirvana is the Ālayavijñāna (universal mind) . . . (Suzuki's translation, p. 55).

But whatever the view of Nirvāna, the Bodhisattva is the savior, the one who makes vows (*praṇidhāna*) to postpone any final withdrawal from the world until he has seen all living things liberated and raised to the level of his own understanding. Thus, in a number of Buddhist sects, the monk repeats daily the following vows to identify himself with the Bodhisattva-ideal:[3]

> How innumerable sentient beings are, I vow to save them all;
> How inexhaustible our evil passions are, I vow to exterminate them;
> How immeasurable the holy doctrines are, I vow to study them;
> How inaccessible the path of Buddhas is, I vow to attain it.

But it will be noted that, although the monk vows to save all sentient beings, he does not seem to expect anyone to save him. The remainder of his vows are firm affirmations of self-help, and this is in line with the main trend of Mahāyāna philosophy and practice in all but the popular sects, which have put the Bodhisattvas in the position of saviors to be worshipped and relied upon almost exactly as the Christian relies upon the saving power of the Christ. Thus there would seem here to be a huge inconsistency between popular and philosophic Buddhism in the Mahāyāna school. The purpose of this study, however, is to show that this inconsistency is more apparent than real.

In modern China and Japan, by far the most popular form of Buddhism is a way of salvation by faith. It has attained its most radical and interesting development in Japan, but, as we have seen, its origins are in India, far back in the early days of Mahāyāna history. Most students of Buddhism are at a loss to find any true similarity of purpose between these popular cults and the highly self-reliant Buddhism of Gautama and philosophic Mahāyāna. They are generally regarded as a mere degeneration of the creed, a pure concession to unregenerate human nature, which demands supernatural beings to achieve what

3. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism.* Vol. I, p. 323.

men are too lazy and too frightened to achieve for themselves. There is no doubt whatever that there are plenty of lazy and frightened human beings and that an easy method of salvation by faith would naturally appeal to them, especially in the more extreme forms which altogether discount the efficacy of works. But there are other considerations, and from a certain point of view these very extreme forms become full of the deepest interest. Here let it be said that I owe this point of view to Dr. D. T. Suzuki, who has recently made a particularly suggestive study of the philosophy and psychology underlying the Buddhism of faith.[4] But as yet he has made no thorough study of the psychological relations of the way of faith and the way of works.[5] This seems to me a very necessary line of inquiry, because I believe that Western students of Christian background can never really understand the Buddhism of works unless they approach it through the Buddhism of faith, itself so close to Christian belief.

Generally speaking, the Buddhism of faith is founded upon the *Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra* which, so far as we know, was compiled some three hundred years after Gautama's death. The *Sukhāvatīvyūha* tells of one Dharmākara, who, in some immeasurably distant age, made forty-eight vows concerning the liberation of sentient beings. Before making these vows he had devoted himself, for an equally incomprehensible span of time, to innumerable good works, thus acquiring for himself a store of merit sufficient to give abundant aid to the whole world. But he renounced the reward of Highest Attainment due to him for these works, in order that he might preside over the Buddha-land (*buddha-kshetra*) of Sukhāvatī, the Western Paradise, and there watch over the world until all living beings had been born into his Pure Land and thus assured of final illumination. From then on he was known as the Buddha Amitābha (Boundless Light) or Amitāyus (Eternal Life). The Chinese form of the name is O-mi-to-fo, and the Japanese is Amida, by which he is most generally known. In the second part of the sutra it is declared that those who, in complete faith, turn towards Amida and repeat his name will be born after death into his Pure Land.

But it is hard to find in the sutra itself sufficient ground for some

4. See his essay, "The Shin Sect of Buddhism," in the *Eastern Buddhist*, Vol. VII, nos. 3-4 (July, 1939).

5. With the one exception of an essay on the Koan exercise and Nembutsu in *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Vol. II, p. 115. This, however, does not relate to our present theme.

of the later interpretations put upon it, and it was not until the time of the Japanese Amidist, Shinran Shonin, that there evolved a real philosophy of salvation by pure faith. In the sutra, Amida is able to transfer his merit to others because, according to the philosophy represented by the *Avataṁsaka Sūtra,* each single atom contains in itself the whole universe. Therefore, what is done by one individual effects all others; if one man raises himself, he raises at the same time the whole universe. But here Amida is not the sole source of merit as the Christian God is the sole source of goodness. In early Mahāyāna the transference of merit (*pariṇāmana*) is a process that may operate mutually between all beings, and, though the individual is helped by sharing Amida's merit, he is yet able to acquire merit by his own unaided efforts, thus adding his own contribution to a universal store. Thus, in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* the possibility of self-help is by no means excluded, and Amida remains one among many Buddhas; he is not yet raised to the position of sole source of light and life and made the personification par excellence of the final, supreme Reality. His distinction is just that he has made a particularly large contribution to the store of merit in which all may share, and has put his *buddha-kshetra* at the disposal of all who seek it in faith. There is still the difference between *in* faith and *by* faith.

The growth of a cult around Amida was supported by a prevalent view that in this dark cycle (*kali yuga*) of history it is impossible for anyone to attain Enlightenment here on earth, although some progress might be made towards it. Hence the advantage of being born after death into a realm unencumbered by the snares and impurities of earthly life in its dark cycle. And here we are able to note either a rationalization of pure laziness or else the growth of what Christianity calls the conviction of sin, the realization of man's impotence apart from God. There is, moreover, a remarkable parallel to this gradual break from the legalistic, ethical self-reliance of Buddhism in St. Paul's revolt against the Jewish law—and for similar psychological reasons. Thus, in the seventh chapter of his *Epistle to the Romans* St. Paul writes, "Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence."

In just the same way there were Buddhists who found that the rigid

morality of monkhood, with its insistence on the negative precept, served only to aggravate the inner desire for vice. They found themselves in a spiritual impasse, unable to change themselves because the self that had to be changed was also the self that had to do the changing—a feat as impossible as kissing one's own lips. Certainly a deep insight into the psychology of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Avataṁsaka* would have shown a way out of the impasse, a way which many of the self-help school discovered (as will be shown) but which many more missed. The trouble was not in the peculiar difficulties of that psychology, but in the obstacles to be overcome before one could get a glimpse of it. It lay hidden under a vast metaphysical structure which those unendowed with considerable powers of intellect could not penetrate, sifting the grain from the chaff. And even then they might be left with a grain that mere intellect could not appreciate.

It was, therefore, not surprising that Far Eastern Buddhism revolted in two quite distinct ways from a combination of metaphysics and self-discipline that might have been endurable separately, but hardly together. The first revolution was against the metaphysics, and this gave birth to the Chinese school of Ch'an (Japanese, Zen) whose profound intuitive grasp of the essentials of Mahāyāna made its ponderous intellectualism unnecessary. Zen discovered a way of communicating the meaning without the words, and for once the Mahāyāna became, in practice, a psychology and a religion as distinct from a philosophy. But in doctrine and discipline Zen remained essentially a way of self-help. The real revolution against absolute reliance on works and self-discipline came last of all, in Japan. Its leader was Shinran Shonin (1173-1262), a disciple of the great Pure Land (Jodo) teacher, Honen Shonin.

Prior to Shinran, the Pure Land school had been only partially a way of salvation by faith, and even today there are two distinct forms of Pure Land Buddhism in Japan—Jodo-shu and Shin-shu, the former still placing a considerable emphasis on the efficacy of works. Thus Japanese Buddhism is divided into the two great divisions of *jiriki* (self-power) and *tariki* (other-power), the way to Enlightenment by self-reliance and the way by reliance on the Original Vow (*pūrva-praṇidhāna*) of Amida. Under *jiriki* we include the Zen, Shingon, Tendai, Kegon, and Nichiren schools, under *tariki* the Shin, while Jodo comes more or less in between, though with a list to *tariki*.[6]

Shinran began his Buddhist studies at the famous community of Mount Hiyei, near Kyoto, where he attained a rank of some importance. But, in spite of such attainments, he was overwhelmed by the moral problem, recognizing that in his heart he was no better than the merest novice. He was deeply conscious of his humanity and keenly aware that mere self-discipline was wholly inadequate to deliver him from the bondage of *karma*. Trying to work out *karma* with self-discipline was like trying to pick up soap with wet fingers; the harder you grasp, the faster the soap slips away. (The analogy is mine, not Shinran's.) More than any of his predecessors, he felt conscious of the overwhelming bondage of earthly life in its present cycle, and, as a man of feeling rather than intellect, he was finally attracted to the *bhakti-mārga* of Pure Land in the person of Honen Shonin (1133-1212). To Honen he unburdened his mind, and was advised to put his trust in Amida and to abandon the monkish life by marrying. Subsequently, Shin priests have never vowed celibacy. Shinran did not remain in the Pure Land school to which Honen belonged; he founded his own school to preserve the purity of a faith which he felt that ordinary Jodo priests did not fully understand.

There are two principal features of Shinran's religion. The first is his conception of *pariṇāmana*, or merit transference. For him, Amida was the sole and original source of merit. Birth in the Pure Land was no longer a question of directing one's own store of merit towards Amida—as a strictly accurate reading of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* would indicate. Shinran turned the sense of the words, making birth in the Pure Land dependent on Amida's turning his store of merit towards the individual. The second feature arises from the first, and is the doctrine of pure faith. According to Shinran, no possible human merit could ever earn the tremendous right of birth in the Pure Land, and to imagine that so great a blessing could ever be claimed as the just reward for human effort was to him the height of spiritual pride. In the light of Amida's infinite compassion (*karuṇā*), all beings, whether worms, demons, saints or sinners, were equally deserving of love, as if Amida would say, "I have the same feeling for the high as for the low, for the just as for the unjust, for the virtuous as for the depraved,

6. Actually the full name of the Shin sect is Jodo-Shinshu, but I use Shin alone to avoid confusion with Jodo.

for those holding sectarian views and false opinions as for those whose beliefs are good and true." Those who would put faith in Amida must therefore offer themselves to him just as they are, not imagining that the Pure Land can ever be a reward for human virtue. Amida's love is not to be earned; it is as much universal property as the sun, moon, and stars—something to be accepted with humility and gratitude, but never measured against human merit. Thus Shinran said:

> You are not to imagine that you would not be greeted by Amida in his Land because of your sinfulness. As ordinary beings you are endowed with all kinds of evil passions and destined to be sinful. Nor are you to imagine that you are assured of birth in the Pure Land because of your goodness. As long as your jiriki sense is holding you, you would never be welcomed to Amida's true Land of Recompense.[7]

All that is necessary is to give up forever any idea of attaining merit by one's own power, and then to have faith that one is accepted by the compassion of Amida from the very beginning, no matter what one's moral condition. One must even give up the idea that faith itself is achieved by self-power, for faith, too, is Amida's gift. Thus man as man becomes spiritually passive and, by Amida's grace, lets the eternal love flow into him and save him just as he is, symbolizing his faith by repeating the *nembutsu*, the formula *Namu Admida Butsu* (Hail, Amida the Buddha!). According to the *Anjin-ketsujo-sho*,

> To understand the Vow means to understand the Name, and to understand the Name is to understand that when Amida, by bringing to maturity his Vow and Virtue (or Deed) in the stead of all beings, effected their rebirth *even prior to their actual attainment*[8] (italics mine).

The fact that Amida himself is the sole source of grace is further stressed in this passage quoted from Shinran in the *Tannisho* (ch. VIII):

> The Nembutsu is non-practice and non-goodness for its devotee. It is non-practice because he does not practice it at his own discretion, and it is non-goodness because he does not create it at his own discretion. All is through Amida's power alone, not through our own power, which is in vain.[9]

At first sight it would seem that the efficacy of Shin depends upon certain supernatural sanctions of a kind that ordinary *jiriki* Buddhists

7. Suzuki, *Eastern Buddhist*, VII, p. 253.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 249 f. The *Anjin* is a work by an unknown author, see p. 248 n.
9. *The Tannisho*, translated by Ryukyo Fujimoto (Kyoto, 1932), p. 10.

would have great difficulty in believing. Such difficulties will always be experienced while Shin is studied in terms of its theology, for to anyone but a Christian it would seem the merest wishful thinking. For it amounts to this: that it is possible to become virtually a Buddha by pure faith. According to Suzuki,

> being born in Amida's Land means no more than attaining enlightenment—the two terms are entirely synonymous. The ultimate end of the Shin life is enlightenment and not salvation.[10]

Thus Shin devotees refer to their dead as *Mi hotoke*, or "Honorable Buddhas." But as soon as we examine the *psychology* of Shin as distinct from its *theology*, it becomes possible to relate it to the deepest experiences of Mahāyāna as expressed, for instance, in the *Laṅkāvatāra* and in some of the writings of Zen teachers, notably the *Lin-chi-lu* (Japanese, *Rinzai-roku*). For we have to ask not what Shin believes, but what are the causes and results of that belief in terms of inner feeling, of those inner spiritual experiences which words alone can never fully communicate.

For example, let us take the case of any person acutely aware of his shortcomings, his fears, desires and passions, his lack of insight, and of any sense of union or harmony with the life of the universe—in fact, just such a man as Shinran. Then someone tells him that, if only he will open his eyes and see it, he is a Buddha (is saved by Amida) just as he is, and that any attempt to make himself into a Buddha by his own ingenuity is rank spiritual pride. By adopting *jiriki* he is ignoring what is offered to him from the very beginning by the laws of the universe, and is trying to manufacture it for himself, so that he can take the credit for having earned it. When we say that a man is a Buddha just as he is, what does this mean in terms of psychology? It means that he is divine or *fundamentally acceptable* just as he is, whether saint or sinner, sage or fool. In Amidist language we would say that he is accepted for birth in the Pure Land by Amida's compassion, which is "no respecter of persons"—in other words, that man is given the sense of freedom to be what he is at this and any moment, free to be both the highest and the lowest that is in him. This results

10. Suzuki, *Eastern Buddhist*, VII, p. 264. By "salvation" Suzuki means simply birth into Amida's Paradise after death, using the word in its eschatological rather than mystical sense. In the latter sense, salvation would be almost synonymous with enlightenment.

at once in a great relaxation of psychic tension. All self-powered striving and contriving (*hakarai*) is set aside in the realization that Buddhahood can neither be attained nor gotten rid of because it alone *is*. For, in Mahayanist non-dualism, the Buddha principle, *Tathatā*, has no opposite and is the only Reality. And while the *Anjin* says that Amida effected our rebirth into the Pure Land "even prior to actual attainment," the *Laṅkāvatāra* says that, if they only realized it, all beings are in Nirvāna from the very beginning. Here are two doctrines, but one psychological experience.

In practical terms this experience is one of exhilarating spiritual freedom, amounting almost to the sanctification of ordinary, everyday life. For, when man feels free to be all of himself, there is a magic in every littlest act and thought. Thus the Zen poet, Hokoji, says:

> How wondrous strange and how miraculous, this—
> I draw water and I carry fuel.

One cannot resist quoting Herbert from the Christian standpoint:

> All things of Thee partake;
> Nothing can be so mean
> But with this tincture "For Thy Sake"
> Shall not grow bright and clean.
>
> A servant with this clause
> Makes drudgery divine;
> Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws
> Makes that and the action fine. . . .
>
> This is the famous stone
> That turneth all to gold,
> For that which God doth touch and own
> Can not for less be told.

This experience may be clarified and related more closely to the *jiriki* way by further consideration of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the writings of certain Zen teachers. It will now be clear that Shinran's faith has a right to be considered as philosophic Mahāyāna expressed in rather colorful, symbolic imagery, even though it appears to be quite dualistic in conception. Philosophic Mahāyāna would not allow the dualism of self and other, man and Amida; but, if it is followed far enough, Shin arrives in experience at what Mahāyāna states in philosophy—although complete non-duality is actually beyond philosophic description. Fur-

thermore, the *Laṅkāvatāra* insists that Saṁsāra, the world of life and death, *is* Nirvāna, and Saṁsāra just as it is, with all its pain and suffering. So, too, Shinran insists that we are saved by Amida just as we are, with all our imperfections. In other words, ordinary men are Buddhas just as they are, and, according to Hui-neng, of the Zen school, those whom we call Buddhas are simply those who understand this truth. Thus it is often remarked in Zen literature that one's "ordinary thoughts" or "everyday mind" is Enlightenment (*satori*). I quote a peculiarly suggestive passage from the *Rinzai-roku:*

> You must not be artful. Be your ordinary self . . . . *You yourself as you are—that is Buddha Dharma.* I stand or I sit; I array myself or I eat; I sleep when I am fatigued. The ignoramus will deride me but the wise man will understand.[11]

And further on the text states,

> Wherefore it is said that the everyday mind is the true law.

Suzuki translates another passage from this text to the same effect; here Rinzai says:

> The truly religious man has nothing to do but go on with his life as he finds it in the various circumstances of this worldly existence. He rises quietly in the morning, puts on his dress and goes out to his work. When he wants to walk, he walks; when he wants to sit, he sits. He has no hankering after Buddhahood, not the remotest thought of it. How is this possible? A wise man of old days says, If you strive after Buddhahood by any conscious contrivances, your Buddha is indeed the source of eternal transmigration.[12]

This kind of writing is very easily misunderstood, for one would naturally ask, "If ordinary life is Nirvana and ordinary thoughts are Enlightenment, whatever is Buddhism about, and what can it possibly teach us, other than to go on living exactly as we have lived before?" Before trying to answer this, we must quote two *mondo*, or Zen dialogues. The first is from the *Mu-mon-kwan* (xix):

> Joshu asked Nansen, "What is the Tao?" "Usual life," answered Nansen, "is the very Tao." "How can we accord with it?" "If you *try* to accord with it, you will get away from it."[13]

11. I am much indebted to the Rev. Sokei-an Sasaki, Vice-Abbot of Mamman-ji, for allowing me to consult his unfinished translation of the *Rinzai-roku*, which is otherwise unavailable in English.

12. *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, II, p. 260.

13. I follow Sohaku Ogata's translation.

This looks very much like pure *tariki* psychology. Then Suzuki gives the following from Bokuju (Mu-chou):

> A monk asked him, "We have to dress and eat every day, and how can we escape from all that?" Bokuju replied, "We dress, we eat." "I do not understand." "If you don't understand, put on your dress and eat your food."[14]

Clearly the monk's question involves much more than mere dressing and eating, which stands for life in Saṁsāra as a whole—"the trivial round, the common task."

Applying philosophy to this more direct language, we find that the Zen teachers are demonstrating that Saṁsāra, just as it is, is Nirvāna, and that man, just as he is, is Buddha. Zen does not say so as a rule, because the terms, Nirvāna and Buddha, are concepts which do not move the soul deeply and lead easily to mere intellectualism. Zen wants us to *feel* non-duality, not just to think it, and therefore when we say, "Nirvāna is Saṁsāra," we are joining two things together that were never in need of being joined. For both Zen and Shin aim, in different ways, to effect a psychological or spiritual state that moves the whole being, not the head alone. They are trying to set us free within ourselves, and to make us at home with ourselves and with the universe in which we live. This freedom is known when we give up "contriving" and accept ourselves as we are, but it does not seem to me that the experience can be effective unless there has first been a state of contriving and struggle. In Zen this is self-discipline; in Shin it is coming to an acute awareness of one's insufficiency through a previous attempt at self-discipline. It is difficult to see how the Shin experience could be fully appreciated unless, like Shinran, one had first tried the *jiriki* way. The danger of continuing in the *jiriki* way is that one may so easily become a victim of spiritual pride, expecting to *make* oneself into a Buddha; the danger of the *tariki* way is that the experience may come so easily that its true meaning is unseen and its force unfelt.

Spiritual freedom, however, involves much more than "go on living exactly as you have lived before." It involves a particular kind of joyousness, or what the Buddhists term bliss (*ānanda*). It is the discovery that to accord with the universe, to express the Tao, one has

14. *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, I, p. 12.

but to live, and when this is fully understood it becomes possible to live one's life with a peculiar zest and abandon. There are no longer any obstacles to thinking and feeling; you may let your mind go in whatever direction it pleases, for all possible directions are acceptable, and you can feel free to abandon yourself to any of them. Nowhere is there any possibility of escape from the principle of non-duality, for "you yourself as you are—that is Buddha Dharma." In this state there can be no spiritual pride, for union or identity with the Buddha principle is not something achieved by man; it is achieved for him from the beginning of time, just as the sun has been set on high to give him light and life.

Yet, in the life of the spirit, it is much harder to receive than to give; it is often such a blow to human pride to have to accept from Amida, God, or life what it would be so much more distinctive to achieve for oneself. In Shin terms, we should say that the meaning of freedom is that you can think any kind of thought, be any kind of person, and do any kind of thing without ever being able to depart from Amida's all-embracing love and generosity. You are free to do as you like, and also as you don't like, to be free and to be bound, to be a sage and to be a fool. Nowhere are there any obstructions to spiritual activity. At the same time, there is an intense awareness of the joy of that activity; one feels impelled to exercise it and feel the ecstasy of its abandon, much as we imagine a bird must feel high up in space, free to soar up, to swoop down, to fly north, south, east, or west, to circle, climb, tumble, or hover. For "the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh nor whither it goeth. Even so is everyone that is born of the spirit." Or, in the more matter-of-fact language of a Zen teacher,

> There are no by-roads, no cross-roads here. All the year round the hills are fresh and green; east or west, in whichever direction, you may have a fine walk.[15]

There remains the moral problem. To a superficial understanding the freedom of non-duality seems to be an invitation to libertinism of the most flagrant kind. In terms of philosophy, the Mahāyāna sutras state very frankly that the principle of non-duality is beyond good

15. Yeh-hsien. Suzuki, *The Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk* (Kyoto, 1934), p. 83.

and evil, and that its attainment has no essential connection with morality. And morality here includes all kinds of works, both social and spiritual. Certainly the sutras speak of *sila*, or morality, as one of the necessary stages, but sometimes it seems as if *sila* were advocated simply as a safeguard against misuse of the enormous, amoral power of supreme knowledge. Thus the *Laṅkāvatāra* says:

> In ultimate reality there is neither gradation nor continuous succession; [only] the truth of absolute solitude (*viviktadharma*) is taught here in which the discrimination of all the images is quieted . . . . But [from the absolute point of view] the tenth stage is the first, and the first is the eighth; and the ninth is the seventh, and the seventh is the eighth . . . what gradation is there where imagelessness prevails? (Suzuki's translation, p. 186).

In yet another passage we read,

> Some day each and every one will be influenced by the wisdom and love of the Tathāgatas of Transformation to lay up a stock of merit and ascend the stages. But, if they only realized it, they are already in the Tathāgata's Nirvana for, in Noble Wisdom, all things are in Nirvana from the beginning.

An even stronger statement of the philosophy will be found in the *Saptasatikaprajñāpāramitā Sūtra:*

> O Sāriputra, to commit the offences is to achieve the inconceivables, to achieve the inconceivables is to produce Reality. And Reality is non-dual. Those beings endowed with the inconceivables can go neither to the heavens, nor to the evil paths, nor to Nirvāna. Those who commit the offences are not bound for the hells. Both the offences and the inconceivables are of Reality, and Reality is by nature non-dual . . . . In the real Dharmadhātu (realm of the Law) there is nothing good or bad, nothing high or low, nothing prior or posterior . . . . Bodhi (Enlightenment) is the five offences and the five offences are Bodhi . . . . If there is one who regards Bodhi as something attainable, something in which discipline is possible, that one commits self-arrogance.[16]

Here, besides an unequivocal statement of non-duality, there is again an example of *tariki* psychology, speaking of the arrogance of striving to attain Bodhi by discipline.

Mahāyāna does not disguise the fact that its wisdom is dangerous and we know that monks of the *jiriki* schools are subjected to rigid disciplines just to pre-condition them against abuse of knowledge,

16. *Saptasatika*, pp. 232-34. Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Vol. II, pp. 251-252 n.

which is unfortunately a fairly frequent occurrence. But it would seem that such abuse is only possible when the experience of freedom is feebly appreciated or improperly understood. Oddly enough, although the experience itself and the thing experienced (*Tathatā*) is non-dual and beyond good and evil, the result of a truly deep inexperience is morality. Shinran speaks very strongly against those who make use of Amida's vow and then go on behaving as immorally as ever. He likens them to those who, because they have found an antidote to a poison, just go on taking it. But this is rather a negative way of looking at the problem. From the positive standpoint, Shin would say that Amida's compassion for us and all other beings, when realized, calls out a corresponding compassion in ourselves. In terms of philosophic Mahāyāna we should say that, having understood that we and all creatures are Buddhas, we therefore treat them with the reverence due to the Buddha principle.

A second factor which makes for morality is the gratitude felt for the freedom to be all of oneself, a gratitude so deep that men will often renounce some of that freedom as a thank-offering. Obviously there is more opportunity for this feeling of gratitude to grow when the ultimate Reality is personalized in the form of Amida. From the philosophic standpoint there is no real ground for gratitude, because in non-duality there is neither giver nor receiver. Hence the danger of a merely philosophic understanding. But from the emotional standpoint there appears to be every reason for gratitude. In discovering freedom to be all of oneself one has a similar experience to the Christian forgiveness of sins; however black your soul, it is not outside the love of God which is as omnipresent as God Himself, and in this connection it is worth citing a remarkable passage from the work of a Catholic theologian:[17]

> For we are never really outside of God nor He outside of us. He is more with us than we are with ourselves. The soul is less intimately with the body, than He is both in our bodies and souls. He as it were flows into us, or we are in Him as the fish in the sea. We use God, if we may dare to say so, whenever we make an act of our will, and when we proceed to execute a purpose. He has not merely given us clearness of head, tenderness of heart, and strength of limb, as gifts which we may use independently of Him when once He has conferred them upon us. *But He distinctly permits and actually*

17. F. W. Faber, *The Creator and the Creature* (Baltimore, 1853), p. 65.

concurs with every use of them in thinking, loving or acting. This influx and concourse of God as theologians style it, ought to give us all our lives long the sensation of being in an awful sanctuary, where every sight and sound is one of worship. *It gives a peculiar and terrific character to acts of sin* . . . . Everything is penetrated with God, while His inexpressible purity is all untainted, and His adorable simplicity unmingled with that which He so intimately pervades, enlightens, animates and sustains. Our commonest actions, our lightest recreations, the freedoms in which we most unbend—all these things take place and are transacted, not so much on the earth and in the air, as in the bosom of the omnipresent God. [Italics mine.]

There are important points in which Faber's words diverge from Mahāyāna philosophy, for, in Christianity, God is essentially Other. But, in so far as doctrine is a symbol of inner experience, I can see no important difference between the inner feeling suggested by Faber's words and the inner feeling of Mahāyāna Buddhism, especially in the Amidist cults. Thus the experience of freedom or Enlightenment is like discovering an immeasurably precious jewel in one's littlest acts and lowest thoughts. One discovers it where all jewels are first found —in the depths of the earth, or lying in the mud. Those who appreciate jewels do not leave them there; they lift them up from the depths, polish them, place them on velvet or set them in gold. This polishing and adornment is our symbol of morality, the expression of our joy and gratitude in realizing that

> This very earth is the Lotus Land of Purity,
> And this very body is the body of Buddha.[18]

It is here interesting to note that considerable importance is given to worship in the Zen school which, philosophically, is the most iconoclastic form of Buddhism. Perhaps there is a clue to the apparent inconsistency of worship and non-duality in the following incident from the *Hekigan-shu:*

> Hwang-pa (Japanese, Obaku) stated, "I simply worship Buddha. I ask Buddha for nothing. I ask Dharma for nothing. I ask Saṅgha for nothing." Someone then said, "You ask Buddha for nothing. You ask Dharma for nothing. You ask Saṅgha for nothing. What, then, is the use of your worship?" At which remark, Hwang-pa gave him a slap on the face![19]

18. From the *Song of Meditation* by Hakuin (1683-1768), one of the most famous Japanese Zen teachers.

19. I follow the version of Kaiten Nukariya. Cf. his *Religion of the Samurai*, p. 96. Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha (the Buddha, the Law and the Order of monks) are the three refuges (*tri-sarana*) taken by all Buddhists.

The Buddhist feeling of worship and gratitude is most notably expressed, however, in the Bodhisattva-ideal, based on a profound intuition of the basic unity of all creatures and things. Those who, having attained Enlightenment, do not become Bodhisattvas, helpers of the world, are termed *pratyeka-buddhas*, which, in Mahāyāna philosophy, is almost a term of abuse. They are not willing to share their experience of freedom with their other selves, and, strictly speaking, Enlightenment is no Enlightenment unless it is shared and circulated. It is no one's property, and those who try to possess it for themselves do not understand it. Service, morality, and gratitude are our response *as men* for a gift to which we cannot respond *as Buddhas*. The Buddha-principle is beyond morality, but not so the human principle. From the standpoint of non-duality, these two principles are one; yet what is so often overlooked in the study of Mahāyāna is that from the *same* standpoint they are two. For non-duality excludes nothing; it contains both unity and diversity, one and many, identity and separation. Japanese Buddhism expresses this in the formula *byodo soku shabetsu, shabetsu soku byodo*—unity in diversity and diversity in unity. For this reason, philosophically, morally and spiritually, Buddhism is called the middle way.

SOME INDIAN TEXTS DEALING WITH THE SUPERNATURAL

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I present here a collection of Wintu Indian texts dealing with what I have called the supernatural.[1] I am not prepared to defend this term, but I use it for the sake of convenience, to cover a field of experience which would be rejected in accordance with the rigid scientific standards of our times and culture. I have tried to discover the attitude of the Wintu toward the supernatural through an analysis of the language which is used in speaking of and to the supernatural. This is possible because, in the Wintu language, the specific verbal forms which a speaker uses reveal his attitude toward the subject of which he speaks.

The primary distinction which the Wintu speaker makes is that between the category of experience and the category of belief;[2] between that which is or can be known, and that which is beyond all sensory, intellectual or volitional experience. A secondary group of distinctions is made within the category of experience. Here the speaker gives meticulously the source of his knowledge: vision, general bodily sensation, inference from circumstantial evidence, knowledge based on logical inference, and hearsay. Thus, through a study of the verbal phrase of the Wintu we can discover whether they can experience the supernatural and, if so, what form this experience takes.

In all my recorded material, I find the Wintu speaker using the category of experience when speaking of the supernatural. This is distinct from his attitude toward natural law or natural necessity; to

1. The texts on which this study is based come from the Wintu Indians of North Central California. They were recorded in July 1938, under the auspices of Claremont Colleges, Claremont, California. My informant was Sadie Marsh, a full-blood Wintu of about fifty. For a full description of the Wintu the reader is referred to Cora DuBois, *Wintu Ethnography*, University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, vol xxxvi, no. 1. Throughout this paper, I simplify the phonetics of the Wintu language.

2. For an exposition and analysis of this aspect of the Wintu verbal phrase see my paper on "Conceptual Implications of an Indian Language," in *Philosophy of Science*, vol. v, no. 1. In that paper I opposed the category of belief to the category of experience and I continue this opposition in the present study.

this he refers only by implication rather than explicitly, and also impersonally, as an outsider who does not co-operate in its processes, who can neither understand nor judge it, nor know it in any sensual way. The supernatural beings, on the other hand, are personal, and are within personal experience. Even the undefined Supreme Being, *olelbes*,[3] he-who-is-above, who serves chiefly as an outlet for the vague religious feeling of the Wintu and has no specific function, is endowed with sensations: "He-who-is-the-above sees you, looking down," says Ida Fan in text IV. She ascribes activity to this being: "It is he who planted you below." Spirits are also endowed with sensations and activity. Ida Fan's spirit-power says to the Wintu: "We see you transformed into something strange"; and again, "We spirits live wandering to the north. . . ." In text III, *qorit's* spirit-power says, "When I was coming here, running toward this place. . . ." In a dreamsong which I recorded in 1929,[4] the spirit of a dead friend of my informant sings:

Down west, down west we dance
We spirits dance,
We spirits weeping dance.

The Wintu enters into a relation with the supernatural beings, as he cannot with impersonal forces. He addresses them in prayer. He controls them in the form of spirit-powers[5] who are at the command of shamans. He speaks of feeling them; I have no instance where a supernatural being is referred to as something seen, but the suffix *-nte* of general sensation occurs often.[6] Furthermore, the Wintu thinks about supernatural beings, makes inferences about them, and comes to conclusions about them. Natural necessity, on the other hand, is something of which the Wintu has no formulated idea. He does not think of it or make inferences about it, or speak of it. He has no words for concepts such as fate, obligation, or necessity.

3. For a discussion of *olelbes*, see Cora DuBois, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 73; also references to Pater W. Schmidt and Jeremiah Curtin given in footnotes to p. 72. See also C. DuBois and D. Demetracopoulou, *Wintu Myths*, *UCPAAE*, vol. XXVIII, p. 287.

4. D. Demetracopoulou, "Wintu Songs," *Anthropos*, vol. XXX, p. 487.

5. The term for spirit-power is a passive participle, which might be rendered as *the shamanistically controlled.*

6. In one of the Wintu myths, when Coyote speaks of the evil spirit which killed his wife, he suffixes *-nte, I sense*, to all his statements. I have not included this in my free translation of the myth, which is given in: D. Demetracopoulou and C. DuBois, "A Study of Wintu Mythology," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, vol. XLV, p. 429.

It is hard to tell from my limited material what comprises the supernatural. The prayer which I give below, in text 1, is addressed to *olelbes* at first. Later, however, *qoltcululi* addresses trees, deer, salmon. Sometimes he does this generically, addressing the essence of these things, so to speak; as, for example, when he says to the deer: "You whose nature it is to be eaten." At other times he uses suffixes of particularization, as when he is addressing the salmon, and the deer once again. It may be inferred that this implies a belief in the immanence of the supernatural in the natural; or, perhaps, that it shows that the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is arbitrary, even fallacious. But the evidence at our disposal is too slight for valid conclusion.

Direct relation with the supernatural is apparently mystical in character, and thus not to be described in terms of direct experience. *qorit* speaks of it only in terms of its results. His account of how he became a shaman is enlightening. He speaks of this occasion with the aid of the suffix *-re,* which implies, "I infer from circumstantial evidence." Only of one thing he speaks as a witness, and that is the *result* of the supernatural experience: "I received-command-of(over)-a-spirit-power."[7] In this account, *qorit* uses the term *maqa,* which means *because of logical necessity, for this reason*[8] four times in the span of a very short text. This is of particular interest as showing on what uncertain ground *qorit* feels that he is treading; because the *maqa* is used very rarely by the Wintu, as it is enough, ordinarily, merely to indicate the inferential or deductive nature of knowledge, without pointing to the grounds on the basis of which the deduction is made. In fact, the rest of my textual material, which is approximately two hundred times the extent of this text, contains, I think, not more than ten instances of the use of *maqa.*

For purposes of comparison with supernatural experience, I recorded some of the dreams of Sadie Marsh, my informant. The dreams are told in terms of direct sensation, even when they deal with

7. Both times when this statement occurs, the direct knowledge implied is to be considered as applying only to this, and not necessarily to what is stated in the rest of the sentence.

8. There is another term, *iles,* which means *because of natural necessity.* The *iles* implies absolute certainty in contrast to *maqa,* which is colored with the uncertainly of purely personal deduction. I have translated the *maqa* variously, according to the context; (1) "I must have done so, *as* . . ."; (2) "I must have done so, *for the reason that* . . ."; (3) "*I deduce this logically from the fact that* . . ."; (4) "*For this reason, that* . . ."

the dead. I quote two short dreams, both of which are told with the aid of the suffix of visual experience:

When my son is ill, I always dream of his grandmother, standing against the horizon. She has white wings at both sides. (The grandmother has been dead for many years.)

I dreamed a few nights ago that Harry was shooting at me with a rifle, chasing me around. I was frightened and I woke up. (Harry is Sadie's husband.)

From a myth told by Syke Mitchell, in 1929, comes the following:

He slept. And he saw in the north rattling-tips of pine trees come gliding along. They fell to the west of where he sat. [Later on, the dreamer recounts his dream] Yes, I did dream something significant, I judge. Rattling-tips of pine trees fell, I saw, on the west side of me.[9]

When the shaman is in a trance, he may speak generally about the world, either foretelling events, or merely describing events with clairvoyance. To speak thus is known in Wintu as *yupa*. I have rendered this word somewhat inadequately as *to speak prophetically*. This the Wintu distinguishes from the diagnostic speech of the shaman. In both the cases of prophetic speech which I recorded, the spirit is conceived of as speaking directly through the mouth of the shaman. The verbal phrases are couched in terms of direct and specific experience, usually vision, except when the context requires suffixes of hearsay, inference, or general sensation, as it would in the speech of an ordinary individual. When, on the other hand, the shaman makes a diagnosis, or speaks about the subject in hand, it is he who describes what the spirit-power communicates to him through his general sensation. As Sadie explained, "His spirit makes him feel all this." Both *sunusa*, in text v, and *qorit*, in text iii, use the *-nte* of non-visual or general sensation. Even when he foretells the death, *sunusa* says, by means of morphological implication, "I feel that she will go onward." Under general sensation, thought is probably included. There is apparently an equation between thought and feeling in the Wintu language, as there is in our own vernacular. Sadie Marsh once asked me, "According-to-your-feeling, is-it-right-do-you-feel to-steal?" So in our own everyday speech, "I think it would be wrong," and "I feel it would be wrong," are often equivalent in meaning.

9. "A Study of Wintu Mythology," p. 486. As this is a free translation, I have not given the English rendering of the source-of-information suffixes.

My textual material dealing with the supernatural is unfortunately very limited. It consists of a prayer, a short quoted account of how a shaman received command of his first spirit-power, and three accounts of "doctoring." It was dictated to me by Sadie Marsh. She reproduces the speech of others; but her memory has been proved to be extraordinarily accurate,[10] and is therefore to be trusted.

TEXTS

I. QOLTCULULI'S PRAYER

Long ago, when I was small, I used to listen to my grandfather when he prayed to *olelbes*. Early in the morning he got up and washed his face in water. Then after he had washed his face, he prayed, he himself praying for himself.

O *olelbes*, look down on me
I wash my face in water, for you, seeking to remain in health.
I am advancing in old age; I am not capable of anything any more.
You whose nature it is to be eaten,[11] you dwell high in the west, on the mountains, high in the east, high in the north, high in the south;
You, salmon, you go about in the water.
Yet I cannot go up to the mountains in the west to you, deer;
I cannot kill you and bring you home.
Neither can I go east down the slope to fetch you, salmon.
When a man is so advanced in age, he is not in full vigor.

If you are rock, look at me: I am advancing in old age.
If you are tree, look at me; I am advancing in old age.
If you are water, look at me; I am advancing in old age.

Acorns, I can never climb up to you again.
You, water, I can never dip you up and fetch you home again. My legs are advancing in weakness.
Sugar-pine, you sit there; I can never climb you.
In my northward arm,[12] in my southward arm, I am advancing in weakness.

10. See Demetracopoulou and DuBois, *A Study of Wintu Mythology*, where versions of tales narrated by Sadie Marsh a year apart have been minutely compared, and show almost word-perfect similarity. In 1938, when I was making an effort to understand the *maqa* of logical necessity, Sadie offered to tell me a story in which this word occurred, by way of illustration. The narrative she told was approximately thirteen hundred words in translation, and had been recounted to her by her mother who had been dead for over ten years; yet Sadie remembered that her mother had used the word *maqa* in it once. Several instances of her amazing memory occurred during the course of my association with her.

11. Ceremonial circumlocution for deer.

12. Ceremonial phrasing.

You who are wood, you wood, I cannot carry you home on my shoulder. For I am falling back into my cradle. This is what my ancestors told me yesterday, they who have gone, long ago.
May my children fare likewise!

II. QORIT[13] RECEIVES COMMAND OF A NORTHWESTERN SPIRIT-POWER

qorit told Harry and me how he received command of a spirit power:

When I sorrowed for my son, through that I received command of a spirit power. North uphill, I think, I travelled to Mount Shasta, seen by no one; I must have done so, as it was my intention to act thus. Two weeks I travelled around Mount Shasta, seen by no one. I sang, I sang, I remained a number of days, I reason. Then, I reason, I went west downhill to the ocean. And there I remained, I reason, one summer: I must have done so for the reason that I was receiving command of a spirit power. Then I recollected myself and came (I know this through direct sensual evidence) homeward.

I received command of a spirit power when I was on the west coast. I deduce this from the fact that I command a spirit power which comes from over there. But I did not know [did not recognize] him whom I command; for this reason, that I must have got a *yoh*[14] for my spirit power.

Though all was well with me when I returned, now I do not feel well. The beings who dwell there came here and took me over there. I reason that it is they who are killing me now.[15] A doctor, I reason, is never very full of health.

III. QORIT DOCTORS MRS. FAN

qorit doctored Mrs. Fan's eyes last year. Harry was the interpreter. He doctored in the evening after Harry and I had arrived. He worked on her, on Mrs. Fan. Then he sent me after fern; and I went off to fetch the fern into which he was to spew his spittle, and the supernatural arrows. Then he smoked tobacco; he smoked tobacco for a little while and then he fell into a trance.

So now he sat singing for a while; he sat speaking prophetically. "Look upon me," he said. "In my desire to be in health, I smoke a pipe in your company. Exactly as I am, may I continue in health,"

13. Cora DuBois, in *Wintu Ethnography*, has written about this shaman under his "White" name of Charlie Klutchie.

14. The *yoh*, or, as they are commonly called, *nomyoh* (*yoh* of the west) are the potent spirits of the Indians of the northwest coast of California, who turned themselves at will into beasts. Children were warned: "Never say *nomyoh* at night; say west-coast-beings instead." *yoh*-old-man was a term applied to a great doctor.

15. *qorit* recounted this a few months before his death.

thus the interpreter. I understood nothing of his own speaking, as he spoke in the language of the people of the northwest.[16]

Then he finished commanding this spirit, and addressed the spirit of his son.[17] He sang for a very short time and then he said, "I want to drink the good drink,[18] that which we used to drink long ago." Then he who was in the doctor's command said, "My parent[19] is advancing in weakness, on his northward side, on his southward side.[20] Why is it that you show no consideration for him? Bring me red water that I may drink." So now he drank. And again he chanted, for a long time. "Of the people I can attend to[21] no one: because I am a person who has not been perfected.[22] I who am a little child,[23] how could I know anything? Thus when people approach my flat,[24] how can I attend to them? For I am a child, personified body-dirt.[25] I never realized that this was my destination; for this, I gather, has been my destination.[26]

So, people, say not in your thoughts, "When we approach that flat, when he rubs us with spittle, we shall be healed." For my parent is advancing in weakness, he can give no support to anyone. She who was his supporter[27] has recently relinquished her hold. And my parent, left alone, is weak of heart, his breathing advances in weakness. This counsel I constantly give to my parent: "When you go north, when you go south, do not drink too much blood-water."[28] Thus I say to him. Nevertheless, my parent gives me no heed. And only recently he

16. See text II.

17. Sadie could tell of the change, because of the change in language.

18. Satcaqmem: red-rock water.

19. *My (alienable) elder* or *parent*, instead of the usual: *my (inalienable) father;* a shamanistic periphrasis.

20. Ceremonial phrasing.

21. Shamanistic custom substitutes *attend, see* for *help;* the form of the verb used here is obsolete.

22. It is not clear whether this refers to *qorit* or to his son. *qorit* himself never attended a shamanistic school; he was a self-made shaman. He did not receive command of his spirit in the conventional way.

23. *qorit's* son was about ten years old when he died.

24. Circumlocution for *come to me for help.*

25. Ceremonial speech is given to self-belittling and understatement.

26. I.e., to become a spirit power. The term destination here is not to be taken as the equivalent of *fate.* The *-weres* of personal intention is used, not the *-les* of impersonal necessity, of the inescapable future. Perhaps he implies that his father, through his excessive mourning, deliberately made him into a spirit power.

27. Circumlocution for *wife. qorit's* wife had died a few months previous to this doctoring session.

28. Intoxicating liquor.

went here, a little distance to the north, he mingled with the people of the mountain-shore,[29] he drank a very little,[30] I have sensed. For that reason, he grows in weakness, his breathing runs along short of stature.[31]

When I was coming here, running toward this place a short distance from the west, something whispered into my northward ear. Something significant it was telling me. And I was frightened. I cannot give you information; because I am an unperfected person, because I am still a child. For I do not know quite everything. And so what am I here to achieve?"

Thus he said, after he had finished singing. And now Mrs. Fan put a dollar and a half into his hand as payment. "Here, by means of this I want to be rubbed with spittle, as I ail in my eyes, I can see nothing. I am being done to death by someone, I think. So, wishing to be healed, I come to you to be doctored. I consider that it is a doctor, perhaps, who is killing me. If so, can you blow the evil force away? Or if you find that which is killing me, send it back to him who sent it," thus she said in my hearing.

And so, "Sit here in front of me," he said to her. And now he took her head in his hands, and sat looking at her a long time. He sat looking at her for some time and then said, "Yes," he said. "It is your own doing.[32] When you were pubescent, you kept eating, I sense.[33] Furthermore, when you brought your child into being,[34] you ate. In the old days, however, people did not behave like this, when they reached puberty, or when they brought children into being," he said. "This is your own doing, your desire to eat your fill of food. If you had approached me earlier, I might have done something. Now you have fallen too deep into illness. Neither did the doctoring people, in the old days, say, 'I promise a complete cure.' On this understanding let me doctor you."

And now he took hold of her and sucked her eyes. Then he said to her, "Never will you be able to see with those which have the nature

29. At Yreka, which is at the foot of Mt. Shasta.
30. Ceremonial understatement.
31. His days are numbered; shamanistic idiom.
32. He was unusually harsh with her because he was offended at the smallness of her offering. The ordinary payment is five dollars.
33. It is here that Sadie commented, "His spirit makes him feel all this."
34. Shamanistic idiom.

of being seen in front.[35] It is said that eyes cannot be doctored. On your eyeballs there is something like a thin cover." So after he had sucked for some time, he was finished.

And that fall *qorit* died.

IV. PROPHETIC SPEECH OF THE SHAMAN IDA FAN

The shaman, in command of her spirit power, spoke prophetically:

You who call yourselves Wintu, when you look west toward the mountains, look not at one another with glowering eyes. The world is growing desolate. The people who were here but a few days ago, they who had a Wintu body-smell, when they went about to the north, when they went about to the south, all was well. But now you are not like Wintu; we see you transformed into something strange when, coming up behind you, we see you. Do not say to yourselves, "I am a true Wintu." You have been transformed into something queer. As for us, we live wandering to the north,[36] wandering to the south. When we look back and see our children, we say, "*hehe*, our children arouse compassion, speaking as they do in a strange tongue."

The world is approaching its end. And you people here live drifting to the north,[36] drifting to the south. We see you; so he-who-is-above sees you, looking down; for it is he who planted you below.

V. DOCTORING

When I was little I saw them doctor my older sister. Many doctored her all night long, kept doctoring till morning. All through the evening they kept doctoring, till morning, for a week. And there was a great doctor whose name was *sunusa* (full-of-straw). So *sunusa* said, "Tomorrow when the sun is barely risen, she will go onward, I sense,"[37] thus he said. "Already her spirit stands a short distance behind her, I sense."

So Carrie and I went to bed. And the following morning we heard them weeping. So we jumped up, frightened. And when we went to the south side of the house, there sat the many doctors weeping. And I saw the sick one; she must have been looking about her still (I was a kid; I can't remember). Then they sent us out. And the sun rose. And now we heard the sound of many people weeping.

35. Shamanistic idiom for *eyes*.
36. Obsolete form of the word, used only by shamans.
37. *-nte*; he senses the communication of his spirit power.

A DEFINITION OF RELIGION

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I

PRELIMINARY: ON DEFINING RELIGION

The problem of defining religion, like the woman in the Gospels, has suffered much at the hands of many doctors. We have a bewildering variety of definitions of religion. What is more significant, we have definitions of various kinds. To add to our confusion, the kind of definition offered is not always made explicit.

At the outset, therefore, one is met with the obligation to indicate the kind of definition presented and the purposes it may serve. Many "true" definitions of religion are possible. For a definition to be useful as well as true, the context of meaning in which it is presented must be made explicit. This seems essential for any fruitful discussion of the subject.

The definition offered here for discussion is as follows: Religion is interest in what is regarded as most important in the universe. This is proposed as a general or descriptive definition in contrast to what may be called special or partisan definitions; it is stated in terms of experience rather than in terms of overt behavior or social institutions; it is intended as a phenomenological and functional description in contrast to genetic and ontological interpretations.

A general definition of religion, it may be assumed here, must be descriptive or neutral rather than normative. The connotation of a general definition is neither dignitative nor contemptuous. It seeks to discriminate and to describe, rather than to evaluate. One may agree with Mr. John M. Moore that it is important to have statements of what is considered good religion or the best religion, by individuals who frankly acknowledge their own assumptions.[1] This kind of definition is not only legitimate, but also of very great importance because it attempts to deal with one of the fundamental questions, some would say *the* fundamental question, in human life.[2] No derogation to such

1. Cf. *Theories of Religious Experience*, (New York, 1938), p. 227.
2. John Macmurray, in his Terry Lectures, *The Structure of Religious Experi-*

partisan definitions is intended here. It is simply maintained that another kind of definition of religion is also possible and useful for certain purposes.

One purpose for which a general definition may be useful is to delimit the field of religion when religion is treated as an aspect of human culture about which some reliable information may be gained. Such a definition may be also an instrument of criticism in somewhat the same way in which definitions in the social sciences may be instruments of criticism. These sciences may be neutral as to ultimate values and ends, but the classification of factors having similar functions in society is, at least, a prerequisite of enlightened understanding and criticism. Likewise, a general definition of religion may indicate those areas in personal and social life to which criticism of "religion" is applicable, though it cannot of itself supply criteria in terms of which criticism is to be applied. One of the dangers involved in exclusive preoccupation with "partisan" definitions of religion is that criticism tends to be directed toward one kind of religion or another, while still other kinds of religion escape unchallenged and uncriticized.

Various kinds of general definitions of religion are possible. For certain purposes, general definitions in terms of patterns of overt behavior or of social institutions may be useful. The definition here presented is, however, in terms of the human interests[3] which are expressed in overt behavior and in institutions. From this point of view, behavior patterns and institutions would be regarded as being "religious" in as far as they express a certain type of interest.

Other general definitions are in terms of the genesis of religion or of the causal factors which are supposed to produce it. The present discussion does not raise this kind of issue. In contrast to genetic defi-

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ence, seems to aim at what is called here a partisan definition of religion. "I have tried, therefore, to exhibit the essential structure of empirical religion and to explain the falsification by which it may become dogmatic and speculative" (p. ix).

3. The term "interest" is used here to mean any positive feeling. To borrow an expression from Whitehead, an interest is an atomic feeling whose subjective form is an "adversion." This use of the term is close to that of Perry in his *General Theory of Value*. But the present discussion abstracts from the metaphysical implications given the term "feeling" by Whitehead, and from the axiological implications of Perry's use of "interest."

This usage is to be distinguished from that of R. M. MacIver, (in *Society: A Textbook of Sociology* [New York, 1937], cf. p. 20, and elsewhere) who by "interest" denotes the object of an attitude. "Interest" is preferred to "attitude," however, since an attitude may be regarded as a complex pattern of interests.

nitions, the present definition is phenomenological and, to use Husserl's term, "brackets" all questions regarding the causes of religious interests. Regardless of how religion may be said to be produced, the attempt here is to discriminate within the field of conscious experience certain human interests which may properly be called religious. Of genetic definitions it might be said that, if they are to be empirical, they can hardly afford to ignore the form which religion takes in conscious experience. This, it may be suggested, is what is to be explained.

It is obvious that such a phenomenological description brackets not only genetic considerations but also metaphysical considerations. Whether those objects which function as religious objects have any status other than their status as components of the field of experience is a question outside the scope of this discussion. In this discussion "object" will be taken to mean that component of the field of experience toward which an interest is directed, that is, a phenomenological object. The religious object, then, is that toward which a religious interest is directed. And a religious interest like any other interest, phenomenologically considered, tells no tales about the metaphysical status of its object.

It should be noted that the analysis of experience on which the present definition is based is concerned with functions rather than with specific felt qualities or emotional states. An interest, as here conceived, is not the same kind of thing as an emotion. The focus of attention in this discussion is not the feeling as it is "felt," but the feeling as a kind of operation or mode of adjustment within the field of experience. Thus it is possible to say that various emotional qualities may be associated with an interest, without defining the interest in terms of these emotional qualities. With a religious interest, for example, various emotions such as fear, love, and awe may be associated. Among these, the kind of feeling described by Rudolf Otto in his *Idea of the Holy* may be dominant or characteristically present. It seems, however, that such emotions regarded as felt qualities are subject to wider variation than are the functional interests with which they are associated.[4] For this reason, when we are seeking a general definition

4. Are there not forms of religion (e.g., primitive Buddhism, Confucianism, some varieties of modern humanism) in which "creature-feeling" is not an important characteristic? Mr. Moore remarks that Otto "showed no interest in James' suggestion that there are 'varieties of religious experience.'" (*op. cit.*, pp. 90 f.)

of religion, it may be preferable to do so in terms of functions rather than in terms of emotional qualities.

II

RELIGION AS A TYPE OF HUMAN INTEREST

It is within this general context of meaning, then, that religion is defined as interest in what is regarded as most important in the universe. The term, "important," has been used because it may connote both "what is valued" and "what is taken to be real." For, as a matter of fact, religious interests tend to be directed neither to values which are regarded as "unreal" nor to realities regarded as devoid of value. One may cite the tendency within the Platonic tradition to ascribe to ideal values, which have often functioned in this tradition as religious objects, a transcendental reality. On the other hand, when the religious object is said to be a reality "beyond good and evil," as in some forms of transcendental mysticism, the meaning seems to be that the object defies description in terms of ordinary categories of value.

What is most important in the universe is that which matters most in the universe. It is to the object which has this function in experience that the religious interest is directed. It is conceivable that a religious interest might be directed toward an object which is recognized as unreal or merely ideal, if such an object is found to function as that which is most important in the universe. This question of fact does not affect the meaning of the present definition. It is suggested, however, that usually the religious object is regarded as in some sense real and in some sense good. For this reason, the term, "importance," or some other term which connotes both value and reality may be a useful one in defining religion.

It will be noted that the specific character of the object of any religious interest is not given by definition. The definition indicates only a general type of object in terms of function. From this point of view, the specific form which the religious object takes in any particular instance of religious interest is subject to empirical determination. All specific objects of religious interests, however, may be found to function as that which is most important.[5]

Whether or not that which is regarded as most important is "really" most important in the universe is a question which does not concern

5. Cf. section III, below.

us here. "The universe" is construed phenomenologically as that which is the universe for the subject, that is to say the total field of experience. Use of this expression further serves to underline the fact that we are concerned with moments of experience which are in some degree reflective.

For our purposes, therefore, religion is defined to mean a class of human interests. The determining condition of any such interest is that its object should function as that which is most important in the universe for the subject. This interest is to be called the "religion" of that individual. In as far as the members of a group have such an interest in common, we may speak of the "religion" of that group. This religious interest may now be further defined in contrast with other classes of human interests. For our purposes, we may refer to what may be called practical interests and aesthetic interests.[6] This classification will constitute the immediate context of meaning in which this definition of religion is offered.

An aesthetic interest may be said to consist in pure enjoyment of an object. The object is enjoyed as it is and for what it is. There is no attempt on the part of the subject to alter the existing objective situation, for no change in the object is desired. When the object is presented in experience, nothing has to be done about it. The object is accepted as being, in the immediate experience at least, ultimate. Further, the subject remains detached and contemplative in his enjoyment of the object. For the aesthetic object as such entails no reconstruction of ends and purposes on the part of the subject. In itself, it bears no "moral imperative" to subordinate some interests to other interests. It makes no demand upon the subject, but is simply there to be enjoyed. Thus, in as far as a purely aesthetic interest is maintained, the interest involves neither reconstruction of the object, nor self-reconstruction of the subject. The interest functions as an enjoyment.

A practical interest, on the other hand, is an interest in the reconstruction of some object or objects of experience. For the purely practical man, who of course is an abstraction, nothing is ever as it should be. Paradoxically, the object of a practical interest is not so much an

6. The following description of "practical" and "aesthetic" interests is somewhat similar to that given by John Macmurray (*op. cit.*, cf. ch. 1). The description of "religious" interests given here differs from Mr. Macmurray's, however, in certain important respects.

object as an objective. That is to say, that in which the practical man is interested is controlled change. There is always something to be gained, yet there is no point at which the process of reconstruction comes to rest. All objects are instrumental; none is ultimate. Nature is a field of action and its forces are materials for use, not objects of enjoyment.

There may or may not be present, along with a practical interest, interests of other kinds, aesthetic or religious. The practical interest as such is merely an interest in exercising control or instituting change. The urge to "go places and do things" is an indication of an interest which is relatively "aimless." It is desirable, no doubt, that interest in change should be intelligently directed, but this condition may or may not obtain. Where there is a conception of a more or less definite end to be gained, as is ordinarily the case, the anticipated end functions as the object of some other kind of interest than the practical interest.

In primitive life, magic seems to be an expression of practical interest. The shaman, by gestures and incantations, obtains a hold upon unseen powers which must then do his bidding. This more or less crude way of controlling nature gives way in the evolution of society to the more reasoned and effective methods of science.[7] The kind of interest expressed, however, is essentially the same. Man, whether by magic or by scientific method, sets out to reconstruct his world. This is not to say that a scientist, as scientist, has only a practical interest. The kind of interest expressed in "pure science" is quite another thing. The use of scientific techniques for instituting change, however, is an expression of practical interest, just as is the use of the cruder techniques of magic. A practical interest functions as a using.

As contrasted with these other types of interest, the religious interest is an interest in what is taken to be most important in the universe. In contrast with practical interests, the religious interest takes its object as in some sense ultimate. One is interested in the religious object in and for itself. Beyond this object the interest does not go, and "this side" of the object the interest does not pause. The religious interest takes its object as final. The practical interest seeks to control and reconstruct; the religious interest seeks to worship.

7. It is not suggested that magic is the only expression of practical interests in primitive society. Along with the attempt to control nature by magic, there are the beginnings of science. Cf. B. Malinowski in *Science, Religion and Reality*, J. Needham, ed. (London, 1929), p. 35.

This is not, however, to identify religious interests with aesthetic interests. As contrasted with the aesthetic interest, the religious interest involves commitment of the self to the object. The religious interest is by definition a dominant interest, since it is directed to that object which is regarded as most important in the universe. All other interests are subordinated to interest in the religious object. For this reason, the religious interest has often been referred to as "devotion." Here the terms, "commitment" and "devotion," may be defined functionally to mean the subordination of all other interests to interest in a given object. The kind of detachment characteristic of the aesthetic interest is no longer maintained. The religious interest establishes its object as dominant within the whole field of experience.

At this point, it may be appropriate to distinguish more explicitly between the general functional relation here called "subordination" and the specific function here called "devotion." Both terms indicate modes of organizing the field of experience, though the normative question as to what would constitute a desirable or rational organization of experience is not hereby raised in this discussion.

Subordination of one interest to another is the functional relation of taking the object of the latter interest to be more important than the object of the former interest. If the two relevant interests are compatible, emphasis is placed on the latter, and the former is relegated to the periphery of attention. The relation between the two interests may be, but is not necessarily, the relation of means to end. We say that we are more "interested" in the latter than in the former. If the two are incompatible, the former undergoes modification or is excluded. Denial or exclusion of an interest is interpreted here as a limiting case of subordination.

It is compatible with the above definitions of types of interest to say that any interest other than a religious interest may be subordinated to any other interest. A practical interest may be subordinated to an aesthetic interest. Taking a certain bus may be less important to me than my anticipated enjoyment of the concert to which I am going. On the other hand, an aesthetic interest may be subordinated to a practical interest. For a physician on his way to a patient, the enjoyment of his automobile as an aesthetic object may be less important than the manipulation of the automobile.

In somewhat the same way, one aesthetic interest may be sub-

ordinated to another aesthetic interest. My enjoyment of the performance of an individual musician in a string quartet may function in my experience as being less important than my enjoyment of the quartet as a whole. On the other hand, my enjoyment of the performance of one member of the quartet may function as of greater importance than that of the quartet as a whole if, for instance, a personal interest in this individual reinforces my interest in the music. Likewise, one practical interest may be subordinated to another practical interest. For instance, one's interest in scraping mud from one's shoes may be subordinated to one's interest in ringing a doorbell.

The term, "devotion," is used in this paper in a specific and technical sense to denote the function of subordinating all other interests to interest in a given object. This function is taken to be the distinguishing characteristic of religious interests. By definition, then, a religious interest is never subordinated to any other interest. On the contrary, a religious interest is an interest to which all other interests in the field of experience at a given moment are subordinated. All other objects of interest are regarded as of less importance than the religious object.

In the case of a Toda priest, for example, all practical interests (in cleaning the buffalo pens, etc.) and aesthetic interests (enjoyment of colors and textures, of social status, etc.) present in a given moment *may* be subordinated to interest in the well-being of the gods or the clan, or in some other object.[8] This object is felt to be of supreme importance. Interest in this object is then said to function as a "devotion," and this function is taken to be the specific function of religious interests.

To say that a religious interest functions as a devotion is, then, an alternative way of saying that this interest is an interest in what is taken in the given moment to be most important in the universe. For, phenomenologically considered, "the universe" is equivalent to "the whole field of experience." Such expressions indicate the assumption, which seems a sensible one, that religious interests arise in those moments of experience which are in some degree reflective. In such moments, there is some degree of clarity and comprehensiveness in

8. The possibility that, in a given moment, no religious interest in the sense defined may be present is recognized. A discussion of the specific forms which religious interests may take is given below in section III.

apprehension of the mutual relevance of interests. The degree to which the relevance of other interests to the religious interest is apprehended or implicitly affirmed may constitute one way of measuring the intensity of a given religious interest. Reflection in this relative sense is taken to be a necessary condition of the presence of a religious interest, but not a sufficient condition. There seem to be reflective moments of experience in which no religious interests arise.

In some individuals and groups, the religious interest tends to be more contemplative than active, expressing itself primarily in self-criticism and in striving for inward harmony with the object of devotion. This is the quietistic type of religion. In other individuals and groups, the subordination of interests primarily involves direction of overt behavior and reconstruction of the environment in harmony with the nature of the religious object. This is the activistic or "practical" type of religion. Other variations in terms of temperament and the emotional qualities associated with the religious interest could be listed. In any case, what is specifically religious is the "devotional" character of the interest, that is to say, the subordination of all other interests to interest in an object which is regarded as most important. A religious interest functions as a devotion.

It is obvious that these interests are not found in isolation from each other. Various practical interests and aesthetic interests, and some dominant religious interest may be present together and function within the total complex of a given moment of experience. What is maintained is that these classes of interests function in different ways, and that these functions can be discriminated in analysis. Such analysis is facilitated by the emergence in developed human societies of certain recognizable types of personality. The purely practical man, the man whose interests are purely aesthetic, and the completely religious man are all abstractions. But they are abstractions which are approximated to in the types of personality denoted by "engineer," "aesthete," and "saint."

It is not suggested that the above classification of human interests into practical, aesthetic, and religious interests is the only analysis of human experience which might be made. The numerous lists of "instincts" and "drives" and "sentiments" which have been presented by psychologists should warn us against such a claim. All these lists seem to have some basis in fact, and to be useful for certain purposes. It is

suggested that at the level of conscious human experience the classes of "interests" described above may be discriminated and that with due regard for common usage these interests may properly be called practical, aesthetic, and religious.

One possible objection to this analysis would be that human experience at this level includes other interests, such as interest in knowledge or science, and moral interest. It might be suggested, however, that an interest in knowledge "for its own sake" may be classed as an aesthetic interest. The process of constructing formal systems of mathematics or logic, for instance, or the attempt of the speculative philosopher to construct a consistent cosmology may have as its intended goal an aesthetic experience. Immediate enjoyment of abstract forms, or of the universe as construed by the speculative philosopher, is anticipated. Such objects are contemplated in much the same manner as are patterns of colors or tones or masses in what is usually regarded as aesthetic experience. When, on the other hand, knowledge is regarded as instrumental, interest in knowledge becomes what has been called a practical interest. This is sometimes expressed in the saying, "Knowledge is power." In this case, knowledge is a means to the realization of certain ends, and the nature of these ends is not specified by the interest in knowledge itself, though it may be specified by other interests functioning as aesthetic appreciation or religious devotion. Interest in knowledge in this latter sense is interest in controlling, reconstructing, or using.

A similar distinction may be drawn in respect to moral interests. In as far as moral interest is directed to what are sometimes called instrumental values, this interest is essentially the same as what has been called practical interest. Ethical theory and moral behavior, so called, become means to the gaining of whatever ends the individual or group has in view, the ends themselves being unspecified. On the other hand, in as far as a moral interest means interest in ultimate or intrinsic values, it becomes essentially what has been called a religious interest. This latter kind of ethical interest acknowledges certain objects to be in some sense absolute or supreme in the universe. These objects are not merely contemplated, as in the case of a purely aesthetic interest,[9]

9. Moral values may, of course, be contemplatively enjoyed. Goodness has its own kind of beauty. In this case, such values would function as objects of aesthetic interest.

but are acknowledged as bearing in their nature an imperative for human life. Because they are what they are, they ought to be realized. Recognition of this imperative and commitment to the realization of these values is essentially a religious type of experience. For instance, one has the impression that the philosophy of Kant expresses a more specifically religious interest, and is more religious in tone, when the moral law is discussed than when the notion of God is discussed.

III

THE FUNCTION OF THE RELIGIOUS OBJECT

It is now proper to indicate the variety of specific forms which the religious object may assume in experience. Since the present definition of religion is a neutral one, no judgment as to the value of any specific form of religion is appropriate here. And since the definition is based on a phenomenological analysis of experience, no judgment as to the metaphysical status of any specific religious object, or of such objects in general, is made. As far as the definition is concerned, any object which functions in the experience of an individual or group as that which is for the subject most important in the universe, is thereby a religious object.

Religion may at times take the form of devotion to the individual self, conceived even in a narrow and exclusive sense. In effect, the self so conceived becomes that which is for the individual the most important thing in the universe. That this possibility has, at least some, meaning is indicated by the common expression "sublime egoism." Whether or not it is possible for such an interest to become permanently characteristic of any individual person, the fact that self-interest may, in a given moment of experience, become absolutized makes it proper to call it religious. In that given moment this interest is, in fact, that which functions as religion.

Usually the religious object is more broadly conceived. The self may become the "social self." The family (as in ancestral cults), the clan or tribe (as in totem groups), the nation (as in some forms of Shinto), or the race (as in some forms of German neo-paganism), becomes that which is most important in the universe, and, therefore, that to which all other objects of interest are subordinated. As in the case of what might be called the religion of self, it may be possible to detect a certain instability in this type of religion, especially if one's description is in terms of enduring attitudes rather than in terms of atomic

"interests." The notion of the family may tend to include the tribal group with its totem as a symbol of common ancestry. The notion of the tribal group may tend to include all descendants of one racial stock, regarded as a blood-brotherhood. The nation may become the symbol of a particular type of culture which it may be regarded as the mission of the group to propagate universally. But it seems generally recognized that these groups, symbolized in various ways, may become objects of that type of interest which functions in the experience of the individual or group as religion.

Another form of religion is that in which the object of interest is universal humanity. Human beings, qua human beings, are regarded as that class of objects which is most important in the universe. Both nature and the gods are for the service of man. This seems one of the characteristic faiths of the modern world. Perhaps not all varieties of "humanism" should be called religious, but it seems to be true that humanism, in the sense of devotion to universal humanity, has often functioned as a religion.

Here it would be interesting to raise a question as to the relation between interest in humanity and interest in reason. Are these interests, when they take religious form, always identical? Devotion to humanity sometimes seems, in effect, to mean devotion to intelligence or the life of reason. The object of religious interest, in this case, seems to be that process in human experience (reason, intelligence, scientific method) which is conceived to be creative of human goods, whether the emphasis be on economic goods (as might be the case in some pragmatic forms of Marxism), or on "spiritual" goods (as in the case of Irving Babbitt). One assumption of this form of religion seems to be that reason is a process which operates in human beings alone. Apart from this assumption, there would seem to be small ground for the term "humanism." Another assumption seems to be that this uniquely human process is, in fact, the source of human goods.

This form of humanism as a religion is, therefore, not a devotion to humanity as such, in the sense that the existing totality of human life is that which is most important. It is a devotion to man qua rational being, and more specifically a devotion to a particular kind of human process which is conceived to be creative of human goods.[10]

10. A similar interest appears in a recent article as a ground for pacifism. Milton S. Mayer: "I think I'll Sit This One Out," in *The Saturday Evening Post*, October 7, 1939.

Hence, in as far as a religion of humanity is identical with a religion of reason, it would have to be distinguished from a humanism which regarded human life as such the most important thing in the universe. Sometimes it is felt that it is man's capacity for intensity of feeling which constitutes "humanity" an object worthy of devotion. Hence the interest is less in the life of reason than in the intensification and expansion of human feeling. Humanism, here, tends to take the form of humanitarianism or love of human beings. Whether or not a reconciliation or synthesis of humanism as love of all humanity and humanism as devotion to human reason is possible, humanism as a religion does, as a matter of fact, seem to take these different forms.[11]

The inclusion of natural objects and processes within the sphere of the religious interest marks a type of religion which seems to differ from those mentioned above. In many instances, natural objects have significance only as symbols of the importance of the social group. It seems, however, that, in other instances, natural objects or processes are regarded as in themselves most important. In primitive human life, the distinction between nature and the supernatural is often vague and wavering and, in some cases, seems hardly to be made. A distinction, for instance, between the totem animal and the mana resident in the animal might not occur to the primitive individual. Again, in the case of sun worship, is the sun regarded as a supernatural being or as a natural object? Further, in the latter case is its function merely to symbolize something else, *e.g.*, human values, or a supernatural being? It seems not unlikely that there are some instances in the life of primitive man where a religious interest, in the sense defined, is directed toward natural objects or processes.[12]

More sophisticated forms of religious naturalism may include man within nature. This kind of religion is distinguished from what have been called humanistic forms of religion by the fact that the object of interest is not exclusively human. For instance, the life-process may be the object of devotion, and religion may be felt to consist in

11. The ancient feud between classicists and romanticists, as illustrated, for example, by Irving Babbitt's polemics against Rousseauism, furnishes material for a comparison between these two views of human life. Another form which the tension between different types of humanism may take is illustrated in an article, " 'Scientific Humanism,' " by Jacques Barzun, in *The Nation*, April 29, 1939.

12. Cf. R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1924), pp. 157 and 161 f., where in criticism of Durkheim, Lowie cites and supports Goldenweiser's assertion that nature often inspires religious emotion among primitive people.

reverence for all life, human and non-human. In some forms of "naturalistic theism," interest is directed toward a more abstractly defined process within nature which is conceived to be creative of all goods.[13] The kind of naturalistic pantheism found in Spinoza indicates that a religious interest may be directed to the whole universe. It seems, however, that such an interest is seldom if ever directed to the universe of nature considered merely denotatively. The pantheist makes a speculative interpretation of the universe. It is *natura naturans* and not merely *natura naturata* which, in this case, is the religious object. The devotion is to nature under a certain aspect.

From these humanistic and naturalistic forms of religion, transcendental and supernatural forms of religion may be differentiated. It should be recognized, however, that concepts which have a transcendental or supernatural flavor may often be used as symbols of the importance of human groups or natural processes. The function of the Olympian gods in later Greek religion may serve as an example in this connection. Conversely, natural objects or processes may be used as symbols of the importance of transcendental or supernatural objects.

In most of the major religious traditions, the religious object is conceived as having a reference beyond nature and humanity. In some of these traditions, such as Christianity and Islam, the religious object is positively conceived, as a being something of whose reality and goodness may be known through nature and man, which he has created and controls, and by revelation. In others of these traditions, as in certain forms of Hinduism and Buddhism, there seems to be a tendency to deny any positive conceptual knowledge of the reality which is beyond "this world." This tendency is not, of course, confined to these traditions, as the history of Christian and Islamic mysticism witnesses. Denial of positive conceptual knowledge of the religious object does not, by any means, imply that in this kind of religion the object does not *function* as that which is of supreme importance.[14]

13. *If* the Marxian dialectic should be regarded as operative throughout nature as well as in human society, and *if*, in an individual or group, interest in this process should take a religious form, then there would be an interesting analogy of *function* between this interest and the religious interest of the naturalistic theist.

14. Does this definition do justice to what is apparently a religious pluralism, namely cases where religious interest seems to be directed to more than one object, as in polytheism? Two considerations may be suggested. It seems obvious that the object of religious interest may change, perhaps even from moment to moment

Within the general forms of religion which have been noted, an indefinite number of individual variations is possible. For, that which functions as religious object for an individual is not necessarily identical with the object as defined by the religious group of which he professes to be a part, though there may be considerable uniformity of interests within a given group. There seems to be a stubborn core of particularity in the religion of an individual at any moment of experience.

This variety of forms which the religious object seems to take, in the experience of individuals and groups in various cultures, makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a general definition of religion in terms of any particular religious object. For instance, John Macmurray's identification of the religious object as human fellowship,[15] since it excludes naturalistic and transcendental forms of religion, would seem to prevent his definition from serving the purposes of a general definition, if it were intended to serve such purposes.

Even the definition which Schleiermacher set forth, with acute insight and persuasive force, in his *Addresses* seems inadequate as a general definition, although it may have great value as a partisan definition. An object held to be infinite and eternal might well be the object of a religious interest. But it does not seem necessary to the existence of a religious interest that its object be felt to be infinite and eternal. Objects which are not so conceived do seem to function as objects of religious interests. It seems a mistake to define religion in terms of the specific character of any particular religious object, if a general definition is intended, rather than in terms of the general function which all such objects have.[16]

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in the experience of a given person. This is entirely compatible with our assumption that, in a given moment, or, to use Whitehead's term, "a particular occasion of experience," there is only one object of religious interest. If, however, "gods" are worshiped simultaneously and not successively, the question of the definition and description of the class of objects worshiped would arise. Why are these and no others worshiped? It is suggested that it is fair to say that functionally this class of objects is one "object," namely, "the gods."

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

16. Schleiermacher's use of the terms *Gefühl* and *Ahnung* also raises epistemological questions which a functional and phenomenological definition must avoid. His later definition, in *The Christian Faith*, if taken as a general, descriptive definition, seems liable to the objection that the religious object is not specified at all, not even as to function. The late Hugh Ross Mackintosh once (exclaimed), "Can anyone really tell me the difference between the feeling of absolute dependence and the feeling one has in a good hot bath?"

One way to defend the formulation of a general definition in terms of the specific nature of the religious object is to say that all particular forms which the religious object takes in experience really imply, or are symbols of, some more ultimate and all-inclusive object, such as "the infinite and eternal." This may or may not be true as a matter of speculation or idealistic logic. It does not seem to be true as phenomenological description. Sometimes this kind of symbolic reference seems to be present in experience; sometimes it does not.

Thus, the result of a survey of the varieties of religious objects is to enforce the conclusion that a general definition of religion from a phenomenological point of view should be in functional terms, and not in terms of any particular form which the religious object may assume. The thread of identity which runs through the indefinite variety of forms of religion can be said to be an identity of function only. The definition offered here, therefore, is in terms of the way in which the religious interest functions in experience and the corresponding function of the object of that interest. Specifically, the function of the religious interest is that of devotion, if "devotion" be taken to mean subordination of all other interests to that which is regarded as most important. Conversely, the function of the religious object is to be dominant over all other objects of interest in the field of experience. Such dominance does not, of course, exclude other objects of interest from the field of experience. The meaning of dominance, here, is that the importance of other objects tends to be subordinate to the supreme importance of the religious object.

IV

LIMITATIONS ON THE USEFULNESS OF THIS DEFINITION

Certain objections may properly be directed against this definition of religion. One obvious objection is that the definition is too inclusive, that it would apply the term religion to many experiences not usually regarded as religious. Specifically, too great latitude is allowed in respect of the nature of the religious object. This criticism has considerable point; but something may be said by way of rebuttal. It may be recalled that this sets out to be a general definition of religion, and that its generality is necessary for the purpose for which it is framed, namely that of delimiting the field of religion as an aspect of culture, about which information may be gained and to which criticism may be applied.

One test of such a definition is its usefulness in calling attention to what are often unrecognized analogies and similarities among the component forms of experience. This means that the definition cannot be an exact transcription of what is meant by the term "religion" whenever that term is used, whether by the man on the street or the man on the lecture platform. It is hoped that a fair description of what seems to be a general type of experience has been given, and that terms are used in what is fairly close to their usual meaning. It is also important, however, to aim at the kind of precision which seems necessary for any fruitful discussion of the subject.

It may be further pointed out that this definition is exclusive as well as inclusive. That which is here termed the class of religious interests is specified. Not all interests are religious interests. In this sense, religion is not "all of life." The attempt here is to specify the function of religious interests in the general context of human experience.

Nor does the definition entail that all men are religious. It is conceivable, consistent with the definition and, as a matter of fact, quite probable that all men in some moments of their experience are not religious. That is to say, in some moments of experience no religious interest in the sense defined may be present. There may be a general sense of triviality, a *taedium vitae*, so that nothing seems particularly important. Or, if some objects of experience seem important, there may be no resolution of conflict or indecision in terms of an object regarded in that moment as most important. Rival interests, so to speak, may be competing for dominance in the given moment. The definition assumes that the presence of a religious interest involves some resolution of such conflict on some level. It is also conceivable and consistent with the definition to say that some men are at all times not religious. This is a matter for empirical investigation which is not prejudged in the definition.

It is freely admitted that difficulty of verification is a limitation on the usefulness of this type of definition. Verification of the presence of religious or other interests in a given subject at a given time is not impossible, however. It is possible by the methods developed in psychology and sociology for determining attitudes generally, and to whatever degree of accuracy is possible in dealing with this kind of data generally.

Further, it may be pointed out that definitions of religion in terms

of overt behavior also have certain limitations. The possible transformations in overt expression of any given interest seem to be indefinite in number and extremely difficult to identify. Also, any instance of human activity seems to be expressive of various interests operating together in a complex of experience, so that it is difficult to obtain a pure expression in overt activity of any single interest. Schleiermacher's remark, "dass die Religion nie rein erscheint, sondern ihre aüssere Gestalt auch noch durch etwas anderes bestimmt wird," points to this limitation on the usefulness of definitions in terms of overt behavior. When two men go up into the temple to pray, their interests may be quite different, and it is entirely possible that for one of them the experience may not function as a religious experience at all, in any intelligible sense of the term. Yet the type of behavior observable in each case may be identical.

It is also admitted that, on the basis of the present definition, the form of the religious object for a given individual may change with elusive frequency. It may be pointed out, however, that a normal growth in apprehension of the religious object is generally regarded as desirable. A condition of such growth may be a certain inclusiveness and breadth in the subject's conception of the religious object, so that continuity would be possible between the religious interests which function in successive moments of experience. Where such change is very abrupt and very frequent, it is generally considered undesirable because indicative of lack of integration in the personality. In practice we usually focus attention on those forms of religion which tend to persist in the experience of individuals or groups. But the fact that the religious object does take different forms in different moments of the experience of a given individual seems indubitable. And this fact must be taken into account in any attempt to answer the question which has been central in this inquiry, namely,—How does religion, regarded as a kind of human interest, function in experience?

BOOK REVIEWS

From the Stone Age to Christianity; Monotheism and the Historical Process. By William Foxwell Albright. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1940. xi + 361 pp. $2.50.

Students of the ancient Near East, and particularly Old Testament scholars, have awaited with keen interest Professor Albright's new book. They expected to find in it, not only a summary and an evaluation of the vast archeological and epigraphical material accumulated in the last two decades of intensive and epochal excavations in the Holy Land, but also a historico-philosophical reinterpretation of Israel's ancient history and religion on the basis of the new data. Dr. Albright's vast erudition, his thorough knowledge of the languages, cultures, and religions of the Near East, and the fact that he had resided in Palestine for more than two decades and had personally participated in many excavations there have made him eminently fit to undertake and successfully prosecute such a task.

Chapter I, "New Horizons in History," forms the foundation upon which the author erects, in the successive chapters, his historico-philosophical edifice. It gives a concise, illuminating, and an exceedingly well integrated summary of the recent findings in the fields of geography, pre-history, anthropology, archeology, and epigraphy of the "Fertile Crescent." The great importance of the knowledge of the cultural achievements of the ancient Near East for a proper understanding of European, indeed, world history, is succinctly pointed out:

> Archaeological research has thus established beyond doubt that there is no focus of civilization in the earth that can begin to compete in antiquity and activity with the basin of the Eastern Mediterranean and the region immediately to the east of it—Breasted's Fertile Crescent. Other civilizations of the Old World were all derived from this cultural centre or were strongly influenced by it; only the New World was entirely independent. In tracing our Christian civilization of the West to its earliest sources we are, accordingly, restricted to the Egypto-Mesopotamian area. This historical situation provides an unanswerable reply to the frequent complaint that disproportionate attention is paid by archaeologists to the Near East.

In chapter II, "Toward an Organismic Philosophy of History," the author reviews the most prevalent tendencies in the philosophy of

history. He begins with Hegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte* and his influence upon German Old and New Testament scholarship; Comte's positivistic school; the studies of Robertson Smith, E. Durkheim, and Max Weber; the most recent movement of the encyclopedic-analytic tendency in the philosophy of history as represented by A. J. Toynbee's *A Study in History* and P. A. Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics;* historical determinism in its three main aspects, namely, geographical, climatic, and economic; the epistemology of history (this is a very refreshing discussion in which the author forcibly defends the validity of history as a science); and finally, in the last paragraph, Dr. Albright states his own viewpoint that

> an inductive organismic philosophy is the only proper way in which to approach the problem of the relation of historical contexts to one another. And this organismic basis must be . . . a modest one, not rising for operational purposes beyond the level of the culture-unit.

Chapter III, "Praeparatio," contains the most up-to-date account of the present state of our knowledge of the Near East. It is an illuminative description of the cultural and religious evolution of the Near East from the Stone Age to the Hyksos Period.

Chapter IV, "When Israel was a Child," embraces the period from B.C. 1600 to 1200. It deals with the interchange and cross-fertilization of cultural and religious elements in the Late Bronze Age, and the growth of the belief in a high god which culminated in the abortive monotheism in Egypt in the reign of Akhenaten. The great importance of the recently discovered Ugaritic texts for an understanding of the pre-Israelite religious conceptions prevalent among the Canaanites of Phoenicia and Palestine are evaluated. It is the opinion of Professor Albright that the crude and basically unethical contents of these mythological poems are very early, going back to the third millennium in substantially the present form. The Mari and Nuzi documents are cited as proof of the contention that the original home of the Hebrews was Northern Mesopotamia, and that they were connected with the Khabiru of the Amarna Age. Concerning the highly controversial theme of the true character and scope of the religion of Moses, the author boldly affirms his conservative attitude in relying exclusively on (the late) Biblical sources to prove that Moses was actually the founder of the Israelite commonwealth and the framer of Israel's monotheistic religious system. Moses must be credited

with the introduction of Yahwism, a monotheistic religion, into early Israel, which, according to Albright, was not a product of a gradual evolutionary process, but the result of a revolutionary break-away from the past. In chapter v, "Charisma and Catharsis," the author rejects most emphatically the views held by many Old Testament scholars that the Israelites were henotheistic in the time of the Judges. This point of view is, of course, a logical sequence of his basic theory. If Moses was the founder of a true monotheistic religion, henotheistic expressions found in that period must of necessity be ascribed to popular notions, and not taken as the credo of the leading spirits in Israel. There is no real indication that the Israelite idea of god was permanently influenced by Canaanite conceptions in this age; the widely held view that Jeroboam represented the national deity in the form of a bull is completely erroneous—Yahweh was never represented in such a form. In sharp contrast to the Wellhausen school, which holds that the religion of the prophets and the teaching of Deuteronomy represented a progressive reform based on an advance beyond previous levels of religion and cult, the author maintains that the prophets were in no way religious innovators, but merely reformers expressing views held in the Israelitic community since the days of Moses, but which had been, to the detriment of the people, neglected by the ruling class of the monarchy. The burst of prophetic activity he ascribes to the terrific blows of the Assyrian conquests. It was essentially a nostalgic movement seeking solace and peace in the nation's past, in the Mosaic religion of early days. The materials contained in Deuteronomy were really believed to go back to Moses and probably do reflect, in general, a true Mosaic atmosphere. Chapter vi, "In the Fulness of Time," deals with the rise and diffusion of Hellenic culture in Palestine and the relation of Judaism to Hellenism. In discussing the Sadducees and Pharisees, the author makes the acute observation that it was the Pharisees and not the Sadducees who were, in more than in one field, deeply influenced by Hellenic teachings and methodology. The last two paragraphs of the chapter deal with the religion of Jesus Christ. Here the author very prudently takes an intermediate position in the famous controversy around C. C. Torrey, who holds that the whole of Mark and Matthew, most of Luke, and the entire Gospel of John, were originally written in Aramaic.

From the Stone Age to Christianity is the most important book in the field of Palestinology which has appeared since the publication, in 1931, of Olmstead's *History of Palestine and Syria to the Macedonian Conflict*. The vast store of information contained in this book makes its appearance a great event in Near Eastern scholarship. Needless to say that one of the basic contentions of the author, viz., the monotheism of Moses and the interpretation of the prophets, including Deutero-Isaiah, as mere reformers whose ideas about religion and cult contained fundamentally long-forgotten Mosaic conceptions, will not be unanimously accepted by Old Testament scholars. This, however, does in no way detract from the great value of the book as a historico-philosophical guide to the intricacies of the history and religion of ancient Israel. Even those who will reject Professor Albright's view of Mosaic monotheism will be thankful to him for his brilliant and stimulating work.

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Greek Popular Religion. By MARTIN P. NILSSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. xviii + 139 pp., illustrations 15 pp., index. $2.50.

This book is made up of seven lectures sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies (Lectures on the History of Religious, New Series, No. 1); they were delivered in the United States in the academic year 1939-40. A foreword by Professor Arthur Darby Nock of Harvard, speaking for the committee of the Council which arranged these lectures, thanks the groups who facilitated Professor Nilsson's tour.

In the first lecture, "The Countryside," we accompany an imaginary Greek peasant through his day; we look at the mountains for signs of Zeus the Cloud-gatherer, lay a stone on a roadside heap sacred to Hermes, call on Pan, the protector of the sheep; we watch for centaurs and silenoi, pass a cave with reverence for the nymphs who live there, wonder whether there will be signs of Artemis in a grove, and walk with prayer past a hero's tomb. These thoughts and acts were those of country-dwelling Greeks from early times through all the changes of the Greek world, and many Greeks today live under the influence of some of these old feelings. In the Greek countryside one could never have gone far "without meeting a little shrine, a sacred

enclosure, an image, a sacred stone, or a sacred tree. Nymphs lived in every cave and fountain" (p. 18). We are too likely to forget that the Greeks were mostly peasants and villagers, and that only a few cities were commercial and urbanized to a degree which made this peasant religion seem superstition. A section on hero cults ends this lecture.

"A survey of the Greek festivals with rites which are really important from a religious point of view shows that an astonishing number of them are agricultural" (p. 23). Festivals had been set previous to the state calendars, and in many instances were too fixed to be displaced by any later manipulations of the year. The Thesmophoria, Thalysia, and the Thargelia are noticed; in the last, two mingled concepts are shown—that of the scapegoat loaded with the sins of the people and that of an old "vegetation spirit" driven out to let a new come in. At the same festival the offering of first-fruits seems to have been not only a thank offering but a way of insuring fertility for the grain; the symbolic offering of first-fruits, common to the Thargelia, Thalysia, Pyanopsia, and the Eleusinian Mysteries, looks prehistoric in origin and persists today in ceremonies of the Greek Church.

It is surprising that the olive does not have any special festival; the vine brings many, one of the most important being the Anthesteria at the pruning of the winter vines. In Athens, on one of the days of the festival, "the wine was brought to the sanctuary of Dionysus in the Marshes, mixed by the priestesses, and blessed before the god; everyone took his portion in a small jug, and hence this day is called 'the Festival of the Jugs' " (p. 33). There are a number of vine and wine festivals not connected at all with Dionysus; many rural festivals are pre-deistic, and not all were attached to divinity after the gods arrived.

The May bough, or eiresione, was carried in many festivals, a "symbol of life and of the renewal of life" (p. 38); it was used in an Apollo festival, and Professor Nilsson thinks it "likely that the laurel became his (Apollo's) holy tree because it was often used for May boughs" (p. 39). Also the thyrsus carried by maenads was "just a May bough" (p. 39); and the crown of flowers the Greek wore at sacrifices and banquets, and when speaking in the assembly, was a form of this branch which gave good luck.

The third lecture is a description of the religion of Eleusis; this chapter is marked by a willingness to forego absolute conclusions which is a great relief from the many attempts of scholars to force a pattern and an interpretation upon the Eleusis cult. Professor Nilsson concludes that we cannot find out either the definite ceremonies or the definite beliefs of this festival, though we can be sure that the most impressive part of the cult drama was something witnessed by most of the participants and not something done by them. In early Greece the festival was not for the promising of immortality or spiritual rebirth; it was an old agrarian cult whose purpose was prayer for the new grain.

Pluto is a form of the word plutos, wealth; in Greece tithes of grain were stored in underground jars or silos; Pluto is the personified wealth of this store of grain, but being underground he was naturally associated with the dead, and in the Eleusis myth is king of the underworld. The time when Persephone is away from earth is usually thought to be the winter, but grain is sprouting and growing in winter in Greece; it is, rather, the period between June and October, during which the fields are bare and dry, that Persephone spends in the palace of Pluto. Her resurrection comes in October, when the seed corn is raised from the underground granaries and sown, and this is the time of the Eleusinian festival. The well-known vase painting in which "A great female head emerges from the ground, and satyrs strike it with large hammers" is explained as the second rising of Kore, at the time when the new grain is just sprouting and the fields are smoothed with large hammers (as modern fields are rolled after the planting). This sprouting of the new grain was symbol of the persisting life of man, but man as a member of a group. At the end of the fifth century this trust in the continuance of the life of the family or clan was made personal, and the promise of immortality of the individual and happiness for him in the next world, if he had been initiated in the mysteries while on earth, became important in the Eleusis faith. Yet, even in the late days of the cult, there seem to have been no rigid dogmas but "only some simple fundamental ideas about life and death as symbolized in the springing up of the new crop from the old. Every age might interpret these according to its own propensities. Thus the persistence of the most venerable religion of ancient Greece is explained. Its power was a result of the absence of dogmas

and of its close connection with the deepest longings of the human soul" (p. 63).

"The House and the Family" speaks of how much the Greek loved his house, and how he looked upon it as a refuge from the out-of-doors long after the Greek countryside became safe from beasts and robbers. Protectors of the house were Zeus Herkeios, Zeus Kataibates, Zeus Ktesios, and the Dioscuri. The Dioscuri and Zeus Ktesios often appear as serpents, not because of chthonic connections but because of the very old veneration of the house snake, which united the thought of the god with the habit of revering and trusting the serpent; in Crete the snake accompanied the goddess who was the guardian of the king's house; later Athena inherits this serpent from her.

Zeus as father of gods and men is an intimate, not a cosmic, figure; he is a father as a mortal man is father, the protector and head of his house.

The fifth lecture is called "The Cities; the Panegyreis." In it the cults of the city-states are contrasted with country celebrations; under the tyrants and prosperous democracies, festivals were elaborate, and the whole population participated; the impressiveness of the festival exalted the great gods but also identified them with patriotism rather than religion. As the great gods became more remote from daily approach many people turned to other and newer divinities: Hecate, Cybele, Bendis, Asclepius, Adonis, or lesser figures.

"Legalism and Superstition; Hell" is the sixth lecture; legalism is the fulfilling of religious commandments and observances with rigid regularity; in such rules for conduct as Hesiod gives in the *Works and Days* we may see a tendency among the Greeks to live by meticulous and often superstitious attentions; but the Greek sense of balance prevented legalism from really imprisoning religious thought and action. The state cults may have helped in freeing the individual, for the large festivals had less concern with detail than private cults had.

One of the common superstitions of Greece was the feeling that unusual praise was dangerous; Agamemnon, shunning the royal carpets Clytemnestra spreads for him, and Polycrates, trying to lose part of his wealth, are examples of men shunning hybris, "the feeling of being supported by good luck."

"The general opinion is that the Greeks of the classical age were happily free from superstition. I am sorry that I am obliged to refute this opinion. There was a great deal of superstition in Greece, even when Greek culture was at its height and even in the center of that culture, Athens" (p. 111). Magic was trusted for the healing of diseases, the raising of the dead, the bringing of rain; witches maimed or burned puppets made to resemble persons whom it was hoped to harm; curses inscribed on tablets were buried in the earth with the belief that the individuals named would sicken and die.

The afterworld in the mind of the Greek peasant today is essentially that of the ancient Greek Hades, "with its pale, dumb, powerless shadows" (p. 115). The concern of the Greek with justice made not only Orphic but also popular thought provide in Hades a place for punishment of sins not atoned for before death; the fear of these punishments was very real in the popular mind and not unknown among the more intelligent.

The last chapter is called "Seers and Oracles"; it has not been sufficiently realized how great an effect prophets and oracles had upon even the cultivated man; in everyday life the oracle was a source of comfort and direction in one's constant desire to know the future or solve the present; and in unusual dangers, such as those of a warrior in battle, favorable auspices or encouragement from an oracle was enough to change fear to hope and reluctance to courage; occasional charlatanism or evasive answers on an oracle's part could not destroy the daily faith of the ordinary man. When the sophists and natural philosophers did harm to the old faiths, the seers and the oracles were defenders of traditional religion.

These lectures are presumably printed in the form in which they were delivered; the style is that of the spoken word; sentences are short and uncomplicated, and the language, for the most part, is suitable to the mixed audiences—scholars and laymen—to whom Professor Nilsson spoke; the subjects of the lectures are not treated exhaustively, but, on the other hand, even the material which sounds introductory or elementary bears the marks of long study and final conviction; they draw upon the text of Professor Nilsson's sizeable *Geschichte der griechischen Religion,* which is to be published soon. Though parts of each lecture would certainly interest many a reader, these are not popular lectures in the American sense of the word. It is the student

and the scholar, or at least the person sympathetic to the attitudes of paganism, who will most enjoy this book, for Professor Nilsson assumes, unconsciously perhaps, a certain acquaintance on the part of his listeners with names and ideas.

Though there is only the politest reference to other scholars, Professor Nilsson's views are firmly held, and he has occasion to deplore certain recent tendencies in the study of Greek religion: the attempt to systematize Greek cults into closed circles of thought, the emphasis upon the primitive in classical religion, and the neglect of the popular religion for the large cult. These lectures are an invitation to look at the simple man in country or town and to realize that his views outlasted, in their original forms, state cults, sophists and political expansions. The reader is warned that Christianity, with its effort to keep only the most exalted religious concepts, is poor preparation for understanding Greek religion, where folklore and superstitions were a part of even the highest cults; and Christianity with its emphasis upon creeds does not lead us to appreciate a religion where the emphasis was upon practices rather than dogmas, where piety was shown by acts not words.

There are many places in these lectures where one finds old themes clarified; concerning the omphalos at Delphi Professor Nilsson says, "In origin it was neither a tomb nor the center of the world, but simply one holy stone among many which was made famous by the fame of the god" (p. 79). In other places there are more abstract conclusions which the reader would like to linger over, and which could be the subject of discussion; the form of the lectures does not allow Professor Nilsson to give the history of the investigations which have preceded decisions of meaning; such a place occurs in the chapter on superstitions, where the peasant's ideas of Hades are spoken of: "Plato's own detailed accounts of the other world and of metempsychosis must be passed over here, for they are myths created by him and have nothing to do with popular ideas. Their influence on the future, however, was great and fateful" (p. 119).

Professor Nilsson has long been trusted for the sanity of his views on Greek religion, for the quiet reserve with which he confirms or questions old ideas, or presents new ones after treating with equal reverence ideas and the evidence for them. This sanity continues in

these lectures and produces interest and curiosity in the reader, for this attitude is not merely one of reserve and abstinence from forced or over-subtle interpretations; it is also positive and shows an inner excitement over the thoughts and feelings which rule men's lives, and a devotion to the Greeks, not only as Greeks, but also as men and women within what Masefield called "the old proud pageant of man." A humanist as well as a scholar has written this book.

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Jewish Proselyting in the First Five Centuries of the Common Era. By William G. Braude. Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1940. viii + 142 pp. $2.50.

Every spiritual faith is a missionary faith. Wherever religion transcends local material interests, wherever it meets the fundamental needs of man as man, its adherents feel the urge to share it. If they themselves truly believe that their doctrine restoreth the soul, they are driven to bring other men within the range of its beneficent influence. The methods of missionary endeavor may vary; the basic impulse is an essential element of spiritual religion.

Judaism, as a universal religion with a spiritual message, possesses this missionary aspect. It is reflected in many Biblical passages, notably in the later chapters of the Book of Isaiah, in Jonah and Ruth, and in many of the Psalms. It is also reflected in Hellenistic-Jewish literature, which includes at least one work—the original portions of the Sybilline oracles—of plainly propagandistic intent. It has been generally agreed by all students that, for several centures before the Christian era, the Jews of the Hellenistic world sought and obtained many converts to their faith.

But regarding the situation in Palestine, there has been more difference of opinion. Many Christian scholars, starting from the false assumption that the religion of the Pharisees (and their successors, the Rabbis) was narrowly and exclusively nationalistic, have asserted that Palestinian Judaism discouraged proselytes, admitted them grudgingly, and treated them as an inferior caste. Even Jewish writers, whose greater knowledge of the sources saved them from such a distorted view, have supposed that there was a division of opinion among the

Rabbis, some favoring, some opposing conversion, and that the unfavorable attitude was intensified after the rise of Christianity and the persecution under Hadrian.

Actually, an objective scrutiny of Rabbinic literature shows that throughout the Talmudic period (roughly through the fifth Christian century) the teachers of Judaism consistently favored proselyting, did everything they could to enhance the dignity and happiness of converts, and—despite the misfortunes which overtook the Jewish people during those years—were surprisingly successful in winning proselytes. Such an objective study is provided by Dr. Braude in his *Jewish Proselyting*. This excellent monograph combines a wide range of learning with a clear, synthetic presentation. Within less than one hundred and fifty pages the author has condensed the results of extended reading in the sources, as well as in modern literature on the subject. The most significant statements of the Talmud are lucidly presented and accurately related to one another. From the abundant evidence, the conclusions drawn by Dr. Braude follow necessarily: that Rabbinic Judaism, a spiritual faith, sought and welcomed newcomers to its ranks.

While giving due attention to the non-legal, homiletic utterances about proselytism, Dr. Braude properly devotes the greatest amount of space to the halakic or legal materials, since these represent the "official" norms of Rabbinic Judaism. These regulations cover not only the requirements which the candidate for conversion must fulfil, and the ceremonies by which he is received into the Jewish fold, but also his status after conversion. Dr. Braude examines, in turn, the rights and obligations of the convert in the religious community, his position as regards government and judiciary, the marriage laws particularly affecting him, and his status as to inheritance and other economic relations. Each chapter, after full presentation of the evidence, concludes with a useful summary in which the meaning and intent of the legislation is made plain. Dr. Braude shows that even where special laws affect the proselyte, their purpose is not discriminatory. They stem largely from the fact that before his conversion the proselyte was a heathen, and that by his conversion he became (legally) a "new born child," his previous ties of blood and legal relationship being completely severed.

One of the most original chapters deals with "The Proselyte in

Government and Judiciary." By and large, converts were excluded from public office. Conservative prejudices kept these offices, not alone in the hands of native Jews, but in those of "old families." The aristocracy barred proselytes from office, not because they were proselytes but because they were not aristocrats. Dr. Braude makes out, however, an excellent case for his contention that a number of Rabbis worked over a period of centuries and with increasing success, to break down these restrictions and to admit proselytes also to positions of honor and responsibility.

Another new contribution of the author is his interpretation of the famous saying "Proselytes are as hard on Israel as leprosy."[1] This saying, attributed to Rabbi Helbo (3rd-4th centuries), has been frequently cited as typical of Rabbinic hostility to proselytes. How far this is from a true picture was shown, once for all, by Israel Lévi (*Revue des Études Juives*, vol. 51, pp. 1 ff.). It should be added that the exact meaning of Rabbi Ḥelbo's saying is not certain, as evidenced by the fact that seven different interpretations are given in the commentaries of Rashi and the Tossafists.

To these Dr. Braude now adds an eighth. R. Ḥelbo's saying, he holds, is not an expression of opinion, but a description of fact. From the time when Christianity became the official religion of the Empire, the Jews were forbidden to make converts, and increasingly heavy penalties were imposed on those who disobeyed. R. Ḥelbo lived at the time of the Council of Nicaea, and his statement simply means that it had become dangerous for Jews to accept converts. (Nevertheless they continued to do so.) Dr. Braude's interpretation is certainly ingenious and not implausible. To prove or disprove its correctness, however, does not seem possible.

This book was of special interest to the reviewer, first because of his personal friendship for the author, and second, because he had himself published a somewhat more detailed study of the same subject about a year earlier, *Proselytism in the Talmudic Period* (Cincinnati, 1939). He is happy to note that the two studies, pursued independently arrive at substantially the same conclusions.

In closing, some comments on specific points. Dr. Braude (p. 13

1. Braude, following G. F. Moore, renders "are as troublesome as the itch," which would suggest that they are merely a nuisance. But *sappaḥat* (Lev. 13.2) is a symptom of leprosy, i.e., an ailment of the gravest sort.

and n. 6) cites a story in which R. Eliezer b. Hyrkanos refuses to accept a woman as a proselyte because of her immoral character, after which R. Joshua b. Chananiah receives her. But the context, and a Talmudic parallel both indicate that the case refers not to a candidate for conversion but to a penitent heretic.[2]

On pages 114 ff., Dr. Braude deals with the controversy as to whether or not converts may marry bastards (*mamzerim*), a union forbidden to born Jews in Deut. 23:34. R. Jose permits such marriages, R. Judah forbids them. Says Dr. Braude: "I am inclined to see in R. Jose's decisions a decided effort at levelling and an attack against incipient caste stratifications in Jewish life; whereas R. Judah clings to the traditional divisions." But this interpretation cannot be maintained. An incident which Braude himself quotes (p. 115) shows that proselytes resented the rule that they might intermarry with *mamzerim*, for this permission implies that converts are not in every sense members of "the congregation of the Lord." It was their full membership that R. Judah, a warm champion of proselytes upheld, whereas R. Jose appears to have been rather cool to converts.[3]

If a convert dies without children born subsequent to his conversion, his estate is ownerless and goes to the first person who takes possession of it. To Dr. Braude's treatment of this topic (p. 128 ff.) the following remark should be added. The topic occupies a disproportionate space in Talmudic writings because of its casuistic interest. In Rabbinic law, no Jew can die without heirs, since all Jews are ultimately related through the patriarchs. If the search is continued far enough, an heir can always (theoretically) be found.The case of the childless proselyte was the only one in which an heirless estate could exist; and this case fascinated the legalists. Though a few cases occurred in which the law was invoked, the frequent references to it are to be explained in terms of its special dialectic appeal.

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A Spanish Tudor: The Life of "Bloody Mary." By H. F. M. PRESCOTT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. xiii + 562 pp. $5.00.

Miss Prescott's study of the life of Mary Tudor, daughter of Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon and Queen of England, 1553-

2. See B. Bamberger, *op. cit.*, p. 235.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 81 f., 284.

1558, should interest all students of religion for two reasons. First, it is an admirable psychological study of an unusually devout woman whose loyalty to Catholicism, in opposition to her father, made her, long before her accession, a symbol of the "old and ancient religion," and who viewed her accession, unlikely as it had earlier been, as a clear sign from God that she was his chosen instrument to restore the Church. In the second place, the study of necessity covers one of the most fascinating periods in the history of English Church and State relations. It begins with King Henry's original break with Rome and dissolution of the monasteries, continues through the Edwardian Reformation, with its first Act of Uniformity and the first English Prayer Book, and closes with Mary's unsuccessful attempt to restore the Catholic Church—an attempt which culminated in the three years of persecution during which close on three hundred men and women were burned because of religious differences.

A new Mary Tudor is here portrayed. Instead of the "Bloody Mary" of popular history—self-willed, bigoted, and cruel—Mary is seen as a very ordinary woman, simple and sincere, caught in a situation with which she could not cope, yet from which her sense of loyalty to God and to England would not let her escape. According to Miss Prescott, Mary's struggle with her father and her acknowledgment, in a fit of panic, of him as "Supreme Head of the Church in England" and of his marriage to her mother as "incestuous and unlawful" marked Mary for life. "In every crisis of her life afterwards she remembered this, and in the shadow of that memory, made her decisions. She never could . . . weigh reason of state against reason of state; all she could do was to try, groping and fumbling, to find out what was right for her to do, as a single human soul, like any other, before God's judgment seat, and then to do it, regardless of wisdom, deaf to argument or persuasion, not daring to compromise or turn back, because once in her life she had known what was right, and had not done it" (p. 89). Mary needed but lacked all those gifts of intuition, judgment, and political aptitude that Elizabeth had in such full measure. "Conscience with her took the place of judgment, and, applied to policy, conscience is a deceivable and deceiving guide unless it is enlightened by a quick and sensitive imagination" (p. 221). Little wonder that the politically astute Renard said of her, "I know the Queen . . . so simple, so little experienced in worldly matters, and such a novice in all things . . . I believe that if God does not preserve her she

will be lost." Such was the woman brought to the throne at a time when problems were to be solved that even the most perspicacious found impenetrable.

It was Mary's misfortune, too, that the religious settlement she earnestly desired was inextricable from economic and political issues. Except for these, she might have succeeded in her efforts. However, King Henry's dissolution of the monasteries and his distribution of the spoil had shackled together the cause of dogmatic reform and the self-interest of a grasping and unprincipled new nobility. These men interpreted a return to Catholicism as endangering their holdings and Protestant tenets as in keeping with their selfish interests. So, too, left to itself, England might have settled its religious problem in some less violent manner. But Mary's reign was dominated by foreign affairs. Mary was the key figure in the diplomatic duel between the Emperor Charles V and King Henry II of France. Both were playing for high stakes, the control of Europe, the Emperor believing that Mary's marriage to his son Philip would complete the encirclement of France; Henry II, in like manner, casting Edward Courtenay for the part of Mary's husband. It was almost inevitable that Mary should lean toward Spain: the Emperor had stood by her during both her struggle with her father and, later, with Edward; Spain was the country of her mother's youth; and Mary distrusted, as well she might, the English nobility. Her marriage with Philip, Spaniard and Catholic, at a time when national sentiment was growing, made well-nigh impossible any happy religious settlement. The English generally feared Spanish rule; English Protestants remembered the Inquisition in Flanders, and the French did what they could to increase the fears of the Protestant party. Had Mary remained single, she might have been spared much sorrow. But she feared that the Protestant Elizabeth would succeed her. She hoped, despite the fact that she was almost forty and from a stock notorious for its incapacity to produce healthy offspring, that, to quote Miss Prescott, "as God had wrought a miracle to set her on the throne, He would as miraculously perfect his work by giving her a son to make safe the restoration of the old Church" (p. 253). Again Mary's sense of religious duty brought about her tragedy.

The author's appraisal of the responsibility of those involved in the persecution from which Mary received her inglorious nickname is objective and fair. She considers in turn Chancellor Gardiner, Bishop

Bonner, Cardinal Pole, Philip, and the Queen. Mary is not exonerated, but neither is she made the cruel, Catholic fanatic of popular Protestant tradition. The truth is that the early part of Mary's reign had been marked by a startling clemency and forbearance. Against the advice of her councilors, Mary had pardoned most of those who twice had taken up arms against her. So, too, she had given no encouragement to the Chancellor's desire to revive the old heresy laws. At the outset of her reign "she had solemnly declared that she wished for nothing else but the restoration of the old Church and peace for all" (p. 374). Indeed, the author states that even during the period of persecution, "Such people as made no stir about their Protestantism might . . . go safe the whole reign through, provided some enemy did not inform against them and force the hand of complaisant Justices of the Peace or Bishops" (p. 377). Unfortunately, much of Protestantism was linked with sedition and foreign intrigue, and Protestant pamphlets encouraging disobedience, and Protestant support of rioting all over the South and East of England could not be ignored. These were probably much more responsible than was Protestant theology for the Government's policy. Against this background of disorder and rebellion, the policy adopted by Mary and her Council is made understandable, ghastly and mistaken though it now appears.

Throughout the book Miss Prescott has fused rigorous scholarship with the creative imagination and sympathetic understanding of the novelist. The result is a study which will receive the approval of the most exacting historian and yet will be followed with ease and interest by the average reader.

In addition to the bibliography, the "note on authorities"—six pages at the end of the book devoted to a detailed description of the sources used by the author—will assist scholars particularly interested in this period.

CYRIL K. GLOYN

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Congregationalism in the Dutch Netherlands: The Rise and Fall of The English Congregational Classis, 1621-1635. By RAYMOND PHINEAS STEARNS. Chicago: The American Society of Church History, 1940. vii + 151 pp. $3.00.

This brief monograph gives us a detail of the history of the Congregationalists, but a significant one. It is a story of "an organized group

of Puritan refugees in the Dutch Netherlands," most of whom belonged to that sect later known as Congregationalists, and it "treats of one of the earliest, possibly the first, successful attempts to practice the Congregational polity on an inter-church scale." The time is roughly between the years 1621 and 1635. Half the volume consists of twenty documents, or extracts from documents. They enlarge upon the text but also, most of them previously unpublished, they make their own contribution to Puritan and Congregationalist history, notably the story of the erection of the English church at Utrecht, and Thomas Hooker's answers to John Paget's "20 Propositions." Text and documents also throw light upon early New England history, Anglo-Dutch relations, and the English Merchant Adventurers in the Low Countries.

Apart from this monograph and its author's article "The New England Way in Holland," *The New England Quarterly*, there would seem to exist no other account of the English Congregational experiment in the Dutch Netherlands. Though contemporary writers must have known something of it, the author finds only "distorted hints" concerning it in the works of English Civil War polemical pamphleteers, and recent historians, with some hazy awareness, have passed it by.

Why this important chapter should have escaped attention as it has Professor Stearns does not hazard a guess, but may it not possibly be due, in part, to the very diversity of the movements upon which it throws light as noted above? Moreover, the decade and a half of this story was unusually dynamic. In the preceding year the *Mayflower's* cargo of Puritans had landed in America. Already the Thirty Years' War was on in Europe, and in England the mines were being laid for revolution, while in the year this story opens Spain renewed her war against the Dutch. Here was movement and confusion enough to obscure the activities of a little handful of English Puritans furtively experimenting on a foreign shore. Professor Stearns might have brought into focus that setting of war which must have contributed much to the climate of opinion, if not to the story in hand, and which perhaps buried this chapter so deeply that not till now has it been uncovered.

Of all the factors that have gone into the making of the "American mind," none has been more continuous nor more persuasive than Puritanism. In the words of Miller and Johnson, it has been of all

factors, "perhaps the most conspicuous, the most sustained, and the most fecund."

The term Puritan, however, of all terms in American culture, is, perhaps the most difficult of definition, for the Puritan, in his seventeenth century England, was an Englishman, his culture varying only in particulars from that of all other Englishmen. The root of this variation, as Professor Stearns says, "lay in the Puritan belief that 'Christ hath left us so perfect a rule and Discipline' in the Bible that the Scriptures were . . . 'the only foundations of our faith and the rule and canon of all truth.' "

But "so perfect a rule" in the hands of imperfect men led to divers interpretations and many sects. The Puritans of the episode of this book were that sect today known as Congregationalists or, more exactly, as "nonseparating Congregationalists," for they neither denied that the Anglican church was a true church nor professed separation from it as did the Brownists. They arose during the reign of James I and were recognized as followers of Henry Jacob and Dr. William Ames. A Church, said Jacob, "is a particular Congregation being a spirituall perfect Corporation of Believers having power in it selfe immediately from Christ to administer all Religions meanes of faith to the members thereof." To this Ames added that "believers doe not make a particular church . . . unlesse they be joyned by a speciall bond among themselves." Beyond the particular congregation there was no ecclesiastical authority. This did not discredit all sorts of Synods. "It is the Ruling, and not the Deliberative Synod, which we except against," and Ames said that the particular churches ought to fellowship in Classes and Synods.

The experiment in Congregational polity by Jacobite and Amesian refugees in the Dutch Netherlands is the subject of Professor Stearns's book. The rise and the fall of their classis is the body of the story. In 1621, eleven English and Scottish ministers, most of them in exile, petitioned James I for permission to establish a classis. Their petition was granted, and then to escape Dutch ecclesiastical authority they petitioned the Dutch States General for permission to organize a classis of English and Scottish ministers independent of Dutch authority. Successful in their petitions, they thus created "the Synod of the English and Scottish Ministers in the Netherlands."

The leader in this movement was John Forbes, with ten other

ministers associated with him. Later additions brought the number to a score, Thomas Hooker, Hugh Peter, and John Davenport being among these latter.

Hardly had the classis been established when the course of its downfall set in. Communication with nonconformists in the homeland afforded grounds for suspicion, and the succession to the throne in 1625 of Charles I, with his devout Anglicanism and his "popish" queen, frustrated Puritan hopes in England. Then when William Laud rose to high positions in the Church a fresh flow of exiles set in for the Netherlands.

At this turn of events, the classis had hardly more than succeeded in surviving a government investigation of charges of the assumption of unwarranted powers. As it was, it succeeded only by adding "weasel words" to argument.

The coming of Thomas Hooker, in flight from Laud, led to the arousing of Dutch opposition to the classis. An attempt to associate Hooker with John Paget in the English church at Amsterdam resulted in Paget's confronting Hooker with "20 Propositions" for his consideration, and then placed the Propositions and Hooker's answers before the Dutch classis of Amsterdam. Hooker's replies convinced the Dutch of the gap between this foreign classis and both the English church and their own.

Then came trouble at Delft between Edward Misselden, resident Deputy of the Merchant Adventurers, and John Forbes, long-time minister of the Delft congregation, over matters of membership in this Congregation. Challenged in his authority, Misselden finally reported Forbes's nonconformity and that of the whole classis to the Privy Council in London. And there ultimately Forbes also carried his side of the case. The results were disastrous for the Congregational classis. Determined to eradicate nonconformity of the English ministers in Holland, the home government put the case in the hand of its ambassador to the Netherlands, William Powell. His task was multiple, complicated, and delicate: the merchants at Delft and the English soldiers in the Dutch service must be brought to conformity, a case must be established for the disallowance of James's grant of liberty to the English classis, and the States General must be induced to rescind their commission to the classis. Nearly half of Professor Stearns's monograph is devoted to the tale of Powell's work. The story

cannot be told here, but suffice it to say that on every count His Majesty's ambassador was successful. The Congregational classis was dissolved, and its ministers obliged to conform either to the Church of England or to the Dutch Reformed Synod. There remained one way out for the conscientious Congregationalist—refuge in the New World. Hooker went thither in 1635, Davenport followed in 1637, and Hugh Peter went to the church at Salem, Massachusetts. Forbes and Ames both died before the end came.

This reviewer has tried to suggest the story of this monograph, not alone because it is one long lost and now found. But, now found, it proves to be an indispensable detail in the institutional beginnings of Congregationalism. All students of its history are in heavy debt to Professor Stearns. His book is closely knit and carefully written; an occasional "perhaps" suggests his caution, and his documentation attests to his scholarship. The documents appended are in large part taken from the papers of Sir William Boswell.

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Bishop Butler: Moralist and Divine. By William J. Norton, Jr. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1940. xi + 336 pp. $3.75.

Bishop Butler's speculations form, in the words of one of their most competent critics, "a cumbrous system, expressed in very loose phraseology" (Sir Leslie Stephens: *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. II, p. 52). Dr. Norton accepts this judgment, granting that Butler made "overt contradictory statements" and had a "desultory way of handling controversy" (p. 11). But he takes the criticism as valid of the literary form rather than of the philosophical principles of the Bishop. In line with the treatment of Butler given by Mr. C. D. Broad, in his *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, Dr. Norton carries through a systematic and detailed exposition of what Butler really meant, or perhaps of what Butler largely meant and ought to have meant more entirely. It is a convincing exposition: it goes beyond verbal difficulties to structural principles of thought; it significantly relates Butler's ethics to his theology, by the same technique by which it consistently relates to each other the varied elements within Butler's ethical thought. Its method is dangerous, for one ought never to con-

fuse what a man said with what he might better have said in order to validate his thinking. But Dr. Norton has, I think, escaped the dangers to which his method exposed him. His readers will escape the dangers too, provided that they observe a footnote on p. 21, according to which the analysis given of Butler's thought "is nowhere worked out by Butler with the degree of detail and argument here presented, but is only suggested by him in its most general outlines."

The book by Dr. Norton is divided into six parts. Part II, on "The Psychology of the Moral Self," and Part V, "The Nature of the Universe," are the most important, as indeed the themes were Butler's two major concerns.

Butler's central ethical principle, Dr. Norton brings out, is that virtue consists in following the nature of man. The moralist must then spend much time in psychological analysis. According to Butler, man's nature has four fundamental tendencies: self-love, benevolence, particular propensions (or affections), and conscience. The evil life is the disjointed or disconnected life. The good life is the organized life in which all four tendencies are unified. The organized life is effected by the proper adjustment of the tendencies. Benevolence and the particular propensions can be adjusted, because one of the particular propensions is compassion. Self-love and the particular propensions can be adjusted, because the former, when it becomes rational, imposes restraining influence on the latter, and the latter compel the former to be concrete and determinate. Self-love and benevolence can be adjusted, because the self is progressive and developing, must be at once individual and social in order to develop fully, and under rational guidance becomes increasingly conscious of its ideal destiny. Conscience, however, is not on a par with the other tendencies; it is rather that which *de jure* has absolute authority. Conscience is the group of correlated activities, rational, emotional, and hortatory, in which we deal practically and speculatively with right and wrong. Its specific judgments may at times be wrong, as is seen in the fact that it recasts its former decisions; but its general canons ("justice, veracity, and regard to common good") are indubitable. Conscience is more than a faculty of approval or disapproval; it is the active correlation of multiple aims whereby the scattered self is transformed into a completed and unified self. To follow man's nature and to be guided by conscience are thus equivalent expressions. "To follow one's nature would

be to express oneself according to the dictates of conscience" (p. 253).

Butler's ethics leads on into his metaphysics. For, as man is a systematic whole in process of progressive unification, so with the world. When we view things casually, we regard them as separate; but when we view them carefully, we find them members of systems, which systems are all eventually contained within greater systems and finally within one all-inclusive system. The more inclusive systems are not constituted by the actual alone but also by the ideal, i.e., by meanings and values potential within the actual and indicated thereby. The universe as a whole turns out to be a totality that is best understood in terms of teleology. Not simply is everything contained within one scheme, but the lesser systems (e.g., the natural order) are formed and governed in subservience to the superior systems (e.g., the moral order). And the moral order leads on to the religious, because order indicates the presence of intelligence, and moral order indicates the presence of an intelligence that can only be called God. The initial statement that man ought to follow his nature is therefore but a preliminary way of expressing the more final statement that man ought to follow the teachings of religion or the will of God (p. 270). Such a conclusion has, of course, difficulties to be overcome; but Butler dealt with these difficulties in his well-known *Analogy*, which has been much more often read than the ethical sermons and has been more adequately examined by former writers than have the ethical principles of Butler.

Dr. Norton's thorough work will be of distinct service to students of the history of ideas. Even if it makes Butler more consistent than Butler ever made himself, it presents effectively a point of view in the light of which a rereading of Butler becomes more interesting and more profitable.

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The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism, 1865-1915. By Charles Howard Hopkins. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. xii + 352 pp. $3.00.

This epitome of a very much longer thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree at Yale University gathers source materials and general data as factual basis for understanding

the social gospel. More than 1,500 items used in this study are to be published as a supplementary bibliography. Lack of space also compelled the author to limit his study to approximately one-half century of the story of the American social gospel movement, thereby avoiding the necessity of sketching its decline and eclipse, if not demise. In his *The Course of American Democratic Thought,* Professor Ralph Henry Gabriel has already paid eloquent tribute to this work by one of his pupils, especially in a brilliantly written chapter, entitled "Protestantism Moves Toward Humanism."

In their estimates of Walter Rauschenbusch, our two authors seem to agree. According to Hopkins, the works of Rauschenbusch "were undoubtedly the most significant religious publications in the United States if not in the English language in the first two decades of the new century" (p. 216). According to Gabriel, "his was the only American plea for the social gospel that was heard across the Atlantic" (p. 326).

But articles and addresses by F. G. Peabody, Starr Jordan, W. W. Fenn, S. A. Eliot, G. A. Gordon, to mention a few, appear in European periodicals. *Die Christliche Welt* and a dozen *Zeitschriften,* including the comprehensive *Theologische Literaturzeitung,* contain numerous reviews of American books and articles in the social Christian field. Rauschenbusch himself, writing in 1918, thus describes the European reception of his books: "My book on *Christianizing the Social Order* has been published in Norway since the war; Swedish and Finnish translations are now being made; and a French edition of *Christianity and the Social Crisis* has been lying in a Paris publishing house since 1914, ready for publication when the war ends. On the other hand, in Germany, though I have had offers from perhaps a dozen good translators, no publisher has been ready to handle my books." His *Prayers for the Social Awakening* had to wait until 1927 before appearing in German.

One also wonders whether Rauschenbusch's influence was greater than that of Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong, Shailer Mathews, and others in the social Christian era. If so, it seems strange that one American publisher insisted upon a thousand volume guarantee before undertaking the publication of a Rauschenbusch biography, while another refused to add it to a series in course of publication. When, prior to the depression, in connection with the great forward movement at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, the attempt was made to raise

a $50,000 Rauschenbusch Memorial Lectureship fund, only the amount of $35,994.30 was finally realized, and that by alumni transferring their gifts from the general fund to this foundation. *The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* contains no article upon Rauschenbusch and devotes about three times as much space to the English as to the American social Christian development; Charles R. Henderson of Chicago is mentioned. Similarly, the Barnes and Becker *Social Thought from Lore to Science* mentions Henderson but not Rauschenbusch, whose books were translated into eight languages.

Turn now to George D. Herron, who for seven years was a very prominent and influential Middle Western preacher, popular with college and divinity school students, churches, forums, covering the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific, preaching that the kingdom was at hand, and courageous enough to join the socialist party. Exceedingly serious and interpreting himself as Messiah, Herron profoundly influenced Charles Sheldon, whose *In His Steps* ran to over twenty-three million copies, was translated into twenty-one foreign languages, and attained motion picture recognition, and Ralph Albertsen, who established the Christian Commonwealth Community of Georgia and the propaganda magazine, *Social Gospel*. Herron also founded the Rand School of Social Science and played a significant role in connection with Woodrow Wilson's efforts during the World War, as well as at the peace conference, and finally propagated his views abroad after that war. One is forced to conclude that Herron reached a larger audience and more effectively than Rauschenbusch.

The author's aim was a description rather than an interpretation of the rise of the American social gospel trend, and this digest of materials is very well done. Otherwise he could not have escaped the task of pointing out that a social emphasis in Christianity is very ancient, and manifested itself in many ways throughout the medieval period until checked by the rise of religious liberty, individualism, and especially the American doctrine of the separation of Church and state. The wider context also required a discussion of economic liberalism, as well as of economic determinism. Moreover, American experimentation in social Christianity begins in colonial times with the Labadists, Ephrata, the Shakers, being continued in quite a variety of later attempts to fulfil the demands of the gospel regarding the use of wealth by establishing religious communism.

One also misses a summary of reasons for the decline of the Ameri-

can social gospel, which included items like the following. On the whole, it was rather arm-chair and academic, failing to appreciate the values inherent in economic liberalism and the weaknesses inherent in co-operative trends. In the former, there is a "close connection between religion and morality; a high evaluation of personality; a devaluation of the sacramental; a secularization of nature; an exaltation of law; a religiously inspired intra-worldly activity." Or to quote Harnack, "without wealth, there cannot be culture." In all Utopianism, the problem of the family proves unsolvable; individual liberty must be surrendered; cultural aspirations must be suppressed; economic inadequacies soon emerge; and the selfishness of man persists. The attempt to Christianize economic determinism was pathetic, while the onslaught of biblical literalism upon the fundamental postulates of the social gospel was never warded off. When Herron dropped Christian phraseology in 1910, he wrote that "Jesus' view of life was inadequate to the social revolution." The fundamental weakness of the social gospel was its failure to take an historical attitude toward Jesus' view of the kingdom of God. For Jesus the kingdom of God was "principally in the future and wholly in the realm of miracle," and simply could not be identified with the twentieth century developmental theory. Organic evolution was utterly alien to the thinking of the early Church. Symbolic interpretations may produce new affections with great expulsive power which last a while, but the subsequent internal disintegration dooms all such evangelism to utter failure.

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The Ways of Things, A Philosophy of Knowledge, Nature and Value. By Wm. Pepperell Montague. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940. 712 pp. $4.00.

Two reasons impel Professor Montague to share his *Ways of Things* with the world at large and with students of philosophy in particular—the desire to get others to philosophize, and to win consideration for his own philosophy and its postulates. In addition to being an experiment and, with Whitehead, an "adventure in ideas," philosophy is for Montague a game, albeit a serious one. The game, however, is not merely a privilege; it is a right and, indeed, a duty. And the philosopher, be he professional or amateur, expert or duffer,

sane or crackpot, is "under the sacred obligation to submit his beliefs about nature and human duty to a critical examination, and in the light of all the evidence available work out, however tentatively, a philosophy of thought and action" (p. viii). Having likened philosophy to the game of golf played in earnest, Montague proceeds to call his shots in his choice of "special problems of many kinds in the domains of Knowledge, Nature, and Value."

The work is divided into two parts. Part I (170 pages) constitutes an Introduction to Philosophy. Part II contains Montague's mature "Philosophy of Knowledge, Nature and Value" (the subtitle of the book), and is composed of essays dating from 1940 back to 1904. There are no indications in the text that revisions have been made in reproducing the essays. One assumes, therefore, that the early esays were not merely *Jugendarbeiten*; rather they may be regarded as early but enduring insights. The book is a new type of introduction. The student is given the benefit of a fairly typical, though streamlined, survey and, in addition, is enabled to see not only "special" problems but a more advanced and detailed approach to philosophy treated in outline in the Introduction. He can also see the growth of one man's mind in fairly brief compass. Both the beginner and the advanced student (and indeed colleagues, as Montague makes clear in the last essay) may not always understand him in the advanced essays. The essays will nevertheless serve well to indicate to the student the thorniness of the path lying ahead.

In Part I Montague devotes two chapters to the ways of knowing. In the first of these he defends the syllogism and opens the way for his own theory of induction dealt with in Part II, Section I. In the second chapter he deals with the sources of knowing. While Chapter I gives the student a brief but adequate introductory knowledge of the syllogism, it fails, except for the specific defense of the syllogism and a statement of disagreement with Dewey's conception of logic as inquiry, to provide the student with any adequate idea of the conflict within the realm of logical theory. Chapter II will bring forth criticism not only of Montague's own position but of his specific definitions and judgments. Intuition defined as "imagination touched with conviction" ought to elicit some comment. The authoritarian, the mystic, the pragmatist, the above all the rationalist, will hardly welcome the judgment that their "precarious procedures" can well be reinforced

and corroborated by the "superior" tests of sense perception. Chapter III contains a most stimulating discussion of epistemology. Montague finds not only excellence but some compatibility in all competing theories.

Two chapters, IV and V, deal with the ways of being—one on the macrocosm and one on the microcosm, the latter leading, in Part II, to an extensive handling of the mind-body problem. Chapter VI deals with theology. Having characterized religion, in the Foreword, as a "philosophy of the heart and will," he presents theology as "Nature in relation to value." Its central problem is belief with reference to "a general or basic value pertaining to the world as a whole or embodied in its core"; that is, a power "at once stronger and higher than ourselves" (p. 17). Atheism, Pantheism and Polytheism are rejected, certainly with too much ease. Montague concludes that "there is too much evil in Nature for Theism in its traditional form to be true; and there is too much good in the world for Theism in some form not to be true" (p. 113). This ancient struggle between power and goodness he seeks to resolve in later essays by recourse to a finite deity. He believes he finds objective evidence for a God, infinite and eternal, but limited in power by his own body (Nature) which is "undergoing leavening and perfecting" (p. 123).

Chapter VII deals with aesthetics, and Chapter VIII with ethics, and both together with the ways of liking. At first glance it would seem that value as liking is purely subjective, but Montague's earlier statement that "to *like* anything is to accord it *value*" (p. 13) is now supplemented by the judgment that "the esthetic experience is a blend of *feeling* and *cognition*. It is an emotive perception." "Beauty is an attribute of a perceived object, and as such it *ought* to be perceived by everybody, for it is out *there* in the object . . ." (p. 131). Not only does he pluralize aesthetic values by including pain, sorrow, terror, horror, etc., along with beauty, but he continues his objective tendency by suggesting that we should regard these former "not only as exciting and thrilling but as wholesomely, if terrifying, instructive" (p. 138). However, in Part II Montague does not elaborate this point of view. He might have gone beyond distinguishing the aesthetic from the purely connational (p. 559) and indicated, as he does with respect to ethics, the way in which aesthetic value contributes to the substance and growth of the self.

In the chapter on "Ethics, Individual and Social," Montague goes beyond any purely sensory theory of the good to the idea of conscience the three components of which are prudence, sympathy, and suggestion. Of these, sympathy is the "most valuable," but suggestion is the "most important and distinctive" and permits man to add new dimensions to his life. Montague affirms that the "true function of moral value consists in an *increase of the substance of a life or self . . .*," but unfortunately in none of the later essays on ethics does he deal with the ways in which the new dimensions can be achieved. He merely gives hints in a reference to S. Alexander in the essay, "A Materialistic Theory of Emergent Evolution." In "The Missing Link in the Case of Utilitarianism," he mediates between sensory and non-sensory values; in "The Philosophy of Nietzsche," he mediates between the Christian and democratic and the aristocratic; in "Democracy at the Cross Roads," he mediates between individualism and collectivism. Even his "Law of Increasing Returns," developed in "The Geometry of the Good Life," does not contribute to this end. In short, somewhere between the quantitative increase of the substance of life and the establishment of recognition of new qualitative dimensions of life there is a gap in Montague's thinking which, it is to be hoped, he may yet bridge. He does, however, succeed, it seems to me, in keeping open the road to growth in a world in which sensory values cannot be denied and might as well be affirmed and given their due place.

"Philosophy is a vision as religion is a faith. The faith of religion is that values are immortal in the realm of existence. The vision of philosophy is of values that are eternal in the life of the spirit" (p. 171). This "Platonic revelation" prevents man from "committing the sin against his own spirit, the unforgivable sin of subordinating the ideal to the real and accepting whatever is as therefore right." The postulates upon which Montague's own organized inquiry rests are:

1. That consciousness is neither separate from material motion nor just an aspect of it, but is itself a high and special form of that same energy which manifests itself in matter and in life.

2. That nature is not only running down but also running up, and, in its long ascent from protons and electrons to the souls within our brains, displays the same strange type of power that we experience as mind.

3. That, therefore, there is more than mere analogy between what is highest in our inner selves and deepest in reality (p. viii).

These postulates, supplemented by a "touch of mystical experience," together with the superstructure of his thought, emerged slowly in a life early impressed by the facts and gaps of what we call the real world. In his concluding essay, "Confessions of an Animistic Materialist," he tells us that his philosophic career, initiated at an early age in the midst of experience, was soon characterized by an imbalance in which the mind-body problem was most important and religion next. Both the pattern of imbalance and empirical approach have continued to the present volume.

Montague believes he has discovered the "place" at which mental activity (sensations) begins, or has successfully shown how energy is transmuted into a special form, consciousness. His theory is that energy or spacial change can achieve infinite slowness and hence take a special form, namely, "duration," or "extension" in time, whose modes are memory and imagination. The theory has no recourse to an assumed or empirically undiscoverable vital principle, or to an emergent appearing mysteriously, or to the action of a transcendent metaphysical principle. If the pre-Aristotelian world sought an answer to the question: How can static matter be adequately conceived to be activated? it is Montague's problem to show how the material world or spatial change can be characterized intelligibly by infinite slowness. He must show, moreover, that infinite slowness, while logically a negation of the material world, is actually a principle both of activity or growth and also the way to a higher dimension of existence. Theoretically, it would seem that this solution is no more difficult to accept than the ideas of potential and kinetic energy in the physical world, were it not for the insistence that the point of transition is to be regarded as a point of growth and the emergence of a new dimension of existence. Both "growth" and the new "dimension" remain unaccounted for; they can only be postulated, if the old dualism of mind and matter is to be overcome. And dualism, he frankly admitted in 1930, is imposed upon him by "feeling and increasingly confirmed by the evidences of experience."

This theory of consciousness Montague then proceeds to link to the vision of philosophy and the Platonic revelation.

> Our minds are imbedded in the matter of our brains, and they play a real part in the economy of nature. It is just because of the physical reality of our minds that we can transcend the mechanical contacts of the *here* and *now*,

and, through memory and imagination, adjust our behavior not only to an environment extending indefinitely in space and time, but also to that Platonic realm of logical and ethical ideals which are independent of the vicissitudes of time and existence (pp. 480 f.).

Here is a philosophy which, as Montague says, can equally well be called "animistic or spiritualistic materialism."

Seen in the light of American thought since Peirce, Montague's philosophy takes its high place with those newer philosophies which do not seek to come to the *defense* of faith (in a spiritual world). Nor does it even, with specious generosity, seek to find a place for mind in a materialistic philosophy. It is rather a head-on attempt to solve the metaphysical problem by venturing where scientists fear to tread, not in the spirit of traditional Christian or quasi-Christian philosophy of religion, but in the hard-boiled spirit of science itself. And this spirit, more than the reaffirmation of the "Platonic revelation" of eternal values, seems to me to be the most important contribution of the great triumvirate of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle—and of Montague.

If we turn now to Montague's treatment of religion it seems, at first sight, to be characterized chiefly by its extreme complexness and also by its unclarity. Only a personal bias is clear: that religion is rooted in authority, eternally threatened by authority, if not continually expressive of it, and through authority may become valueless (p. 160), or even a menace (p. 521), especially when asceticism, that self-denial of the senses which precludes growth, is fostered. It is not clear whether Montague means that religion is apparently or essentially authoritarian in "spirit and method." He challenges religion to rid itself of authoritarianism and thus suggests that authoritarianism is not essential to religion. But if authority is not essential to the spirit of religion, why make it one of the factors which *essentially* distinguishes religion from philosophy, and from science?

Philosophy, Montague goes on to point out, is organized but free intellectual inquiry, embracing a recognition of a material world and a vision of eternal values. Religion, however, is a matter of "feeling and action" (or "practice"). That is, religion is a faith, and though it is the "philosophy of the heart," it is really philosophical only in its founders. On one point he is clear and unwavering, namely, that feeling and action "are largely social in character" and "are embodied in

ritual and custom, and pertain to a group." Religion is organized, but in contrast to a philosophy which is freely and individually constructed, "a religion is in general accepted by its followers on the basis of authority." In a sense, philosophy has no followers. Everyone is on his own.

Now one may assume that Montague is far too well informed, sophisticated, and retentive of memory not to be able to recall, quite aside from Whitehead's definition of religion as what a man does with his solitude, that there have been religious men who as individuals have stood apart from the group in their relation to a Divine power, or Reality, or the world, or society. Also, that both religious leaders and followers have existed in great number who have been far from ascetic both in action and thought. Also, that periods of history—not only that of Augustine and Aquinas, but that of Protestantism in the nineteenth century, featuring Schleiermacher, Channing, and others, likewise that of Upanishadic and Buddhistic India, of the China of Confucius, Moh Tse, and others—have revealed abundant evidences of the intellectual life in religion, and a freedom in expressing it. Indeed Montague recognizes that "every great religion embodies a vision of the world and of man's place in it, and in that respect it resembles a system of philosophy" (p. 3). It is, however, his considered opinion that finally religion and philosophy differ in "spirit and method," that religion is basically authoritarian in spirit, and markedly emotional and practical in method. A reading of the final essay, in which Montague relates his childhood experiences in Calvinistic New England, leads one to speculate on whether his opinion of the nature of religion may not be more conditioned than considered, for he seems early to have been deeply repelled by the authoritarian and ascetic spirit he found in his home community. He makes no mention, for example, of the great New England tradition of heterodoxy which includes such names as Williams, Franklin, Allen, Emerson, and Peirce. And yet here again we may assume a fairly intimate acquaintance with these giants of unpopular faith. Again one may, then, regard his opinion as a considered one.

With respect to the further elaboration of his thought, Montague follows, up to a point, the same procedure in his discussion of religion as of other topics. In the chapter on "Theology," he presents his brand of Theism as a creative insight leading beyond the stalemated

battle between no god at all and a god of arbitrary power. As a philosopher, he does not even bow in recognition of the Christian God who is both all-good and all-powerful. In this I feel he acted wisely; for, to say that God, for whom all things are possible, *is* good, *is* truth, solves nothing. It is to accept or to glorify a mystery, but it is not doing the work of the philosopher—offering an account of a thing which gains acceptance because of its rationality. The chapter on "Theology" (really Philosophy of Religion) is a presentation of rational grounds for his belief that it is most "probable" that God is "infinite and eternal like the universe which is his body," but "limited in power by that totality of possible and actual being which is within Himself yet not Himself, and which in what we may call evolution is undergoing the endless leavening and perfecting that such an infinite chaos would require" (p. 123). If perfecting means acquiring completeness and definiteness of form, then one wonders how that is possible for an "infinite chaos."

In a later essay, entitled "The Trinity—A Speculation," Montague attempts to reconcile in greater detail his God of finite power with the idea of an infinite and all-embracing God. There he seeks to show how the perfecting takes place, not only logically but actually. He argues for the strong probability that there is a single source for the existence of the diffused physical units of existence. The same is true of essences. "One ground for similars," he believes, "has about it a strongly axiomatic flavor" (p. 534). The essences are not wholly static. Essence, or subsistence, does not ensure the existence of any particular thing; it does, however, represent the limit of possible existences and makes impossible the existence of incompatibles (p. 278). This theory is later supplemented by the theory of "growth" (p. 535), both on the existential and subsistential level. Further augmented by Leibnitz's idea that possibility, represented by the essences, tends, when uninhibited, to become actual, the theory makes the world of existence "a sort of vector resultant of the tendencies to exist of all the essences."

From Montague's point of view, the world of existence is not slag, or the lowest level of reality. It is divinity or spirit incarnate. On the other hand, the realm of existence, unlike in Christianity, is not in need of redemption, but in need of further development. The universe, including this development, Montague now sets forth in trinitarian form. "God the Father" is the creative ground of the existential

and subsistential being. "God the Son" would be "its integrated and personal unity." "God the Holy Ghost," the ever present process we call evolution, is "the spirit of the Whole fructifying and organizing its own independent and self-existing parts." God is not a dead, nor a fully conscious, nor a blind God, but an awakening God. But this God awakens, not only to the chaos and evil in himself, but to his conscious personality and its potentialities. We are reminded more of Yaweh in the twenty-eighth chapter of Job who *discovers* Reason, rather than Zeus who has it forced upon him. Here is another doctrine of the Trinity, interesting in its way; yet the reviewer finds it difficult to understand why Montague (unless for mere aesthetic or nostalgic reasons, suggested, however, in the final essay) did not say simply that the universe is infinite, eternal, and inherently active, is coming to consciousness, achieving integration, and awakening to new possibilities. He is, to be sure, not a defender of a faith he regards as authoritarian yet a thing of "beauty" (p. 649), but he comes close in this essay to being an aesthetically minded fellow-traveler. Whether aestheticism linked to traditionalism is the best possible emphasis in contemporary religion is a highly debatable matter. This reviewer, for one, doubts the wisdom of such an emphasis.

Quite in contrast to this metaphysical approach, Montague, in an earlier essay on "The Promethean Challenge to Religion," identifies the Christian God with the Christian Church as he conceives it—a Church dominated by the ethics of love, and of asceticism and authority. He urges the Church to abandon the latter two. Indeed, by 1924, when the essay was written the Church had very largely done so. It had had a hundred years of free investigation at work within itself, and a hundred years of extensive co-operation with the then dominant forces in the modern world—science, capitalistic industry, and even democracy. In the period in which Montague wrote his essay the modern, non-ascetic character of the Church was probably at its height. The rains came and the floods, and the question now is: How able is a non-authoritarian and non-ascetic Church to withstand the pressures upon it, not from "democratic leadership," but from new forms of authoritarianism and new religions, the very coming of which Montague doubted? So much from the point of view of the Church.

There are also those who, though indifferent to the Church and

Christian doctrine, are far from indifferent to what the philosopher has to say on religion. To these Montague's speculations on the Trinity must seem like an interesting but unimportant exercise in that intellectual sphere of religion to which Montague gave so little attention in his initial effort to characterize religion. Though as religious men they may no longer go to the church of their fathers, yet they think and find themselves anew in their common life and its conditions, envision their future, have faith that vision and effort need not be abandoned. As religious men they do this both in solitude and in society. They do it as seekers (whom Montague would restrict essentially to the realm of philosophy) and as doers. They may or may not do it as ascetics. It is interesting that Montague never distinguishes empirically between the various forms of asceticism and their function in society, but without further ado pronounces asceticism to be denial of the senses and life-denying. Since asceticism, in addition to being many other things, is a way of counteracting numerous forms of authoritarianism, Montague may wish to revise both his characterization of it and his personal attitude toward it.

The religious philosophy of Montague is completed in his ethical essays on "The Philosophy of Nietzsche" and "Democracy at the Crossroads." In "The Promethean Challenge to Religion," the Church was charged with opposing "democratic leadership" (p. 521). In "The Philosophy of Nietzsche," he comes to terms with the challenge of Nietzsche that the might of the democratic majority is hardly desirable or right, though it had largely displaced both Zeus and Yaweh, and indeed Yaweh's Church. Montague proposes to drop asceticism from the Christian ideal, and the selfish egotism from Nietzsche's philosophy, and unite Christian altruism or love of other lives with the "will to power or the right and duty of affirming one's own life impulses" (p. 581). But as participators in the formation of policies of institutions to which we belong, what are our "own" life impulses?

The proposed solution seems to me to be schematically neat rather than illuminating. For surely Montague must have recalled that this way has been tried before. It is suggested in Plato's *Laws*, and in Augustine's desire to save men in spite of themselves. Finally, the Inquisition embodied it socially on a grand scale. We hoped, indeed, that we had escaped all inquisitions. Such a hope is dead, and we can only hope again. Did we not really believe, however, that in democ-

racy we had gone beyond both the will to power and altruism? Did we not believe that the will to power had been tempered with rationality and that altruism had been infused with scientific knowledge? Actually, of course, that belief was false, belied by our actions. But was not the insight that there was a form of conduct to be sought *beyond* both power and altruism a valid insight? I believe so.

Again, Democracy has advanced the two principles that "all men are equal in the sense that they have equal and uniform abilities" and that "all men are equal in the sense that they merit equal opportunities to develop their various and unequal abilities." Montague agrees with Nietzsche that the first is false, but the second he holds to be true. From Jefferson to Dewey men have supported the second thesis. Is it not also true, however, that under the surface our faith was never in the majority as a mob, nor yet in the majority as individuals, but in the majority—individually and collectively—as possessed of a genuine basic capacity for insight into the wise course of action? Perhaps that was a mistake. Surely, however, it is still a question whether the nation suffered from too much or too little leadership; suffered more from those who developed their various abilities or those who did not. Moreover, we have not yet forgotten past aristocracies; and the present new ones, bloated with both ethics and power, are not too pleasant to behold. Nor is Montague pleased with them, be they "red" or "white."

One is quite ready to agree with Montague that there is no necessary incompatibility between intensive leadership and extensive justice. Since, however, he said in another essay that philosophy must not exaggerate in the use of rational etiology by thinking away a component in a problem, yet must go beyond the world and its existing categories, is it not almost incumbent on Montague to speculate at this point as to how these leaders can be procured? This he does not do. Yet in all justice to him, with his customary bravery he did offer, in 1934, a plan in "Democracy at the Crossroads" by means of which intensive leadership might function so that extensive justice might possibly be procured and Democracy "saved." The plan called for a dual economy: a free economy for those prizing initiative, adventure, luck and profits, and a planned economy for the unemployed and those not interested in adventure and gambling. Whether

the plan would have worked had America been able to try it is now a matter of speculation. However, Montague failed to take into account our participation in world affairs, and that adventurers leave home. Like the democracy of Athens, modern democracy has been breaking on the rocks of imperialism and counter-imperialism. At this point Montague offers no solution.

To return then finally to the considered opinion of Montague. Though he holds that religion is feeling and practice, he devotes his chapter on theology in the Introduction, and the chapter on the Trinity, to the intellectual aspects of religion. Those who hold (presumably on the basis of evidence to be dealt with by the intellect) that there is a "basic value pertaining to the world as a whole or embodied at its core," have a theology. The faith of religion is that "values are immortal in the realm of existence." It is far from certain that this faith is so much a matter of revelation, feeling and action, and society as Montague thinks it is. The whole history of research in the field of religion in the last seventy-five years tends to reveal great disagreement among religious theorists, but few would say that religion needs to be viewed empirically, or yet rationally, as exclusively a matter of "revelation of divine truth." The "vision of the world," the human "intellectual analysis and creative imagination," would be regarded by many (and certainly by the reviewer) as a *primary* factor in religion. Religion, viewed historically at least, is secondly, certainly, not exclusively or originally a matter of feeling and action but also a matter of vision, of intellect. If the old triadic approach to religion must be taken, then surely the attempt to give special importance to one of these three—intellect, feeling, action—ought by now to be abandoned, for each in its own way is equally important. All are functions of religion. And finally, unless, the terms social and individual can be fruitfully redefined with hitherto unachieved clarity, it would be far better to abandon the effort to hold or to prove that religion is either individual or social. It is so obviously both—varying altogether with the field of activity of the individual and the group. Also, it seems well to point out that, empirically, religion can hardly be defined as faith in the immortality of values in existence. Surely the concepts of longevity and intensity of values have played no small roles and are coming to be more and

more worthy competitors in the history of religion. In short, Montague's basic distinctions seem to the reviewer the least fruitful part of his work.

In dealing thus finally with religion, it ought once more to be emphasized, as Montague himself does, that his first concern was, from earliest youth to the present, with the mind-body problem. Very probably, and with complete justification, he takes pride in his theory as to how the mind and the body are related. To suggest the principle of this relation, anergy, is to perform the function of the philosopher. To have set forth with similar specificity an equally fruitful principle by means of which man's relation to nature and man is made clear would have placed religion on a level in Montague's thought with the mind-body problem.

The world is sweeping past Montague's condemnation of authoritarianism and asceticism in religion. It is experimenting with new forms of authoritarianism on a large scale. If the newly envisioned forms of socialization fail, we can look forward to new forms of asceticism at least akin to those of the post-Platonic world. The forms and nature of asceticism may, therefore, deserve more positive study than Montague accords them.

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The Problem of Religious Knowledge. By DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xviii + 390 pp. $3.50.

This book does for religious knowledge what the author's previous work, *The Problem of Knowledge* (1915), has done for epistemology in general. It is, first of all, a survey of all the reputable theories of religious knowledge which have been expounded in recent years. To these theories the author brings a critical, analytical, and appreciative mind, cataloging them logically and helpfully. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to present the author's own position, which has been known to theologians since 1915 at least, in a more refined form. Against the background of the contemporary field, we are able to make a more just evaluation of Macintosh's "critical monistic realism" as a basis for empirical theology.

The book must be read carefully. In the preface and introductory

chapter are important statements which are necessary to an understanding of the whole. Only as one grasps Macintosh's fundamental postulates is it possible to understand why, e.g., he is so certain of the fundamental agnosticism which lies at the heart of all dualistic epistemologies. It is his strict interpretation of verification which is the key to his thesis: "Whatever is or would be indubitable for logical thought, or verified, i.e., found to be real, *in adequately extended experience*, we may rightly depend upon as being what we call 'true'" (p. 2, italics mine). This direct presentation (p. 6) is considered the heart of verification, and any epistemology which does not provide it must be considered agnostic about the ultimate reality of the object represented by a concept. All dualisms are agnostic, and this leaves the choice between the monistic idealisms and monistic realisms. The theories considered are so classified. The extreme monistic realists in religion (mystics) are first considered; then there is an extended treatment of the many idealisms; the introductory statements of critical monistic realism follow; the dualistic realisms are considered in Part IV; finally, there are the normative and metaphysical statements of critical monistic realism.

Mysticism is the naïve realism of religious epistemology. The mystic claims "an immediate experiential acquaintance with Deity" (p. 15), and this is illustrated abundantly. Mysticism leads to quietism. It is frequently pathological. Practically, its results have been both good and bad. There is no criterion by which to test the truth of mystical experiences, for in the experience itself everything is accepted as divine revelation.

The author turns next to monistic idealism in religion (misprinted "realism" on p. 45), which he defines as follows: "that God or the gods, Divine Reality, the distinctive object of religious interest, is no more than idea in some sense of the term." It is the "identification of the religious object we seek to know with the idea which we do or at least can know" (p. 47). There are several varieties of this group, providing somewhat strange bedfellows: religious psychologism, psychiatric interpretations, various types of humanism, and logical and logical-psychological idealism. He treats these positions in detail, pointing out the errors of individual thinkers. The chapters on John Dewey and George B. Foster are especially discerning. Bishop William Montgomery Brown's humorous humanism is given more space than

it deserves (four pages). Natorp, Santayana, McGiffert, Sr., and Dean Inge are among the logical and logical-psychological idealists. All of these positions prove to be inadequate because the God-idea never becomes embodied in reality.

Somewhere between extreme mystical realism and the forms of monistic idealism, there must be an attempt to develop an adequately critical monistic realism. Macintosh presents here his own distinctive position, measuring it against a number of similar theories of knowledge held by such men as Gerald Birney Smith, Wieman, von Hügel, Oman, and John Baillie (in his latest book). He halts his constructive work to examine the work of the dualists, for they provide many helpful auxiliary methods for establishing the concepts of normative and metaphysical theology.

"Dualistic realism in epistemology is the doctrine that even at the moment of perceptual experience the immediately experienced object and the object which exists independently are two wholly different objects, that is, they are totally different as existences, or numerically, no matter how similar they may be supposed to be in their qualities" (p. 217). In religion, this means that there can be no direct perception of God. Theoretically, this leads to religious agnosticism. A large number of Christian thinkers are so classified. There is a chapter on "argumentative theism," in which appear Thomas Aquinas, F. R. Tennant, Rashdall, Sorley, and John Baillie (in his earlier books). The "religious agnostics" include Mansel, Spencer, J. S. Mill, and Schleiermacher. The whole Ritschlian school follows in three magnificent chapters. Then come the pragmatists, including William James. Finally, there are the followers of "reactionary irrationalism," which include the whole Barthian movement, and, as a different type, Berdyaev. In the end, all of these positions are found to be agnostic because of their epistemological dualism.

At this point, Macintosh returns to his constructive statement. We need "a theology at once empirical and evangelical, a theology of verified religious knowledge and tested religious faith, a theology not only rational and ethical, but vitally religious" (p. 354). His position is presented in a careful and balanced statement which allows for the real existence of God independently of his being perceived and, at the same time, makes room for the direct perception (partially) of

his real being. There is no place for essences, representation, the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal realms, or the other devices of dualism. His fundamental claim is that "there is a partial identity between the immediately experienced and the independently real in the religious realm" (p. 357). Beyond this limited field, there is duality. We do not experience God's transcendent nature, for that is (by definition) beyond experience.

What is *known* about God as a result of this procedure is very meager. God is the immanent value-producing factor in the cosmos. A value is defined as "a quality which anything has by virtue of its relation to an end-directed (teleological or quasi-teleological) process" (p. 8). Certain of these processes are or ought to be appreciated universally, and therefore may be believed in as universally and finally valid. "Such absolute and eternal ideals or values are, *qualitatively* considered, divine. . . . In so far as these divine ideals or values are real in the actual world of human experience," there is "an immanence of the divine within nature or humanity or both." The factor which produces divine values is God. This "divine value-producing reality" is "working in and through the cosmos" (pp. 163 ff.). It is the verification of this admittedly meager concept of God which provides the foundation for theology. Because it is not based on dualism, there is no agnosticism here; because it is not based on idealism, the *independent* existence of God is established. At this point, we are able to bring in the "valuational norm" to develop a "normative theology" (p. 363).

We may believe that "whatever value or values serve as a valid criterion or criteria of the divine as perceived and known may be reasonably taken as applicable also to the divine as transcendent and only believed in" (p. 358). Value-judgments combined with the sense of the numinous (p. 170), perceptual intuition supplemented by imaginal intuition, lead to a combination of empirical and normative theology, and this leads to metaphysical theology. These conclusions are suggested but not developed, for Macintosh is only an "epistemological Moses" preparing the way for a "metaphysical Joshua."

The statements in this book will remove many misunderstandings of Macintosh's position (cf. my "Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology," *The Personalist*, Winter, 1940). He puts 140 pages be-

tween his statements of the empirical laws of theology and his normative theology (which is his familiar realm of reasonable belief and permissible surmise). His distinctions between perceptual and imaginal intuition make clearer the sources of his empirical data. There are only two references to "moral optimism" (pp. 229, 323), and it is put in its proper place. The fundamental laws of empirical theology are still claimed to be "scientific," which means they are the result of the application of an essentially "scientific spirit" which leads to assured results.

His chapter on "reactionary irrationalism" will mislead some readers by its title, but the content is an admirable analysis of the whole movement. He sees the good in this emphasis, but points out the underlying Kantian dualism and the lack of sufficient criteria for knowledge of God. When all other criteria are destroyed, the test of knowledge of God is the miracle of faith, and faith means only "I believe it because (without reason or empirical verification) I feel sure of it" (p. 346). Such thinking is too "abstractly subjective and anti-intellectual" to be considered truly "existential" (p. 348).

The three chapters on the development of Ritschlianism (similar to his treatment in *The Pilgrimage of Faith*) are an excellent picture of the attempt to get around epistemological dualism by the appeal to value-judgments (without metaphysics), the move to make existence-judgments on the basis of value-judgments, and finally, with Troeltsch, the turn to critical rationalism. At the heart of the problem, however, is the dualistic epistemology, inherited from Kant, and all these efforts have therefore failed.

The place where Macintosh's theology is most open to question is in the normative realm. It is here that he might learn more from the emphasis on "depth" which is the genius of the "reactionary irrationalists." There is a universalism and forgiving love about his normative concept of God which obscures the ideas of God's judgment and, perhaps, even his wrath. His failure to read the working of God fully into history (which is also a record of empirical fact) makes his concept of God too much the result of the contemporary and the individual religious consciousness. There is too little place for the sense of frustration in religious living, precisely because for Macintosh the "right religious adjustment" can be dependably achieved. At the same time, his emphasis is a good corrective for the tendency to accept

uncritically the pessimistic Augustine-Luther-Barth axis. But as these judgments are in the realm where there can never be fully verified knowledge, it is to be expected that men will disagree over the transcendent attributes of God.

All epistemologies rest on primary assumptions, and the fundamental estimate of Macintosh's thesis must rest on the choice between his and the dualists' assumptions. The dualists will not admit that they are agnostic. The answer to Macintosh's criticisms would be that, while Macintosh makes his primary assumption at the point of "partial identity," they make a similar assumption at the point of correlating the essence or representation with the real object. Is it harder to accept, e.g., Santayana's idea of "animal faith" or Macintosh's partial monism? To the mind of this reviewer, the answer to this question is neither so crucial as Macintosh believes nor so irrelevant as many dualists believe. The agnostic implications of the dualists' positions are obvious, but they can be overcome by a special assumption at a particular point in the knowledge process. There are no agnostic implications in Macintosh's position. The problem centers in the answer to the question, Which is the more reasonable assumption? Because Macintosh's assumptions are made at the very beginning of his theory, he has a consistent means of accounting for religious knowledge. The dualists, on the other hand, must make an unconvincing jump at some point in the process, in order to avoid agnosticism; something must be sneaked into the system which is not provided for in the primary assumptions.

While these other positions have many helpful suggestions for interpreting the superstructure of religious knowledge, only Macintosh's critical monistic realism can adequately account for the certain empirical data and laws which are verifiable in direct experience. Empirical theology provides verification when it is supported by an adequate epistemology. Beyond the strictly empirical results are the fields of normative and metaphysical theology, and it is here that the dualists, because of their preoccupation with the means of overcoming their inherent agnosticism, have made their most suggestive contributions.

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Wisdom and Folly in Religion. By Joseph Haroutunian. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xiv + 174 pp. $2.00.

This book is a communication from Protestantism to modern unbelief. It is an open declaration of the mind of the Reformation by one who is also thoroughly at home among the thoughts of those who cannot come to a significant religious faith. The author is Associate Professor of Systematic Theology in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Chicago. What he has written is living theology, living because it is organic both to itself and to the context of its situation. There is no tedious and artificial attempt at a reinterpretation of supposedly archaic ways of theological thinking, nor of fashioning a new language more suited to his own temper, and supposedly, therefore, more suited to the time. There is no changing of the categories in order to preserve or to recapture the abiding experiences. On the contrary, the author believes that the original impact of Protestantism upon a culture no less formidably opposed to it than is our own (if the sixteenth century was less secular than the twentieth, it may be ascribed to the still considerable authority of Catholicism and the still ascending spirit of the Renaissance, not to any fundamental hospitality to the Protestant interpretation of the Christian faith) was due essentially, if not entirely, to the solid sense with which, in its time, it affirmed the Christian view of life. Therefore, he sets out to examine and expound the principal Protestant categories—justification, original sin, total depravity, election, and predestination—as a Protestant in *his* time. And Dr. Haroutunian understands his time. *A Study in Chastened Protestantism* is the sub-title of the volume. That is to say, the orthodox faith to which he is devoted is militant without being arrogant. There is no doubt about the *right* answers to the restless quest of the contemporary spirit for a meaningful resolution of its disquietude and affliction. They are the *right* answers because they correctly appraise the total dimensions of man's life—God and the world, his fellows and himself. But there is a robust and undisguised iconoclasm which accompanies the giving of these answers. It is the iconoclasm of one whose own faith has been wrung from the truest insights and the most persistent skepticism of the unbeliever, over and above the ignorance and the bigotry of its most zealous adherents, by an inescapable conviction. The conviction is: that the end of skepticism,

despite its insight, like the end of bigotry, despite its ignorance, is death; that the refusal to come to terms with death is sin; that there is no life in sin unless it be that God be really God; and that it is the genius of Protestantism to let God be God.

> The continued prevalence of "man's inhumanity to man" suggests that the problem of sin is rooted in the problem of life. . . . Sin is the restless and persistent murmuring of the soul, the undercurrent of discontent and ill-temper with which it greets its end in an enduring world. It is rooted in the horrible intuition that nature's last word to man is "Nay," in the loss of faith and hope which are life's food and drink. . . . The diabolical manifestations of sin in our common life today are due to a determined effort of the contemporary man to live and act as though the anguish of life before death were unreal. . . . The Christian religion is turned into a colossal conspiracy to turn men's minds away from the anguish of life and to make them at home in this world and happy while life lasts. . . . A Protestantism which exposes the sin within us and teaches us radical self-criticism, which leads us to the fear of God and concern for the glory of God, will act as a true Church of God and become a genuine power toward peace and righteousness among men. . . . It may not destroy the latter's sin and suffering; but it will sow in it seeds of wisdom and charity to which God will give the increase hundredfold: in His proper time and to His greater glory (pp. 115, 119, 125, 130, 172-73).

Dr. Haroutunian believes that "contemporary atheism is the opportunity of a genuinely Protestant religion," because the two confront each other "in the valley of the shadow of sin and death." What atheism apprehends, Protestantism comprehends. This atheism has long since penetrated the pretensions of piety and moralism to the secrets of making men happy and desirable. It knows not only that death is inexorable, but even more. It knows that until men die, they are involved in powers beyond their ken and their control, "the power of the flesh and of the ambiguity of man's responsibility for his sin and death." This atheism is, therefore, more factual and more honest than contemporary Protestantism, which has betrayed both the insights of its origin and "the people of the land." Yet, if Protestant thought will abandon this trifling with its birthright and take up again its own classic answers to the problem of sin and death, it can both fairly meet and profoundly satisfy the wistfulness of those who are without illusions about the present decadence of culture and civilization, but also without faith and hope, i.e., without a living convic-

tion of meaning in life—life which "moving toward death becomes a living death and a dying life."

The atmosphere of the volume as a whole is reminiscent of the Bible, which informs its message, as well as the Reformation, which it seeks to revive. There is a simplicity, directness, and imaginativeness of utterance which seems, in an almost aphorismic way, to transcend the limits of rational argument and to put the reader, together with those to whom the essay is addressed, in the position of decision. All the while the line is being drawn between those who see and those who do not, between those who, having ears to hear, hear, and those who do not. Like the Bible, too, there is an intimate correlation of polemics with position, of wrath with promise, of the way of folly with the way of wisdom in religion. This is really the mark of high religion and of the integrity of the man of faith. High religion always joins with its affirmation of the deity a prohibition against idolatry (the first and second commandments), and the true believer always speaks to the unbeliever out of the persistence of, but without the terror of doubt. "Skepticism," as Pascal remarked, "helps religion. . . . It is not in Montaigne, but in myself, that I find all that I see in him."[1] It is, therefore, the great merit of this book that it has made earnest with the main difference between the Biblical view of life and that view of life which has ended in the frustration of contemporary atheism. If the focus of his present thought can be taken as an indication of the direction of his mind, what Dr. Haroutunian has written promises to make an invaluable contribution to the future of American theology.

Dr. Haroutunian is occupied here—as a Protestant and as the friend of unbelievers, "the publicans and sinners of our day"—with the problem of death. This is not only the great enigma of life, it is the great oversight of the "scientific outlook," itself both child and parent of the naturalistic way of looking at things which has increasingly dominated the minds of men since the Renaissance. It may be true that Medieval culture engaged men over-much with the affairs of heaven as against the things of earth, and that the longing for the eternal and the permanent which occupied antiquity was no sufficient resource when the collapse of Hellas left men, sooner than they thought, upon the threshold of frustration and death. Nevertheless, the misery of

1. *Pensées*, Everyman Library Edition, Nos. 391, 64.

man and the transitoriness of his existence were genuine factors in the practical reckoning of life, and Catholicism did provide a glorious, if monotonous, prospectus for *homines viatores* until the new heaven and the new earth should come. What the author of this book is saying is, that it is as true at "the end of the Renaissance" (Berdyaev) as it was at the beginning, that no meaningful interpretation of life is promising or possible, except it be founded on the fact of death. Naturalism, of course, also recognizes the fact of death. But it sees the inexorability of death in its universality, and, therefore, regards death as an ultimate calculation beyond which there is either ignorance or darkness. Religious faith, on the other hand, sees the inexorability of death in the dread of death which haunts the soul of every man, and therefore, regards it as the initial calculation of human existence beyond which lie both knowledge and light—the knowledge of God and the light of truth, the truth that God is the first and the last, the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end of human existence. When death is the first calculation of human existence, God becomes alpha and omega because no man can face death without anxiety. His anxiety uncovers the sin in his death because the inexorability of death aggravates rather than cancels the deeply-rooted suspicion in man that he ought not die, and since he does, it is also somehow his responsibility. And man's involvement in anxiety, i.e., the disquieting recognition that death is both overwhelming and of his own doing, gives voice to the cry for the deliverance of his soul from vanity and evil. "The continued prevalence of 'man's inhumanity to man' suggests that the problem of sin is rooted in the problem of life (i.e., death).[2] . . . Man's persistent anticipation of ultimate frustration is the source of that anguish which is the connecting link between sin and death. . . . Let us not deceive ourselves. It is only as we consider our desperate need of God that we believe and hope properly, that we learn of the compassion which led Jesus to the Cross and which remains our hope of deliverance from man's inhumanity to man." When death is the first calculation of human existence, there is a radical alteration of perspective. The *horizontal* view of existence, according to which man, like nature, lives out his life in process and infinity until the agony of his infinitesimal individual frustration has spent itself in meaningless death, is exchanged for the *vertical* view of existence, according

2. Parentheses mine.

to which man as creature lives out his life in tragedy and expectation, in disobedience and need, sustained by the providence of the Creator in whose image he was made and for whose service he was intended, until the anxiety of his life in death shall have been translated, after the Creator's own will and way, into a deathless life. Frustration without faith is despair. Faith in the midst of frustration means that deliverance is forthcoming. The unbeliever lives as one who dies. The believer dies as one who lives.

Dr. Haroutunian is so thoroughly correct about this "antidote to inhumanity" (i.e., the Divine compassion over sin and death) and naturalism's helplessness before the problem of life (since it fails to deal straightforwardly with death) that he may be allowed some overstatement of his case. It cannot be overlooked, however, that when he concludes from "the radical character of sin and evil in our world" that "it is written in the constitution of man and his world that he should sin and die," he is involved in overstatement. This is too close to Manichaeism for the comfort either of a Protestant who knows the meaning of sin and death, or for an atheist who doesn't. It is, moreover, the dangerous pitfall into which every zealous articulation of the honor of God and the total depravity of man inadvertently stumbles. And though I myself would rather trust the ultimate mystery of evil to the secret counsels of the Creator than dissipate the mystery of evil by celebrating the creative possibilities of the natural and the human order (Augustinianism is a more robust and more accurate treatment of the problem of man and the problem of God than Pelagianism), so rigorous a consistency seems unnecessary to the problem itself and has always seemed unnecessary in the theological tradition. The question at issue here is not only that of the responsibility of God for evil but the even more vexatious question of the relation of death to finitude. It seems to me that Dr. Haroutunian is correct in ascribing death to the created order, since the power by which the world was called into being is the same as the power by which it can come to an end. But the trouble lies at the point of the entrance of sin into the creation and its consequences for the finite order. The Christian mind on this matter, in view of the triumph of Augustinianism, can be said to be that without making God responsible for evil, sin introduced both a rupture in the relations between God and the world, and actuality and terror into death. Hence God will

destroy the world of sin and death for the sake of the justice due unto His Holy Name, and for the sake of His compassion God will accomplish the deliverance from sin and death (the torment and the terror of the powers of darkness). And this, according to the Christian gospel, is the mystery of the Cross.

But this volume raises a question of theological methodology as well as of theological interpretation. It is the question of apologetics. It is a tribute to the theological integrity of the author that he might even be suspected of apologetics, for only a concern for the purity of the gospel can prompt an equally serious concern for the manner of its propagation. A theologically barren apologetics is better known today by the term "philosophy of religion," which it would be most ungrateful to the author and his work to apply to them. But a theologically fruitful apologetics is debatable. This is the meaning of the controversy which, until the outbreak of the war, at least, had so furiously occupied Emil Brunner and Karl Barth. And it cannot be ignored amidst the restoration of self-respect to theology as an independent scientific discipline in America. If one understands by apologetics any attempt at an intelligent and relevant exposition of the gospel, then it is difficult to see how apologetics could be distinguished from theology, except as methodology were formally to be distinguished from substance. If, on the other hand, one recognizes two responsibilities confronting the theologian instead of one, then one is on the way toward a clear-cut destinction between apologetics and dogmatics as separate theological disciplines. Apologetics is preparatory, dogmatics is expository. The one makes a way for the other to tread. The one, by presuppositions and criticism, leads up to the understanding and pursuit of the presuppositions and criticism of the other. When we are told that "obedience is religion's counterpart to the demand of intelligence that proper regard be paid to facts," and that "there is a kinship between the contemporary idea that the good life is dependent upon intelligent regard for facts and religion's hoary demand that men obey God," we are in the area of apologetics of the second variety. For if this is a genuine "counterpart," then the man outside the gospel is already on the way to the gospel, can by the adequate analysis of what he already knows be brought to comprehend as well as apprehend the gospel, and theology becomes the tutor of the unbeliever as well as the servant of the Word of God. If, on the

other hand, this "counterpart" is merely formal, then it seems, if not ill-mannered, at least ill-calculated to impress the atheist whose devoted "regard for facts" has been the most potent factor in his repudiation of "the knowledge of God" and "the service of God."

Perhaps, it is this subtle transposition of the task of theology from that of *thinking God's thoughts after Him to thinking man's thoughts before God* which leads the author to identify contemporary atheism with "the publicans and sinners." If so, isn't this identification, with its consequent appreciation of the "sense of proportion" in modern unbelief and in historic Protestantism (or should one say, more accurately, "Edwardean Protestantism"?), a lurking survival of theological rationalism which, precisely because of its confidence in reason, prevents the atheist from coming to despair and obscures the miracle of forgiveness on acount of which the Reformation could not be avoided?

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The World's Need of Christ. By CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940. 237 pp. $2.00.

It is characteristic of a secularist age that a book on religion with a frankly theological title, written by a sociologist, should commend itself more readily to a lay public than a similar book written by a theologian. In the present instance, however, the author has earned a right to be heard as a student of religion, quite apart from the standing he has achieved in his own academic field. His *Reconstruction of Religion,* published in 1922, probably influenced many a troubled mind when the social interpretation of Christianity was undergoing reformulation in the post-war years.

Now, as then, Professor Ellwood writes as a liberal in opposition to the orthodoxy of his time. But he is none the less a critic of the prevailing culture. He takes his departure from the well-known thesis of Professor Sorokin, of Harvard, developed in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* to the effect that we are living in a sensate, that is, "a body-minded and thing-minded," age. Yet, while Professor Sorokin's indictment lends itself readily to the support of the orthodox reaction in religion, Professor Ellwood's points in a different direction. He believes thoroughly in the necessity and the possibility of embodying

Christianity in the structure of social relationships—in the social application of the imitation of Christ. He is stoutly opposed to the neo-orthodox trend in theology. "On the continent of Europe," he says, "has arisen a theology, born of the social defeats and despair of that continent, which emphasizes that the essence of religion is the worship of the Infinite and Eternal, and that the sole use of religion is in the reconciliation of man's will to God's will. . . ." Against this he would oppose the full strength of the social gospel.

Now it must be said that this way of disposing of the orthodox reaction in Christian theology is stoutly resisted by the spokesmen for that movement, who claim with some reason that the European theologians who inspired it have had deeper insights into the persistent problems of human life than liberal Christianity has evidenced. Their natural retort is that American religious thinking has been influenced by the easy optimism which has characterized American life. If the neo-orthodox theology is in some sense "situation-determined," reflecting a crisis psychology, may not liberal Christianity be likewise "determined" by what has been, until recently, the American situation?

To recognize this difficulty is not to discredit the author's main contention, with which this reviewer agrees, but many readers will feel that Professor Ellwood's argument is a bit too facile. If there were no weakness in liberal social Christianity, would we be witnessing so sharp a reaction against it? Professor Ellwood's indictment of our contemporary secular culture needs, perhaps, the support of a theology which plumbs the depths of human sin and man's need of personal redemption, which the modern preoccupation with progress and "betterment" has tended to obscure.

It is good, however, to read from a sociologist's pen a declaration of the essentially social nature of the Christian faith. The social gospel which this book defends rests on the proposition that human character is, in so large part, determined by the social structure that all efforts at personal redemption unsupported by social reconstruction must be abortive. "If it is true," we read, "that we cannot build a Christian civilization without Christian individuals as the building stones, it is equally true that Christian individuals will not fit into the structure and life of pagan groups without themselves becoming pagan."

The contrast between business and industry as now conducted and

the assumptions of the Christian society is quite frankly stated. "The truth is that the average business man is not willing to make his business a means to promote the welfare of mankind; he makes it an end, and this means that he helps our civilization to retain its predominantly sensate character." This goes, the author says, for church members as well as others. The Church is challenged to "ask the business world to repent the very basis upon which it has been built." These are brave words and true.

The indictment is repeated in terms of international relations. Religion does not receive the devotion and sacrifice now given to the state. Here a false dualism relegates political duties to the secular realm. Recurrent wars evidence the result, but there is no getting rid of war except as we "get rid of that kind of peace which conceals warlike attitudes."

Professor Ellwood's optimism may be thought extreme. When he says, "A new human world in which Christ's ideals shall be honored both in word and in deed is entirely possible," the theologian of the school he condemns is sure to exclaim, "This is religious humanism and social meliorism, unaware of the tragedy of sin." Yet the comment will do much less than justice to the author's thinking. That he is aware of man's capacity for evil purpose the words already quoted show. What he manifestly is contending for is a Christian ethic that is supported by a sufficient hope to warrant a vigorous attack upon the social order. He deplores the secular outlook in modern science precisely because it is *potentially* a support for a rugged revolutionary ethic. That is to say, science can establish the superiority, in terms of survival value, of the Christian ethic. Humanized science and education based upon it can produce the like-mindedness among men upon which religion must build. Religion unsupported by the sciences is ineffectual, as the author sees it, since it is predominantly emotional rather than rational. Therefore, no conflict between religion and science can properly occur, but the dependence of religion upon science is great.

However critical a reader may be at the points noted as somewhat vulnerable, the book is a challenge to current Christian orthodoxy at its own weakest point—its failure to supply an adequate basis for a rugged social faith.

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Experience, Reason and Faith: A Survey in Philosophy and Religion. By Eugene Garrett Bewkes, Howard Bonar Jefferson, Eugene Taylor Adams, and Herman Arno Brautigam. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xiv + 649 pp. $3.00.

This book has been developed in connection with a survey course in Philosophy and Religion at Colgate University and will undoubtedly find its chief usefulness in such courses, there and elsewhere. But it deserves a wider audience, for it is a clearly and competently written history of the religious and philosophical movements which have profoundly influenced modern culture. An introductory chapter, which treats the mind and religion of primitive man, is followed by three chapters on the development of religion among the ancient Hebrews and two chapters on the life and teachings of Jesus. Mr. Bewkes is the author of these sections which make up Parts One and Two of the volume. Part Three, by Mr. Adams, contains three particularly clear and interesting chapters on philosophy and religion among the Greeks. Mr. Jefferson is responsible for the able treatment in Part Four of religion and philosophy in the Greco-Roman world and the development of Christian thought to the time of Augustine. Part Five deals with the Middle Ages, and Part Six with the transition from the medieval to the modern world, that is, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the rise of modern science. Mr. Brautigam is the author of both these sections. The last major division, Part Seven, contains five chapters on philosophy and religion in the modern world, and to this section each of the writers has contributed. There is a great deal more unity in the book than one might suppose from this diversity of authorship and range of subject-matter As instructors in the co-operative course on which this book is based, these men have learned to work together, and they have achieved a remarkable degree of similarity in point of view and manner of presentation throughout the volume.

There are differences of opinion about the value of survey courses of this type, and some who accept their general validity will question the advisability of including philosophy and religion within a single course. My own opinion is that a survey course which depends upon a textbook virtually alone is open to obvious and damaging objections, but that, if sufficient time can be given to make possible considerable use of source material and other supplementary readings, such a course provides an educational experience of very high value,

particularly as a background for later work. The suggested readings at the end of each chapter in this volume give little attention to primary sources but provide wisely chosen references to much of the best secondary material. The decision to handle religion and philosophy together can be justified in terms both of the interests of undergraduates and of the historical and logical interconnections of the subject-matter. The choice of topics and the apportionment of space seems very satisfactory on the whole, except for the absence of any treatment of post-biblical Judaism.

The standpoint of the writers is that of empirical naturalism and cultural relativism, modified by faith in the essential validity of liberal Christianity. This point of view is not obtrusive, but it evidently colors the treatment of historical philosophies and movements. In itself this is not open to objection, for a purely objective survey would lack character and interest. It results, however, in a tendency to assume that a theological or philosophical theory is adequately dealt with when it is shown to be in some sense a product of contemporary cultural influences. From this point of view it seems unnecessary to engage in lengthy philosophical criticism or refutation of doctrines which have gone out of fashion. One must admit that this short and easy method has obvious advantages where time and space are severely limited, but it is open to grave objections. It confirms students in their tendency to dismiss old ideas as irrelevant, and it fails to give them desirable training in rational analysis. Would it not have been well to have selected a number of doctrines for more extensive treatment and to have subjected them to fairly detailed analysis and direct criticism, as examples of what philosophy does? This would greatly weaken the objection often urged against surveys of this kind that they teach a student about philosophy rather than to philosophize.

It is almost inevitable that in a work of this kind a few mistakes should creep in, but as far as this reviewer was able to discover, they are remarkably few. There is a double error, however, in a single sentence on p. 199 about the date of the Last Supper. There is no discrepancy between the Synoptic and Johannine traditions as to the day of the week on which this event took place; for both it was on a Thursday. Friday night would have been virtually impossible, since that would imply that Jesus was crucified on the Sabbath. The dis-

crepancy lies in the circumstance that for the synoptics this was also the first evening of the passover when the paschal lamb was eaten, while according to the Fourth Gospel (probably correctly) the Supper took place on the evening before the passover was due to begin. Henry VIII did not receive the title Defender of the Faith from Parliament (p. 477) but from the Pope, whom he had defended against Luther in 1521. It is hardly correct to say that "the Scotch Presbyterians . . . dominated the Long Parliament" (p. 501), though that Parliament certainly took account of the wishes of the Presbyterian leaders in Scotland in order to gain their support in its struggle with the King.

It is more inevitable that questions should arise about the interpretation of specific persons or doctrines. The rationalism of Duns Scotus seems to be exaggerated on p. 426. To say of Spinoza (p. 447) that for him "only mathematical knowledge was worth while" is misleading; what is meant, I suppose, is that for Spinoza the only worth-while knowledge is that which conforms to the standards of demonstrability or intuitive clarity exemplified by mathematics. The interpretation of Kant as a subjective idealist is at least open to question. The statements on p. 474 comparing Luther and Calvin seem likely to lead to misunderstanding. Both great Reformers were sure that the saved man remains a sinner, but they drew different conclusions from this belief. Calvin emphasized the duty of obedience to God's demand for holiness, and consequently thought of Christian virtue in terms of rigorous discipline. Luther was so sure of God's forgiveness that all tension was removed from his conception of the Christian life, and he could emphasize equally that the Christian is free and capable of acts of disinterested love and that he remains a sinner who must inevitably sin because of his duties in a sinful world. The unqualified statement (p. 484) that "Protestantism, instead of restraining commercial behavior, sanctified and indorsed it," is not quite fair, for surely it did both, as Catholic moralists were also coming to do in the same period. The following statements on the same page are also dangerous half-truths: "The Reformers feared and opposed secular learning. . . . Modern science and philosophy had to move forward against the opposition of both Protestantism and Catholicism." A large part of the warfare of science and theology was due to opposition not against science as such, but

against the theological conclusions which some scientists or their followers drew from the new disoveries. It seems unfortunate, also, that the writers of this volume have identified Protestant orthodoxy with fundamentalism, which is usually much narrower in spirit than the faith of the Reformation and frequently not even "orthodox," in spite of its loud protestations.

A number of illustrations add interest to the book. Some of them are excellent, but they are not very well integrated with the text.

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The Meaning of Happiness. By ALAN W. WATTS. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xxiv + 209 pp. $2.50.

There have been several books in recent years devoted to the subject of happiness—that elusive state of mind so greatly sought by man, and so rarely found. Indeed, instead of happiness we are confronted today by an ever increasing misery, and the minds of all men are oppressed by fear, uncertainty, and dread of the future. Into this confusion and chaos Mr. Watts's book, *The Meaning of Happiness,* appears as a call to contemplate another world. Yet it is not to another world, but the adaptation to this one, and to the complexity of the individual himself as he is here and now, that his call is directed. "The meaning of happiness," says Mr. Watts, "consists in three elements, freedom, gratitude and the sense of wonder." There can be little exception taken to this definition, for anyone possessing these subjective qualities is, unquestionably, a happy person. The problem is how to bring such a state about. Mr. Watts's book is a brave attempt to present a way that the individual may accept to win for himself this desirable mental state. He calls this way, "Total Acceptance," and the book is devoted to explaining what he means by this term and how it is to be achieved. For this purpose, he has brought together the teachings of the Christian Gospel, Zen Buddhism, and Analytical Psychology, and with copious quotations from them all creates a modern basis for his use of the Buddhistic thesis of total acceptance, total acceptance in the sense of the Eastern religions, instead of the inner struggles and conflicts of the Western mind, as the answer to the strains and fears of modern life.

To be able to surrender the inner conflict and meet himself with a

free acceptance and no apologies for what he is here and now, would certainly promote the happiness and comfort of the individual, but the attainment of that state for the active, restless, modern man is as difficult as his effort to overcome directly within himself that which he realizes is a weakness or deterring factor in his life.

Mr. Watts recognizes the differences between the psychologies of the Eastern mind and the mind of the West, and urges the necessity of using a different approach in the achievement of the purpose. He also emphasizes the folly of the Western mind attempting to take over the religious practices of the Orient, when, because of the profound psychological differences in the mentality, this can never be anything but imitation for him, instead of a genuine experience. He stresses the value of the principles of the Oriental religions "from which we can learn much," but recognizes that their practice is worked out in accordance with the Asiatic psychology from which they arose. The book points out that the Christian teachings, in which the roots of the Western mind have been nourished, contain all the values found in other religions, and, in addition, the particular contribution which specifically characterizes the Christian doctrine.

He devotes chapters to Jung's Analytical Psychology and to the Oriental religious teachings which are concerned with states of mind and are, therefore, psychological religions. The modern psychological concept of the Unconscious with its unknown forces, its powers and compulsions, is recognized as the equivalent of the ancients gods and demons, the Christian Devil, and the Oriental's congeries of diabolical images which, even though no longer believed in, still exercise their influence on individuals as fatefully today as ever.

In attempting to handle such an abstract subject as total acceptance, which Mr. Watts calls "the most elusive thing in the world as well as something against which both intellect and reason rebel," it is not strange that he entangles himself frequently, as for example, when he speaks of the psychological acceptance of life and its opposite, the escape from life, and affirms that "the technic of psychology is exclusive in that it creates a new evil called escapism." In other words, escapism is created by the technic of psychology, whatever that means—instead of existing as a negation within the organism itself. He fails to recognize the biological reactions of fight and flight in his discussion, and consequently he writes as

though the primary attitudes of individuals were produced by the environment and were a matter of choice or will, although, of course, they can be influenced by the environment, but, at the same time, he specifically states the futility of will or of any mental effort in the attainment of the experience of total acceptance.

Also, from Mr. Watts's emphasis on the need for the experience rather than the purely mental or intellectual grasp of the idea, one is hardly prepared for his own obvious inability to recognize the personal need of the experience before one can really understand what he calls the "mysterious jargon of analytical psychology." Since this technic is one which aids the individual to become conscious and aware of the inner conflicts which he is to accept, and clarifies the picture of his stage of psychological development, so that he knows from his own experience what it is he is accepting, it is certainly an important contribution from the West for the active Western mind, as contrasted with the passive reflective mentality of the East.

Mr. Watts rightly sees in analytical psychology a technic which is not only applicable to the relief of the neuroses as such, but also contributes to the finding for oneself of a satisfactory way of life. He describes the psychological concepts on which the work proceeds as well as anyone without the experience can be expected to do, but he fails to recognize that the theories are not intellectual concepts into which the individual is fitted, but are formulations based on the psychological material brought forth by the analytical experience itself. His warning comments apply to the half-trained, half-baked adherents of any healing method for which there is no licensed, or properly accredited authority to control it. If Mr. Watts had halted his comments there, all would have been well, but when he assumes knowledge of the conditions under which the sufferer from neuroses should undertake a cure, and states that the cure of the neuroses is not generally desirable unless his formulations are present, he is treading upon ground for which he has no equipment and becomes himself the ill-advised practitioner whose work he rightly criticizes.

Nevertheless, Mr. Watts has written an interesting and valuable book on a very difficult subject for the Western mind to grasp. It carries a message of hope and assumes the capacity of the individuality to win a freedom from conflict and to create for himself a new mental outlook. It is consistent in emphasizing experience and raising it to

the highest value, with a consequent overthrowing of intellect and the thought function from its pedestal. It offers an affirmative attitude towards life not dependent on particular things, but on the state of mind itself expressed in the personal feeling. Thus, the power of the pairs of opposites which dominates humanity is nullified. In Mr. Watts's words, "Acceptance is activity and passivity in one; as passivity it is accepting ourselves, our desires and fears as movements of life, nature and the Unconscious; as activity it is letting ourselves be free to be ourselves and to have our desires and fears." A little obscure for many, perhaps, but since neither intellect nor reason belong in this realm, criticism is only resistance and therefore useless. The book must be read as a whole, and those seekers to whom it will appeal will find in it valuable chunks of wisdom.

Beatrice M. Hinkle

New York City

BOOK NOTES

Religion in Science and Civilization. By Sir Richard Gregory. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. xiii + 366 pp. $3.00.

The relationship between religion and science in the development of civilization is herein traced from its early stages in Egypt and Babylonia, through Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages, down to the present day. As knowledge has advanced, so human interpretation of natural phenomena and events has changed. Religious ideas and their crystallization in formulas, creeds, and faiths have also changed, and will change again according as conceptions of the divine become more and more exalted. Science challenges the wisdom of man in the use of its newly discovered powers; and religion nurtures that inner urge toward truth and righteousness which is native to mankind.

In guiding the reader through the centuries of change and progress, the author has traversed ground familiar to the student of history and religion. His treatment has had to be general, and sometimes popular, in the interest of the general reader, but it has not, on the whole, been superficial or casual. Indeed, the fine general grasp of the essence of so many fields of specialization is to be highly commended.

There are, however, certain details, in the understanding of some important religious and cultural movements, which are highly questionable and which, therefore, should be called to the attention of the prospective reader of the book. Such, for example, are the author's estimate and approval of Freud's book, *Moses and Monotheism,* which is really a work devoid of all serious historical method, dealing with historical and religious data in a most careless and unscientific manner; his understanding of so-called Egyptian monotheism in the time of Ikhnaton, which is confused, and takes for granted historical synchronisms which are highly debatable; his faulty understanding of the relationship between tabu and the origin of ethical codes; his approval of undemonstrated theories to the effect that the legends of Osiris and Isis grew up around the ritual to explain human sacrifice; and his assertion, contrary to the teaching of the well-known Athanasian Creed, that "The Christian Church never actually said that Jesus was God."

There are other blemishes, such, for example, as the expression "Moon Goddess" in reference to the Moon "God," Sin, of Ur; the misuse of terms, such as in the statement about "many Christianites" (p. 256); and the tendency to overstatement, such as the supposed existence of serious truth-suppression in modern times (p. 221). Nor is it correct to assume such a slavish borrowing of one culture from another as Sir Richard does in the case of Hebrew and Sumerian legislation. These, together with a tendency to ramble in discussing things fairly well known to the average reader, and a general assumption of ignorance on the part of the average modern thinker of the reality of development in faith, become at times a bit irritating. Never-

theless, and in spite of all, the book deserves a very wide circulation, for it presents a broad and generally reliable survey of religion in science and civilization from the viewpoint of a modern observer and thinker, who "has a heart as well as a mind," and who thus shares his well-balanced and matured thoughts with his readers.

SAMUEL A. B. MERCER

Lamentation over the Destruction of Ur. By SAMUEL N. KRAMER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940 (Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, Assyriological Studies No. 12). xii + 97 pp. and 4 plates. $2.00.

This Lamentation is one of the few almost complete works composed and written some time during the Isin-Larsa-Babylon I period, according to the learned editor, which are known to scholars. Dr. Kramer has established the Sumerian text by a careful examination of the tablets from Nippur found in the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania and in the Museum of the Ancient Orient at Istanbul; in the present work he has given a transliteration, translation and commentary in the competent and skilful manner which readers of his earlier publications in Sumerology have been led to expect.

The Lamentation consists of 436 lines divided into eleven "songs," apparently meant to be recited by a temple singer on some commemorative festival. In vivid and concrete language it describes the calamities that befell Ur and other Sumerian cities probably through a foreign invasion, tells of the abandonment of temples by various local city-gods, and expresses the hope that peace and prosperity will return to the land.

The poem exhibits the Sumerian characteristic of monotonous repetition of whole phrases, which gives the recitation a somewhat hypnotic effect. It is interesting to compare it with the biblical book of Lamentations, which undoubtedly describes the fall of Jerusalem in B.C. 586. The Hebrew poems are much more dramatic, personal, and religious; moreover they are dominated by the moral theme of divine punishment for the sins of people, kings, and prophets. The Sumerian poem, on the other hand, is concerned chiefly with the material damage that has been done, and the concern about the removal of the gods is chiefly an expression of helplessness or fear. Occasionally, however, the Sumerian writer strikes upon an image or mood that has something of the biblical pathos and emotional force. There are, moreover, several phrases that directly or nearly parallel some of the verses in the Hebrew book of Lamentations (incidentally the editor has little to say of the literary aspects of the Sumerian poem or of its relation to biblical forms). A few of these parallels may be quoted (by lines):

their mouths touched the dust (220).
the young lying on their mother's bosoms like fish were carried off by the waters;
the nursing mothers—pried open were their breasts (227 f.).

O my queen, thy city like a . . . mother weeps before thee (369).
How long, pray, wilt thou stand aside in thy city like an enemy? (374).

Both in its own right, and because of the basis of comparison it affords for an evaluation of similar biblical compositions, the Sumerian poem, as edited and explained by Dr. Kramer, is a welcome addition to the number of ancient Near-Eastern texts which the Oriental Institute has published.

R. M.

Undefeated. By SOLOMON GOLDMAN. Washington, D.C.: Zionist Organization of America, 1940. 135 pp. $1.00.

This booklet contains the three principal addresses delivered by the erstwhile President of the Zoinist Organization of America at the various conventions of that Organization, and dedicated to Mr. Louis Dembitz Brandeis, former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the first of these addresses, Dr. Goldman deals with the historical review of the land of Palestine and its future destiny. Historical evidence, as well as quotations from various sources of Jewish literature, go to prove that the Jewish right to Palestine is not only a tradition but a basic necessity, dictated by the upheavals in a maddened world which render the lot of the Jew unbearable in most European countries. On the other hand, the achievements of the Jews in Palestine have been noteworthy, and the country has been turned into a garden of loveliness, as well as a pronounced cultural center. The attitude of Great Britain as expressed in the *White Paper* is deplored by the author, who ascribes it to the upsurge of world anti-Semitism, and urges further and continued construction of the land as the only positive answer.

In the following addresses Dr. Goldman stresses the important gains made in Palestine during the last two decades, also the importance of the American Jewish Community in their assistance towards the upbuilding of the homeland. The duty of the Zionists of America is to continue their endeavors for a publicly recognized and legally secured Jewish homeland in Palestine, and to bring this to full realization. In rendering support to the democracies in their fight against aggression in world-affairs, the cause of Palestine should not be forgotten, but the gallant efforts of a small people to regain its self-dignity and the right to live an uninterrupted and free life should be supported. The plea for the continuation of the upbuilding of Palestine continues with an urgent appeal for maintenance of the integrity of the Jewish Community in America, as well as for continued aid to the stricken Jewish communities abroad.

While recognizing the plight of the Jews throughout the world, and being one of them, the reviewer, nevertheless, deplores such statements as "anyone who proposes a rival for Palestine is not merely treacherous, he is out of his mind," as well as some of the comparisons of the American and German peoples (pp. 58-61). There is much one-sidedness in this analysis which does not call for common harmony. There is also much arbitrariness

in many of the statements in the book, such as calling the Zionists the sole representatives of the Jewish people. If we are to anticipate a better world where the full rights of the individual are to be respected, let us find courage in our hearts to be tolerant to the territorialist on the Jewish scene, as well as to the internationalist. They surely carry a philosophy of life and a program of action.

In this hour of human tragedy, the reviewer feels that the outflow of Jewish energy should be directed not only for the upbuilding of Palestine, but also for the reconstruction of a better social order throughout the world.

LOUIS STANLEY GREENBERG

Jesus Christ the Same. By JAMES MOFFATT. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940. 223 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Moffatt's latest book is explicitly a work of apologetic that takes the supreme value of Christian experience for granted. What, however, was the origin of this experience? Is the ideal that lies behind it a "pure" ideal, independent of time and place, with no necessary relation to history? Or, as most Christians claim, is its origin to be sought within the frame of history, incorporated in the person of Jesus? Everyone knows that "in art some supreme genius may appear, never to be equalled in succeeding ages. Bach will never be out of date. Neither will Raphael." It is the Christian claim that "the revelation of Jesus in the New Testament is a unique embodiment of God's purpose, which possesses a timeless significance within its historical limitations of the first century"; can the connection of this revelation with Jesus be established historically?

The present-day dominance of the form-critical method in Gospel research has not infrequently produced a radical skepticism about Jesus and his teaching. Not, to be sure, about his actual existence, for competent form-critics eschew the theories of the "mythological" school. But, for form-criticism, the primitive traditions are the ultimate material beyond which it cannot go; for it the problem of what lies behind these traditions is not so much insoluble as non-existent. Form-criticism can determine the needs and the environment that gave the primitive traditions their form, but it cannot penetrate further. And certain scholars who recently made the attempt to penetrate further have been taken to task by reviewers for unscholarly interest in an "obsolete" theme.

To Dr. Moffatt this belief that man must live by form-criticism alone represents the suicide of historical method. Is not the existence of the primitive traditions an historical problem? Granted that the needs and environments of the first Christian communities produced the forms, is not the existence of these communities an historical problem? Here are facts that challenge the historian for explanation. To refuse to face them is to abdicate as a scientist; to dismiss them as somehow due to "some sudden swirl in a first-century concourse of 'isms and 'ologies" is to appeal to a miracle.

Dr. Moffatt was trained in the "grand style" of nineteenth-century German Synoptic criticism—far too rigorous a discipline for many investigators today. For many years he worked in the technical field of New Testament criticism in all its aspects; for many years thereafter in the broader field of general history. He is, therefore, equipped to attack the problems abandoned by form-criticism, which at the best can account for only part of the facts. The needs and environment of the first communities, after all, explain only a minimal portion of the traditions; behind all these traditions lies a common block of material independent of these needs and the environment, material which was not "adapted" but *created*. And, for the creator, the historian must look where all the sources point unanimously, to Jesus.

That all the traditions are interpretations is unmistakable, and the variety in these interpretations is equally unmistakable. But both facts are only as unmistakable "as is the fact that all are elicited by the one person of Jesus." The historian's task is to trace and record these interpretations and to analyze their relation to the original they purport to explain; the theologian's task is to appraise their religious validity. Dr. Moffatt is so completely the master of his material that in fulfilling this double task he lets himself range far afield, jumping from the first century to the twentieth and back to the twelfth, illustrating with a wealth of citations, and then beginning all over again. To read such a book is a delight; perhaps, indeed, too great a delight, because the fascination of the style is such that the structure of the argument may be overlooked. It is probably for this reason that an analysis is printed on the "jacket"!

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

Anno Domini. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xv + 248 pp. $2.50.

Anno Domini is an essay on the influence of one Personality upon history and society. That Personality, of course, is Jesus of Nazareth, whose life and death have left their imprint unalterably stamped upon the quality of life in the twenty centuries since his death. No believer in blind and mechanistic forces which shape the course of human events, Professor Latourette is fully cognizant of the operation of political, sociological, and economic influences upon the mind and temper of an age. But his thesis is that these influences have been counteracted or re-directed by the overpowering effect of the character of Jesus, still alive in the minds and hearts of individuals and in the institutions to which it has given birth.

The background of this essay is Professor Latourette's study and research into the history of the missionary expansion of Christianity, three volumes of which have already been cordially welcomed by the world of scholars, while the concluding volumes are as eagerly expected. *Anno Domini*, parts of which were originally delivered as lectures, presents a condensed and somewhat popularized account of the material which the weightier volumes

contain, and it is written from the point of view of one who looks to the "author and finisher of our faith," rather than toward its formal and institutional development. The chapters of the book cover the periods to which whole volumes of the larger work are devoted. And for those who wish a glimpse into the future volumes of the *History of the Expansion of Christianity*, as well as for those whose interest does not embrace the more detailed study, *Anno Domini* will prove an interesting and illuminative survey.

GEORGE E. RATH

Militant in Earth. By EDWARD ROCHIE HARDY, JR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940. vii + 255 pp. $3.00.

Into six chapters Dr. Hardy has compressed the tale of the spread of Christianity from the days of its first mission to the present. The author well describes his task as one of sketching "the story of a frontier, the frontier between the Church and the world." To write a single short volume on a subject so stupendous is not easy, and every author who undertakes it is aware of the extent to which he lays himself open to criticism. But Dr. Hardy has succeeded remarkably well. He tells the tale with clarity and simplicity, and has illuminated it with several carefully chosen incidents and references from the sources. His work is particularly valuable in its treatment of Christian missions beyond the Roman Empire and in medieval Asia.

To the first five centuries the author has devoted over a third of his volume, and here he might be criticized for a lack of balance. The more modern period, especially the nineteenth century, receives a correspondingly scanty treatment, while the chapter heading, "The Age of Individuals," is hardly a happy description of a period characterised by nationalism and denominationalism. At times the author tries to compress too much into a single paragraph, which to the untutored reader may sometimes seem little more than a list of unpronounceable names. But, all in all, Dr. Hardy has provided the general reader with an interesting, freshly written, and competent account of the expansion of Christianity.

C. C. R.

The Bride of Christ: An Enquiry into the Nuptial Element in Early Christianity. By CLAUDE CHAVASSE. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1940. 253 pp. 8s. 6d.

This book, which traces the history of the nuptial idea of Christ the Bridegroom and His Bride the Church, should come under the province of the theologian. There is, indeed, little in it that the philosopher can treat, for the author does not consider the metaphysical structure of marriage in the natural order as a prefiguration of the theological and mystical, but is intent only on the "mystical union that is betwixt Christ and his Church," which the preface states is the subject of his essay. Nor does he treat the philosophical problem, which is just mentioned in passing, the problem of symbolism. Between symbolism and allegory, offered by Chavasse as mutually

exclusive alternatives, there is the analogical approach, not even mentioned here, worked out by St. Thomas and some of his commentators like John of St. Thomas, Cajetan, and others. This analogical approach, so fruitful, not only in theology but also in philosophy, especially the metaphysical analogy of proportion which differs from the analogy of attribution and metaphorical analogy, would have enriched the author's unfolding of the Nuptial Idea which he claims "has been forgotten," notwithstanding the numerous Catholic theological and mystical writings on the subject. The analogical method, too, would have enabled Chavasse to see that the emphasis in the Middle Ages on the individual soul as the bride of Christ, and the pre-eminence of the Blessed Virgin Mary, in no way eclipsed the Church-Bride relationship to the Christ-Bridegroom. It is regrettable that the implications of this doctrine for modern times are touched upon so sketchily in the last chapter. The casual allusions, and the short Appendix A, on some nature myths among the primitives, hardly justifies the publisher's blurb that some readers may "care more eagerly for the folklore and the history of European imagery" than for the theology and liturgy of this book.

EMMANUEL CHAPMAN

Andligt och världsligt regemente hos Luther. By GUSTAF TÖRNVALL. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1940. xv + 231 pp. Kr. 4:75.

Contemporary Swedish theologians have made many lasting contributions in the field of Luther-research. Arvid Runestam has examined Luther's doctrine of Christian liberty, Torsten Bohlin has given us a lengthy treatise on "God-faith" and "Christ-faith" in Luther's theology, Gustaf Ljunggren's researches are concerned particularly with the concepts of sin and guilt in the great reformer's writings, Sigfrid von Engeström treats of the idea of forgiveness, and Ragnar Bring has studied the dualism in Luther. This work has been going on at both of the national universities, Uppsala and Lund. Gustaf Aulén and Anders Nygren are familiar names. The former, now Bishop of Strängnäs, was for many years Professor of Dogmatics at Lund, where together with Nygren he did so much creative work in developing the "Lundensian Theology." Particular mention may also be made of the earlier leaders: Nathan Söderblom, the late Primate of Sweden, and Einar Billing, the late Bishop of Västerås. The latter was probably the pioneer of all. Almost without exception the productions of the Swedish theologians in the field of Luther-research have been related to the discipline of Systematic Theology.

Gustaf Törnvall has now added to the already impressive list of productions a thorough study—a dissertation at the University of Lund—anent the spiritual and temporal "regimes" in Luther. (It is difficult to find an exact English equivalent for the Swedish word "regemente"; but in addi-

tion to "regimes," the renderings "spheres," "realms," or "structures" might be suggested. This is unquestionably one of the most complicated problems in Luther's theology.

In Luther's thinking the drama of the good versus the evil looms large. The kingdom of Satan and the kingdom of God are two mighty powers, and there is constant warfare between them. A spirit of pessimism in regard to this conflict is often dominant in Luther's thinking, but when a definitive credo was to be given (as in his hymn, *Ein feste Burg*) he made bold to proclaim: "The kingdom ours remaineth."

Luther does not consider the social and political structures as necessarily evil, although they can become that. A regent who rules in obedience to the word and will of God is included in the spiritual "regime"; when the same power considers itself *causa principalis*, however, not acknowledging the Creator and not willing to be His instrument, then such action becomes *opus diaboli*. Of particular interest is Törnvall's chapter concerning dualism in world-view: *politia* and *religio; iustitia christiana* and *iustitia civilis;* the Creator and the creature (pp. 129 ff.).

The bibliography is well-pruned, listing only such works as have a very direct bearing on the immediate subject.

EVALD BENJAMIN LAWSON

The Elizabethan Sermon. A Survey and a Bibliography. By ALAN FAGER HERR. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940. 169 pp.

This book is a dissertation submitted for the Ph.D. in English at The University of Pennsylvania. As the title suggests, it is only a cursory survey of a large and important subject. Dr. Herr begins by discussing the vogue of the Elizabethan sermon, the manner in which it was delivered, and the state of texts of the many which were printed. In a final chapter, he analyzes various styles in which the sermon was written, showing effectively that the linguistic tricks of the preachers were most of them imitations of the practice of Isocrates, Cicero, and the medieval rhetoricians. In his examination of the contents of the homilies, Dr. Herr has apparently restricted his attention to conventional exhortations on scriptural texts. This limitation of his scope forces him to ignore some of the most important aspects of the subject. Many of the sermons, particularly the official ones preached to order at Paul's Cross and the Spital, played a powerful part in molding public opinion on ethical, social, and political questions. For example, William Perkins' *Treatise on Vocations* is a very important social document, and the operation of his mind is often Protestant casuistry at its best. The important subject of the Elizabethan sermon as a herald of ideas and a guide to conduct still invites careful study.

The most valuable part of Dr. Herr's book is a sixty page bibliography of all the Elizabethan sermons in the Short Title Catalogue and of, at least, a dozen which had escaped the notice of its compliers.

OSCAR J. CAMPBELL

Is God Emeritus? By SHAILER MATHEWS. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. ix + 93 pp. $1.50.

With characteristic pungency and directness, Dean Shailer Mathews carries forward the thought of his earlier book, *The Growth of the Idea of God*. He argues that, since all ideas of God are relative to cultural conditions, it behooves us to revise theistic belief in the light of contemporary needs. The transcendent God of Christian doctrine and philosophical theism is "emeritus." Our ideas of God should now be based upon scientific findings, although religion retains a distinctive function because it "is the reciprocal personal relationship of humanity with those personality-producing activities of its cosmic enviroment with which it is organically related" (p. 31). Prayer should be neither petition for divine intervention, nor acquiescence in a fixed fate, but experimental discovery. The will of God should not be identified with particular claims concerning revelation or conscience; it should be identified, rather, with that cosmic activity of integration, called "love," which has produced personalities. The findings of New Testament criticism, which the author discusses in a frank and sympathetically written passage, may require much revision in Christology; but they do not in the least undermine the faith that in the life, teachings and cross of Jesus was disclosed a cosmic power of such a nature "that appeal to spiritual forces must be ultimately successful" (p. 81).

It is impossible to appraise even so brief a book without raising far-reaching questions concerning its fundamental orientation. The author writes as though belief in God as the transcendent ground of cosmic process and belief in God as personality-producing activity within that process were mutually exclusive alternatives. He then declares that the latter belief rests, not on metaphysics, but "on data given by science" (p. 31). Yet the only evidence to which he appeals is the fact that personality has emerged—a fact which is neither distinctively "scientific" nor, in itself, sufficient to settle religious questions. The scoundrels, weaklings, and tyrants of history are just as much due to "the personality-producing activities of the cosmos" as is Jesus Christ. Thus scientific and historical considerations alone give no adequate grounds for the belief that love will triumph; for, as the author himself repeatedly observes, cosmic activity has produced individuals and social patterns which prevailingly fall far short of the spirit of Christ. In a word, immanental categories cannot bridge the hiatus between a conception of God based on generalization from the empirical existence of man, and "the acceptance of Jesus Christ as the revelation of God" (p. 80). Therefore, Dean Mathews fails to show how, without even mentioning the Resurrection in this connection, he can regard the cross as the symbol "not of a defeated God, but of the way in which the personality-producing activities of the universe operate" (p. 83). Elsewhere (p. 63), he regards suffering as an inevitable result of opposition to these same activities.

D. E. R.

The Springs of Creative Living: A Study of Human Nature and God. By ROLLO MAY. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1940. 271 pp. $2.00.

The current attempt at a rapprochement between dynamic psychology and religion, to which this author contributes, is attended by some discordant notes. One of these is the undertone of emphasis upon psychological analysis, which frequently has a surer ring than the subsequent plan of religious reconstruction. Another is the slurring of the fact that numerous psychologists fail to share the present enthusiasm of some for describing psychological problems in religious terms, while in some directions suspicion of the entire psychoanalytical approach continues to be cherished. To say this is to call attention to the numerous difficulties involved in the application of depth psychology for religious purposes, and to propose that such an application may be judged partly on the grounds of the difficulties avoided.

From this point of view, there is much to be said for the effectiveness of Dr. May's effort. Unnecessary technical terms and background discussions of theory are suppressed or relegated to the appendix. The hazardous choice of a unified method of characterizing people's present spiritual predicament is happily made by selection of the concept of egocentricity as presented by Kunkel. There is no attempt to disguise the heavy borrowings from such writers as Kunkel, Jung, and Horney; at the same time the author develops a distinctive treatment of his own.

The thesis of the book is that neurotic disorders require a religious cure, which is found through the affirmation of values demanding the renunciation of egocentricity. These values establish the meaning of one's life, and appearing variously in individualized terms, they are essentially the central values of Christian theologies. This general thesis has been presented before by several writers. What seems to be new and distinctive about the present treatment is the author's elaboration of a consistent, dialectical treatment of the integration of personality, which finds its counterpart in a dialectical theology that betrays the influence of Berdyaev.

This dialectical interpretation is open to criticism, although not necessarily on the ground on which Dr. May states his expectation that it will be attacked, which is that the prevailing tradition is to oversimplify personality by treating it as unidimensional. G. W. Allport and others have produced theories of personality that avoid both this oversimplified view of integration around one focal point, and the alternative dialectical conception of transcendent solution through a struggle of opposites. The latter interpretation, which Dr. May synthesizes from Freud, Jung, Adler, and others, while concise and plausible, especially in ethical applications, soon becomes a refrain embodying its own strong semblance of oversimplification. Dialectically, creative living becomes the synthesis of a perpetual interplay between the subjective and the objective, romanticism and authoritarianism, freedom and determination. The poles of this dialectic are regarded as given at the outset, thereby reopening the dubious controversy concerning

such theoretical constructs as Freud's death instinct and Jung's collective unconscious. At any rate, lack of sufficient attention is paid to the details of the dynamic development of the individual, and notably in cited case material, to the all-important and basic parent-child relationship.

On the other hand, insistence upon the dialectic of individual integration promotes a rather wholesale disregard for cultural and social factors. It was suggested above that the author's selection of egocentricity as his principal theme was a happy choice, but this is precisely because egocentricity seemingly corresponds summarily to the prevailing conflicts within the social order. He recognizes the operation of this factor, since he needs it for his theological exposition of the good life, but he does not give it anything like the prominence that it deserves.

The book is apparently addressed to religious workers. It would seem, therefore, that they would get more out of it if it emphasized clinical crises less and threw more boldly into relief the innumerable everyday difficulties of a less cosmic character, such as are not entitled to the formal name of neuroses, but which account for most of the wear and tear to which individual, family, and social life is subject.

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

Preaching in These Times. The Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. 172 pp. $2.00.

These are the sixty-fifth in a distinguished series of lectures on preaching, begun in 1871 and delivered before the Divinity School at Yale. It is usual for the lectures to be given by one man, but "these troublous" times led the Faculty of the Divinity School to invite six outstanding clergymen to share the 1940 series. These men are: George A. Buttrick, W. Aiken Smart, Arthur H. Bradford, Elmore M. McKee, Edwin McN. Poteat, and Ernest F. Tittle. The publisher's blurb stresses the representative character of the group and the resulting strength of material. The group is representative geographically and denominationally; but all six lecturers represent the wing of liberal theology, with strong emphasis on the social implications of the Gospel and on pacificism in politics. This is not said to condemn, for the combined efforts of these men makes an excellent presentation of their point of view, each lecturer having a particular area for consideration. Dr. Buttrick's interpretation of the "whole Gospel" is most warmly pastoral; Dr. McKee, in the longest chapter in the book, stresses particularly the inclusiveness of the preacher's task without sacrificing incisiveness of insight; Dr. Smart, appealing for a restatement of the cardinal Christian doctrines, provides an excellent analysis of the effects of scientific and industrial development on the theology of the man of the street.

ROBERT G. ANDRUS

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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